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Abstract 
 
i 
 
Profitability Change Persistence, Managerial Overreaction, 
and Dividend Policy 
 
Xiehua Ji 
 
Abstract 
This thesis proposes a hypothesis that managerial overreaction of past earnings 
performance which can affect managers’ dividend decisions. This proposition claims 
that managers can extrapolate earnings growth/decline over the past few years into 
the future, and then managers may make dividend decisions based on their 
expectation of such extrapolation. Managerial extrapolation is different from 
managerial overconfidence, although they both belong to managerial overreaction.  
To examine this hypothesis, we follow Fama and French (2001), Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a) and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)’s methodology to test whether managerial 
extrapolation which is represented by firms’ earnings persistent growth/decline over 
the past five or three years can affect managers’ decisions to 
initiate/continue/increase/pay/omit/decrease dividends, given other conventional 
determinants including size, investment opportunities, profitability, and risks. We 
find robust evidence that indicators of managerial extrapolation have significant 
effects on firms’ dividend decisions during the in-sample period from 1963 to 2000, 
the out-of-sample period from 2001 to 2013, and the whole sample period from 1963 
to 2013 in the U.S. market before or after controlling for recession or financial crisis. 
Further, we find that firms who initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends after 
experiencing past growing earnings do not show future growth in profitability, while 
firms who omit/decrease dividends after experiencing past declining earnings do not 
show future decline in profitability. Our findings hold when we use alternative 
measurements to form proxies of managerial extrapolation by using positive EPS 
only, by using past sales growth/decline, or by using past free cash flow 
growth/decline. Importantly, we find that the significant impact of managerial 
extrapolation on firms’ dividend decisions is not affected after considering other 
managerial behaviour factors including catering incentive to dividends (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004a) and different measurements of managerial overconfidence based on 
option-holding activities, investment ratio, or managers’ net-buying activities on 
their own firms’ shares. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The behaviour of managers in corporate finance is becoming one of main streams in 
corporate finance textbooks and the investigation of managers’ behaviour is one of 
its main branches. Managers’ behaviour bias includes ‘overconfidence’ 
(overestimate, overplacement, and overprecision in psychology literature) and 
‘overextrapolation’; both belong to managerial overreaction. There have been 
widespread discussions about the impact of managers’ overconfidence on corporate 
decisions like merger and acquisition, investment strategy, and payout policy, and 
there is also literature about investors’ overextrapolation resulting in mispricing. 
However, the previous literature lacks discussion about the impact of managers’ 
activities in extrapolating firms’ future performance in making corporate decisions. 
A firm’s dividend policy is one of main distribution methods the firm can use to pay 
back investors’ profits. A firm’s dividend decisions can be affected by varying 
factors including fundamental factors like the firm’s profitability, size, and market to 
book ratio, and it can also be affected by managers’ behavioral factors like 
extrapolation which we will discuss in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1    Introduction 
 
2 
 
1.2. Background 
1.2.1. Investors’ irrationality and managers’ irrationality in behaviour 
finance 
Before the rise of behaviour finance as one of main explanations for phenomena in 
the financial markets, the conventional finance paradigm assumed that agents are 
rational in updating their knowledge after correctly understanding new information, 
and then making decisions based on it (Baker and Wurgler, 2013). For the majority 
of conventional research on financial markets, managers and investors have fully 
rational expectations and preferences, and make decisions by following the rule of 
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). Although conventional theory assumes 
that the market is efficient and both investors and managers are rational, the real 
market is inefficient because of limited arbitrage (Miller, 1977; De Long et al., 1990; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; D’Avolio, 2002), and there are risks and costs to correct 
the mispricing caused by irrational investors under limited arbitrage (Pontiff, 1996; 
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). 
Arguments based on irrationality of investors and managers were boosted 
around the mid-1990s when some phenomena in the financial markets could not be 
fully explained by conventional theories (Baker and Wurgler, 2012). On the one 
hand, investors may become irrational in making investment decisions under several 
explanations such as investors’ category views about financial instruments (Barberis 
and Shleifer, 2003), investors’ prospects based on reference points (Shefrin and 
Statman, 1985; Ferris et al., 1988; Huddart et al., 2009), and investors’ biased beliefs 
caused by anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). On the other hand, managers 
may become irrational in making corporate decisions under assumptions such as 
managerial hubris may lead to overly payment in acquirers to takeover target firms 
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(Roll, 1986), managers’ overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier 
and Tate, 2008; Ben-David, 2013), managers’ overextrapolation1 (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974; Alti and Tellock, 2011), and managers’ projection biases 
(Loewenstein et al., 2003; Conlin et al., 2007). Whether managers are smart enough 
to detect investors’ irrationality and make rational decisions is another issue under 
discussion (Seyhun, 1992; Gao and Ritter, 2010; Baker and Stein, 2004; Greenwood 
et al., 2010). Besides, managers could make financial decisions based on the 
overreaction of the market, despite whether managers are rational or not (e.g. 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
It is difficult to analyse biases caused by behavioral factors, because biases 
cannot be simply attributed to only one behavioral explanation. Investors’ 
irrationality and managers’ irrationality may operate at the same time, and there 
could still be managerial behavioral bias under the assumption of rationality and 
standard preference (Baker and Wurgler, 2012). A detailed analysis based on 
multiple-channels of rationality and irrationality can be a better choice than a model 
with only one possible explanation. 
 
1.2.2. Managers’ behavioral biases and dividend policy 
We narrow down the discussion of behavioral biases to the topic of firms’ dividend 
decisions. After considering fundamental factors’ impacts on firms’ dividend 
decisions (Fama and French, 2001), behavioral biases from investors (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004a) and managers (Malmendier and Tate, 2005) also play an essential 
                                                        
1  To the best of our knowledge, there is no extant research focusing on managers’ 
‘overextrapolation’. The research of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Alti and Tellock (2011) 
are about extrapolation from individuals and agents, which can include both investors and 
managers. 
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role in affecting firms’ final payout decisions. In terms of investors’ behavioural 
biases, the catering theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; Baker and Wurgler, 2004b) 
describes investors’ demand on dividends and rational managers’ concern on 
satisfying this demand. Bird-in-hand theory (Gordon, 1959), self-control purpose 
(Thaler and Shefrin, 1981), and mental accounting (Shefrin and Statman, 1984) are 
also investors’ behavioral biases in showing possible irrational preference in 
dividends. In terms of managers’ behavioral biases, managerial overconfidence can 
cause changes in dividend policy. Managers who are overconfident in expecting high 
future cash flow will increase dividends (Wu and Liu, 2011), while managers who 
are overconfident in predicting high future investment need and costly external 
finance will tend to decrease dividends (Deshmukh et al., 2013). In addition, the 
theoretical model of Baker and Wurgler (2013) with the setting of full rationality 
concludes that managers can use dividends as a signal of future performance.  
Among previous literature of managers’ biases on dividend policy, theoretical 
argument and empirical evidence about managers’ overconfidence on payout policy 
have been better developed than that for argument and evidence about managers’ 
extrapolation on payout policy.  There is also plenty of discussion and practical 
evidence for the impact of investors’ overextrapolation on the biases in the financial 
market (e.g. Lakonishok et al., 1994; La Porta, 1996; Barberis et al., 1998; 
Greenwood and Hanson, 2013), but there are few papers about managers’ 
overextrapolation in affecting financial decisions.  
 
1.3. Motivation of the research 
The first motivation of this research is that the impact of behavioral bias can hardly 
be ruled out in analysing determinants of firms’ dividend policy. DeAngelo et al. 
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(2008) summarize previous literature about behavioral influences on firms’ payout 
policy. They conclude that managerial behavioral biases can be a powerful 
explanation for payout policy, as they “see no good reason to mandate an ‘either/or’ 
choice between conventional agency and behavioral influences on managerial 
decision-making”. Compared with conventional theory and factors claimed to affect 
firms’ payout policy, behavior-related arguments are newer and not discussed further. 
A ‘horse race’ with all fundamental factors and behavioral factors is required for 
better analysis in issues of corporate finance.  
The second motivation is that proper proxy for behavioral factors in explaining 
payout policy are still under debate. The catering theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a) 
indicates that managers tend to cater for investors’ demand on dividends, and Baker 
and Wurgler (2004b) find empirical evidence to support the argument that changes 
in propensity to pay is positively affected by investors’ demand on dividends for 
each appearance or disappearance of dividend payers. Baker and Wurgler (2004b) 
conclude that the disappearance of dividend payers after the 1970s is explained by 
the dividend premium which is the proxy of investors’ demand in dividends. 
Although Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) argue that the dividend premium (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004a) is only a proxy for firms’ risk and cannot directly explain the 
propensity to pay dividends, they also suggest that a more reliable proxy of 
behavioral factors should be developed to explain firms’ dividend policy.  
The third motivation of this research is the re-appearance of dividends. Dividend 
payers began to re-appear from 2002 (see Chapter 2 for details), after Fama and 
French (2001) came to the conclusion that dividend was disappearing. Several years 
later, researchers tried to investigate the cause of dividend fads in the U.S. market 
based on a sample period no later than 2004 (DeAngelo et al., 2004; Baker and 
Chapter 1    Introduction 
 
6 
 
Wurgler, 2004b; Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009). Therefore, it is worthwhile to 
investigate the cause of re-appearances in dividends by jointly considering varying 
conventional factors and behavioural factors after 2002. We suggest that the lack of 
U.S. firm-year observation after 2004 is caused by the change in the format of 
WRDS’ data set from FTP to XPF, when the FTP format of COMPUSTAT data has 
observations until 2004 and the XFP format of COMPUSTAT data has frequent 
updated observations. The FTP format of COMPUSTAT data uses data number as 
the name of items, while the XPF format of COMPUSTAT data uses data name in 
short as the name of items. This change in items’ name may cause inconvenience in 
applying the data from previous research. We also find that firm-year observations in 
FTP format COMPUSTAT data and observations in XPF format COMPUSTAT data 
are slightly different. These differences may not affect the conclusions of most 
research, but a robustness check is recommended for later research related to this 
data set. This robustness check by using different formats of data set and time period 
can be a sub-motivation of the third motivation. 
The fourth motivation is what has been mentioned in section 1.1.2 about the 
research gap in previous literature. There is still not paper focus on managerial 
overextrapolation in influencing dividend policy based on our knowledge. My 
research develops a proper proxy of managerial overextrapolation explanation for 
dividend policy through the dividend signalling theory. We hypothesize that 
managers may extrapolate future earnings performance after observing positive past 
performance, and then initiate/increase/pay dividends which are “sticky” or use 
dividends as the signal to attract investors. Although trivial practical supports have 
been found for the dividend signalling hypothesis by some researchers (e.g. Watt, 
1973; DeAngelo et al., 1996; Benartzi et al., 1997), it does not indicate that 
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managers will not use dividend as the signal to attract investors. In fact, when 
managers are overconfident or overextrapolated in estimating firms’ future 
performance, it can directly lead to the result that current dividend paying cannot 
signal positive future earnings performance. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that managers who overextrapolate firms’ future growth tend to currently 
initiate/increase/pay dividends or use dividends as the tool to attract investors based 
on dividend signalling theory. 
The last, but not least, motivation for this research is that there is limitation in 
the applicability of some previous managerial behavioral factors in explaining 
corporate finance based on a large size of sample. Most previous literature on 
managerial optimism (confidence) and information content of dividends have only 
limited size of observations. They mostly focus on large firms or firms with 
observable past long-term performance (e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2008; DeAngelo et al., 1996; Koch and Sun, 2004), but other 
literature on dividend payers’ characteristics have much larger sizes of observations 
(e.g. Fama and French, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; Hoberg and Prabhala, 
2009). A wide applicable proxy for managerial behavioral factor is valuable in 
connecting most conventional factors and behavioral factors together in one model.  
 
1.4. Contribution to the literature 
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. Compared with previous 
literature, this thesis is the first to argue that managers could extrapolate past 
earnings' patterns into the future, and this overextrapolation may lead to wrong 
dividend decisions of "pay too much" or "cut too early". Our hypothesis of 
managerial overreaction is related with Roll (1986)'s discussion on managerial 
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hubris, Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011)'s examination on managers' traits. This 
thesis also links managerial overextrapolation with psychology theory that 
individuals may overestimate the representativeness of limited samples and then 
blindly believe that the limited samples they observed can represent other samples 
(also called "rule of thumb") ((Kahneman and Tversky, 1974), and psychology 
theory that individuals tend to make decisions based on their past experiences 
(Jullisson, Karlsson, and Garling, 2005). Based on the assumption that managers 
tend to extrapolate past growing earnings into the future, we link managerial 
overextrapolation with firms' dividend decisions. 
This thesis also makes several contributions to the previous literature of 
empirical studies. The first empirical study in Chapter 3 discusses managers’ 
extrapolation on firms’ future earnings performances which lead to managers’ uses 
of dividends as a signal to attract investors, and then finds supportive evidence from 
the U.S. market. Chapter 3 investigates whether firms’ dividend policy can be 
affected by managers’ extrapolation, after controlling for: (1) Fama and French 
(2001)’ firms’ characteristics variables; and (2) Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s 
dividend premium. Based on the FTP format of COMPUSTAT data and the same 
sample period, which is from 1963 to 2000 as in the research of Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a), Chapter 3 uses the same Fama-Macbeth logistic regression method as both 
Fama and French (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2004a) use for ruling out the 
impact of fundamental factors on firms’ decisions of being dividend payers (Hoberg 
and Prabhala, 2009) or being new dividend payers (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). It 
also allows a direct comparison between the results of this research and the results of 
previous most relevant research as well as a comparison between the impact of 
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investor’ behavioral biases (dividend premium of Baker and Wurgler (2004a)) and 
the impact of managerial behavioral biases (overextrapolation). 
After bringing managerial behavioral biases into conventional models in 
investigating determinants of firms’ payout policy, this research also discusses 
whether dividend payers or new-payers’ extrapolation activity is ‘overextrapolation’ 
on the prospect of future earnings growth by using simple statistics methods. The 
research topic on whether firms’ past earnings performance can predict future 
earnings performance is still under debate (see Finger, 1994; Chan et al., 2003; 
Bradshaw et al., 2012), so it is still new and necessary to examine whether dividend 
payers or new-payers, who are affected by extrapolation based on past earnings 
growth, overreact in making dividend decisions.  
The second main contribution this research makes to the literature is that 
Chapter 4 examines determinants of firms’ payout policy in the out-of-sample period 
from 2001 to 2013. Chapter 4 also tests the robustness of indicators for managerial 
extrapolation in the larger sample period from 1963 to 2013. Since Fama and French 
(2001) record a sharp decline in dividend payers from 1978, most recent relevant 
research focuses on the discussion of disappearing dividends’ causes (see Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004a; Baker and Wurgler, 2004b; Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009; Kuo et al., 
2013). However, Julio and Ikenberry (2004) find a reverse in this decline from 2000, 
and they attribute this rebound to: (1) needs of firms to announce to investors that 
they will not waste excess cash flow; (2) signalling theory that firms pay dividends 
to attract investors in showing their confidence in corporate governance; and (3) tax 
cuts before the rebound. Julio and Ikenberry (2004) also find trial evidence that the 
reappearance of dividends is caused by catering requirements (Baker and Wurgler, 
2004a). We find empirical evidence in Chapter 4 that the percentage of dividend 
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payers increased from 2002 to 2013 with moderate fluctuation. After investigating 
regressions’ results based on the sample period 2001 to 2013, we find that the 
reappearance of dividends is caused by increases in the percentage of firms who 
experienced earnings growth over the past few years rather than the catering factor 
(dividend premium). This finding is partly consist with the argument of Julio and 
Ikenberry (2004) on determinants of reappearing dividends.  
Compared with most previous literature which ends its testing period around 
2004, Chapter 4 provides supportive evidence to this thesis’ main hypothesis that 
firms’ dividend policy can be affected by one form of managerial behaviour bias – 
managerial extrapolation – and finds that this behaviour bias is one of the key 
determinants for the reappearance of dividends around 2002. In addition, Chapter 4 
also contributes to the literature by investigating determinants of different dividend 
policy including dividend initiation, continuation, increase, payment, omission, and 
decrease in a larger sample period from 1963 to 2013 as well as in the out-of-sample 
period from 2001 to 2013, and finds evidence that the explanatory power of 
indicators of managerial extrapolation is significant and robust.  
This thesis makes the third main contribution to the literature by running a 
‘horse race’ among varying definitions of managerial behaviour factors which are 
claimed to affect firms’ dividend policy by previous literature. In previous literature, 
dividend premium (Bake and Wurgler, 2004a) reflects managers’ catering incentive 
to investors’ behaviour biases. It does not represent managers’ behaviour biases, but 
it is a manager’s rational behaviour after responding to investors’ behaviour biases, 
and it can be one of the behaviour factors rather than a fundamental factor for 
managers to make dividend decisions. On the other hand, managerial overconfidence 
is also argued to play an essential role in affecting firms’ payout policy (see 
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Ben-David et al., 2007; Cordeiro, 2009; Wu and Liu, 2011; Deshmukh et al., 2013). 
Compared with managerial overconfidence calculated by using varying methods (see 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2008, Campbell et al., 2011), 
managerial extrapolation may have connection with but is different from managerial 
overconfidence, given that managerial overconfidence and managerial extrapolation 
both belong to the definition of managerial overreaction. However, previous 
literature does not compare among these factors representing different managerial 
behaviour activities in explaining firms’ dividend policy. Therefore, Chapter 5 of 
this thesis contributes to the literature by comparing these factors representing 
different managerial behaviour activities, and finds that indicators of managerial 
extrapolation have consistent impact on varying firms’ dividend decisions (dividend 
initiation, continuation, increase, payment, omission, and decrease). In addition, 
Chapter 5 tests two alternative measurements of managerial extrapolation – by using 
sales or free cash flow to replace earnings per share (EPS) informing indicators of 
managerial extrapolation, and finds sales or free cash flow show similar results as 
results by using EPS to form indicators of managerial extrapolation. 
 
1.5. Research questions 
Chapter 3 launches the main research question of whether a firms’ growing/declining 
profitability over the past three to five years can affect managers’ decision to pay 
dividends. Given other conventional determinants of dividend policy, Chapter 3 
argues that managers tend to make dividend decisions by extrapolating future 
earnings performance based on past growing/declining profitability.  Based on the 
main argument and main research question, this thesis also answers several detailed 
research questions. 
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1. After controlling for risk factors (Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009), does dividend 
premium still have significant impact on dividend decisions (including propensity to 
initiate dividends, propensity to continue dividends, propensity to increase dividends, 
changes in propensity to pay dividends, propensity to omit dividends, and propensity 
to decrease dividends)? 
 
2. Are firms who initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends over optimistic in 
extrapolating their firms’ future earnings performance (overextrapolation)? 
 
3. Are firms who omit/decrease dividends over pessimistic in extrapolating their 
firms’ future earnings performance (overextrapolation)? 
 
4. Is the reappearance of dividends after 2000 affected by managerial 
overextrapolation? 
 
5. Do the same factors have the same impact on firms’ dividend policy within the 
extended period from 2003 to 2012? Could the same conclusion be made based on 
an extended sample period from 1963 to 2012? (robustness check) 
 
6. Is the impact of managers’ overextrapolation on dividend decisions robust after 
considering managers’ overconfidence and using different alternative proxy to 
represent managers’ activities of extrapolation (e.g. extrapolation based on sales and 
free cash flow)?  
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7. Can managers’ overconfidence affect dividend decisions, when there is a ‘horse 
race’ among the impact of investors’ behavioral biases, managers’ extrapolation, and 
managers’ overconfidence? 
This thesis will only focus on dividend policy of all existing payout methods, 
but not discuss about share repurchase which is also one of methods to give money 
back to investors for two reason, because share repurchase has its unique motivations 
like changing firms' leverage ratio and takeover deterrence (see Dittmar, 2000) that 
dividend does not have. Compared with dividend policy that pay out cash flow 
which is expected to be ongoing, share repurchase is usually used to pay out cash 
flow which is temporary (Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach, 1999). Our 
hypothesis on managerial extrapolation represents managers' extrapolation of past 
long-term growing earnings into the future which is also a long-term expectation, so 
it can hardly to assume a reasonable relation between managerial extrapolation based 
on past long-term earnings and firms' decisions of share repurchase. In other words, 
it is not correct to jointly test determinants for both dividend policy and share 
repurchase in one regression function. Therefore, share repurchase will not be the 
topic we are going to discuss in this thesis. 
 
1.6. Structure of this thesis 
This thesis contains six chapters including three chapters of empirical studies. 
Followed by the introduction in chapter 1, Chapter 2 summarizes the literature 
review on both conventional fundamental determinants and behavioral determinants 
of payout policy. After finding the research gap in previous literature, Chapter 3 (the 
first empirical study) examines whether managers’ extrapolation can affect firms’ 
dividend decisions by applying the methodologies of Fama and French (2001), 
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Baker and Wurgler (2004a), and Horberg and Probhala (2009). Chapter 3 also uses 
statistic tables to discuss whether payers who are extrapolating future earnings 
performance overestimate their future performance. With the motivation that 
dividends reappeared during the recent decade after a trend to disappear discussed by 
previous literature, Chapter 4 extends the sample period in Chapter 3 to 2013 by 
using out-of-sample’s COMPUSTAT data (1963-2013), and then compares results 
from in-sample data (1963-2000) to test whether our conclusion based on in-sample 
data holds in the out-of-sample data. With a concern on arising issues about the 
impact of financial crisis on finance and economics, Chapter 4 also tries to find 
evidence on whether financial crisis or recession have impact on firms' dividend 
decisions, especially for the most recent financial crisis, and whether other 
determinants of dividends will be affected when financial crisis or recession are 
brought into the analysis. The whole of Chapter 5 plays an essential role of 
robustness check by using alternative proxy of managers’ overextrapolation in 
models as well as bringing different measurements of managers’ overconfidence in 
regressions. Chapter 6 concludes. .
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Before the discussion about the influence of managerial overextrapolation on 
dividend policy, a literature review on possible determinants of dividend policy is 
necessary. Previous literature on payout policy’s determinants includes fundamental 
factors like size, current profitability, and market to book ratio (M/B), as well as 
recent-developed determinants like life-cycle proxy, liquidity, and investors’ demand 
on dividends (dividend premium of Baker and Wurgler, (2004a)). Some of the 
fundamental factors show robust significant impact on firms’ dividend policy (e.g. 
size and profitability), while results for others are mixed in previous literature (e.g. 
Market-to-book ratio and dividend premium). If a new theory can be developed on 
the issue of dividend policy’s determinants, it is necessary to control for these 
existing relevant factors when examining the impact of new-developed factors. 
In terms of the empirical test for examining determinants of dividend policy, 
the Fama-Macbeth logistic regression is widely applied (see Fama and French, 2001; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; Hoberg and Probhala, 2009; Kulchania, 2013; Kuo et al., 
2013) in large size samples. Except for the dividend premium (Baker and Wurgler, 
2004a), most other behavioral explanations for dividend policy focus on smaller 
samples (see Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Ben-David, 2007; Malmendier and Tate 
2008; Deshmukh et al., 2013). Although it is still difficult to apply most explanatory 
variables in one empirical model about determinants of dividend policy because of 
data’s avaliability, it is necessary to understand all main determinants of dividend 
decisions before this research moves to the empirical test. 
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This literature review chapter is divided into four parts. The first part (section 
2.2) focuses on literature on conventional non-behavioral determinants of dividend 
policy. They not only include basic firm-specific factors like size, profitability, and 
M/B ratio which are discussed earlier, but also include later-developed factors like 
firms’ life-cycle and firms’ liquidity. The second part (section 2.3) introduces papers 
which investigate behavioral explanation of dividend policy. They include investors’ 
behavioral biases and managers’ behavioral biases. The third part (section 2.4) is a 
summary of models and samples used by previous relevant papers, and the last part 
(section 2.5) is a conclusion on the value of this research based on all literature listed 
in this chapter. 
 
2.2. Fundamental determinants of dividend policy 
2.2.1. Firm-specific characteristics as dividend decisions’ determinants 
Fama and French (2001) summarized that payers’ characteristics including size, 
profitability, and investment opportunities could determine firms’ dividend policy. 
After the empirical findings of Fama and French (2001) in the U.S. market, later 
literature finds more international evidence that firms’ dividend policy is determined 
by fundamental factors. These main fundamental factors are listed as follows: 
Size is the first determinants of firms’ dividend policy. Dividend payers are found to 
be large firms in a wide range of literature. The impact of size on dividend decisions 
is widely found across different markets in varying countries (see e.g. DeAngelo et 
al., 2004; Eriotis, 2005; Reddy and Rath, 2006; Dennis and Osobov, 2008; Utomo, 
2008; Ahmed and Javid, 2009). The size of a firm is usually calculated by using the 
firm’s total assets, sales, or market capitalization (market equity). 
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Profitability is one of main fundamental factors significantly affecting firms’ 
dividend policies. It is usually proxy by earnings before interests divided by total 
assets. Profitability is also a robust significant determinant of dividend decisions, as 
it can offer firms the necessary cash flow to pay dividends. According to Miller and 
Modigliani (1961), firms can barely pay dividends if there are not sufficient earnings 
to support firms’ investment and distribution. The intense relation between 
profitability and dividend is supported by world-wide evidence that firms with high 
profitability tend to pay dividends (see e.g. Adaglu, 2000; DeAngelo et al., 2004; 
Omet, 2004; Reddy and Rath, 2006; Amidu and Abor, 2006; Dennis and Osobov, 
2008; Ahmed and Javid, 2009). 
A firm’s investment opportunity is found to have a negative relation with the 
firm’s dividend payment. A firm will tend to pay dividends if the external finance is 
costly (Myers, 1984) or agency cost exists (Jensen, 1986). Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a) use two measurements to proxy for firms’ investment opportunity: asset 
growth rate and M/B ratio, when the asset growth has been discussed by Fama and 
French (2001) as a good proxy for firms’ investment opportunities. Compared with 
size and profitability, investment opportunities proxy by asset growth or M/B ratio 
cannot provide robust significant impact on managers’ dividend decisions (see e.g. 
Fama and French, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; DeAngelo et al., 2004; Amidu 
and Abor, 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Ahmad and Wardani, 2014).  
Leverage is also a conventional fundamental determinant of dividend policy. A 
firm’s financial leverage exhibits the way the firm finances itself, and leverage can 
also reflect the ability that the firm has to meet its obligation. Leverage can be a 
proxy of a firm’s financial risk. In previous literature, firms’ financial leverage is 
usually evaluated as the ratio of total debt on total asset or the ratio of total liability 
Chapter 2    Literature Review 
 
18 
 
to total book equity.  Several previous papers have discussions on the relation 
between dividend policy and leverage, and find cross-country empirical evidence 
(see e.g. Baker et al., 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2006; Naceur et al., 2006; Ahmed and 
Javid, 2009; Ahmad and Wardani, 2014).           
 
2.2.2. Life-cycle theory, and liquidity as dividend decisions’ determinants 
The life-cycle theory is developed later than early fundamental dividend-determining 
factors like size, profitability, and asset growth. Life-cycle theory claims that young 
firms can encounter more investment opportunities than can be covered by internal 
finance, and they tend to preserve free cash flow for future investment rather than 
paying out to investors. When firms become more mature and more competitors 
enter the market, they cannot find sufficient projects with positive NPV, and they 
tend to distribute profits for avoiding high cost of retention.  
Life-cycle theory is widely supported by empirical studies. Fama and French 
(2001) find that dividend paying firms are usually large ones with low asset growth 
rate, and the sharp decrease in the number of dividend payers may be affected by the 
rise of young firms from 1978 in the U.S. market. Grullon et al. (2002) also find that 
firms with reducing capital expenditures tend to increase dividends. The slowdown 
of capital expenditures means that the firm moves into a stage with limited 
investment opportunities and becomes mature after fast growth. Julio and Ikenberry 
(2004) test the maturity hypothesis by averaging estimators from results of 
cross-section logistic regression for each quarter to get the model’s forecast, and 
variables age is used in these regressions to proxy for firms’ maturity. Firms’ 
retained earnings on total equity (RE/TE) and retained earnings on total asset 
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(RE/TA) are used as the proxy for firms’ maturity by DeAngelo et al. (2006). 
DeAngelo et al. (2006) find that these two life-cycle variables have significant 
impact on firms’ propensity to pay dividends. In the work of DeAngelo et al. (2006), 
the life-cycle stage of firms (RE/TE or RE/TA) was also found to have the most 
significant impact on firms’ decision of initiating and omitting dividends. Denis and 
Osobov (2008) extended the evidence of DeAngelo et al. (2006) of life-cycle theory 
in firms’ dividend policy to world-wide level to include the Canadian, British, 
German, French, and Japanese markets. The explanatory power of firms’ maturity 
(calculated as RE/BE) is even more significant in research at the international level. 
By re-defining dividend initiators as firms who pay dividends for the first time since 
its IPO, Bulan et al. (2007) find that capital expenditures to total asset ratio (a proxy 
of firms’ maturity) is positively affecting firms’ decisions of being initiators. 
Different from previous research, Bulan et al. (2007) comprehensively test the 
differenced or lagged/leading form of other factors like size, M/B ratio, and 
profitability (ROA), and find that the life-cycle factor’s impact on initiation 
decisions is robust. 
Liquidity is another factor found to affect firms’ dividend policy. Banerjee et al. 
(2007) claim that firms’ liquidity could have impacts on dividends decisions, 
because investors may have higher expectation of high-liquidity firms’ value than 
low-liquidity firms’ value in a market with fractions, and firms with low liquidities 
may also tend to pay dividends for the purpose of increasing their valuation. Kuo et 
al. (2013) summarize main liquidity ratios which can be used to proxy firms’ 
liquidities, and then find international support from different countries. Four main 
liquidity ratios used by them (Kuo et al., 2013) are turnover ratio (TUN), illiquidity 
ratio (ILLIQ) introduced by Amihud (2002), relative bid-ask spread (PS) put forward 
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by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and liquidity measure (LM) by Liu (2006). Kuo 
et al. (2013) apply these liquidity ratios in the Fama-Macbeth logistic regression 
used by Baker and Wurgler (2004a) and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009), and find that 
TUN is the optimal proxy of liquidity from international level evidence. 
 
2.2.3. Historical long-term earnings performance and firms’ dividend 
decisions 
It is interesting to find that prior literature mainly focuses on the current effects of 
factors on dividend decisions, and the impact from past value of determinants is only 
investigated within a short-term period (e.g. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 
1998; DeAngelo et al., 2006; Bulan et al., 2007; Kulchania, 2013). It suggests that 
the long-term effect of factors on dividend decisions could be a gap which needs to 
be filled, although the historical long-term pattern of earnings and dividends has 
been considered in prior analysis on the topic of dividend changes’ information 
content (e.g. DeAngelo et al., 1992; Charitou, 2000; Koch and Sun, 2004; and 
Charitou et al., 2010). 
The reason why profitability may be more important than other determinants is 
not only argued by Miller and Modigliani (1961) – in that profitability is the only 
limitation in determining the trade-off between investment and distribution – but is 
also discussed by several previous studies in that earnings stability, persistence of 
earnings’ growth rate, or expected future earnings are key determinants of firms’ 
dividend decisions (see e.g. Pruitt and Gitman, 1991; Veit, and Powell, 2001; Brav et 
al., 2005). Therefore, profitability combined with its long-term performance, which 
reflects the stability, persistence, or future expectation of earnings, should be an 
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important factor in affecting dividend decisions. However, no paper directly 
mentions forming a variable representing firms’ long-term earnings performance. 
Long-term profitability is only used as a criterion to selecting samples in some 
previous literature (see e.g. DeAngelo et al., 1992; Charitou, 2000; Koch and Sun, 
2004; Charitou et al., 2010). 
The historical long-term earnings’ effect on dividend is only mentioned by a 
few papers. The paper by Campbell and Shiller (1988) seems to be the earliest one. 
As an early study which uses the VAR model to investigate the impact of long-term 
historical earnings on expected future dividend affected by present stock market 
returns, it also uses long moving average of years’ earnings to forecast the present 
dividends as well as the present dividend growth rate, and finds that past long-term 
earnings do play a dominating significant role in these relations. Campbell and 
Shiller (1988) introduce a theoretical framework that present stock returns should 
reflect discounted expected future dividend, and present dividend increases are 
affected by past long-term earnings. Their research has two specifications: (1) their 
empirical analysis is based on the aggregated market level data rather than firm-year 
level data; and (2) only the change of dividends is analysed. DeAngelo et al. (1992) 
focus on dividend deduction and omission caused by firms’ past long-term earnings 
performance: a loss in earnings during 1980-1985. The cross-section logistic 
regression method is employed. The loss in firms’ earnings is found to be the 
essential but not the only condition of dividend deduction, and unusual items as the 
component of earnings also play important roles in dividend deduction and omission. 
Based on the arguments of Campbell and Shiller (1998) and DeAngelo et al. (1992), 
it would be reasonable to expect that there could be a statistically significant 
relationship between earnings’ performance (historical and/or present) and managers’ 
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decisions on issuing dividends, although the reason why this relationship may exist 
requires further discussion. It seems that managers can still make dividend decisions 
based on available information including past and present earnings performance, 
when future earnings may not be able to be forecast precisely (e.g. a random walk 
(Barberis et al., 1998)).  
Several other papers also only concentrate on the investigation of payers and 
their dividend changes, when the earnings-dividends relation is discussed. Pruitt and 
Gitman (1991) surveyed 1000 of the largest firms as early as 1991 when they found 
that historical variability of earnings and the earnings’ increase rates are important 
factors that affect managers’ dividend decisions. Baker, Veit, and Powell (2001) 
summarize most previous research all based on Lintner’s (1956) behavioral model 
and survey. They also conduct a new survey on 630 payers’ managers and conclude 
with the similar conclusion to these earlier surveys that stability of earnings is one of 
dominating factors influencing firms’ dividend policy. Following the papers by 
DeAngelo et al. (1992) and Koch and Sun (2004) about past earnings changes’ 
impacts on information content of dividends, Charitou et al. (2010) use descriptive 
statistics and OLS regressions to show that firms’ dividend decisions can tell a good 
story about future earnings performance when firms have current earning reduction 
after long-term past positive earning patterns. In addition, dividend decisions after 
longer patterns of earnings have more pronounced information content than those 
which have shorter patterns. As a summary of literature, it is reasonable to assume 
that: (1) managers can notice firms’ past long-term earnings performance before they 
make dividend decisions; furthermore, (2) a long-term earnings pattern may bring 
more significant impact on dividend decisions than a short-term earnings pattern 
could bring. 
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2.3. Behavioral explanation of dividend policy 
2.3.1. Investors’ behavioral biases: Catering theory and its 
counterarguments 
Following the similar data sample (Fama and French, 2001), Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a) construct four measurements of investor sentiment for dividends to represent 
the investors’ will to receive dividends. In the U.S. market, past non-payers tend to 
become dividend payers when the investor sentiment on dividends increases. On the 
other hand, past payers tend to omit dividends when investors do not prefer receiving 
dividends. As a further discussion, Baker and Wurgler (2004a) find that investor 
sentiment on dividends only affects firms’ decisions of paying dividends or 
not-paying dividends, but does not affect the changes in dividends’ amount. Later, 
Baker and Wurgler (2004b) divided the analysing time period into four parts; 
disappearance and re-appearance of dividend paying are found to be driven by the 
catering incentive (dividend premium) which is the difference between log of total 
dividend payers’ value-weighted market-to-book ratios and log of total dividend 
non-payers’ value-weighted market-to-book ratios. The catering theory of Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a) is supported by Li and Lie (2006) with empirical findings that firms’ 
dividend change decisions and the magnitude of dividend changes are significantly 
related to dividend premium, and the stock market rewards managers for their 
correct response to investors’ dividend demand which is proxy by dividend 
premium.  
The practical evidence for catering evidence is mixed. Inconsistent with the 
findings of Baker and Wurgler (2004a; 2004b), Julio and Ikenberry (2004) do not 
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find supportive evidence for the catering theory2. Among the three explanatory 
variables of Julio and Ikenberry (2004), industry dummy is mentioned as the proxy 
for firms’ investment opportunities instead of M/B ratio, while age variable is used 
to represent the maturity of firms. Beside testing the life-cycle theory, Julio and 
Ikenberry (2004) also tested catering theory by investigating the three-day window 
abnormal returns surrounding the day when the initiation decision is announced, and 
they found that the catering theory’s explanatory power becomes weaker when firms’ 
size and age are controlled. The catering theory developed by Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a) was also claimed to be less important in firms’ dividend decision by Denis 
and Osoboy (2008) through some statistical evidence (i.e. the gap between real 
propensity to pay and expected propensity to pay does not fluctuate as much as the 
dividend premium), and the life-cycle theory is found to have the most significant 
explanatory power in explaining firms’ decision on dividend policy.  
In another counterargument to the catering theory, DeAngelo et al. (2008) gave 
a good literature review on the behavioral influence of investors on dividend policy, 
and they concluded that behavioral explanatory power is limited in explaining firms’ 
dividend decisions. By following the methodology of Baker and Wurgler (2004a), 
Hoberand and Prabhala (2009) found an alternative way to explain firms’ decisions 
in being dividend payers and new dividend payers. They also found that the 
significant impact of investor sentiment/dividend premium disappears after firms’ 
idiosyncratic risk is controlled. Based on the empirical results of Hoberg and 
Prabhala (2009), they argue that the disappearance of dividend after 1978 is driven 
by risk factors, and the dividend premium of Baker and Wurgler (2004a) is in fact a 
good proxy of risk. 
                                                        
2 Julio and Ikenberry (2004)’s methodology has been shortly introduced in section 2.2.2. 
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However, Bulan et al. (2007) defined initiators as firms who issue dividends 
for the first time from their IPOs, and this definition is different from the one in the 
paper by Baker and Wurgler (2004a) who defined dividend initiation as new payers 
who were not payer the previous year. By using a new definition of dividend 
initiation as the dependent variable and using different three-year averaged 
independent variables in their regression models, the significant impact of catering 
factor exists after controlling other firm-specific factors including the idiosyncratic 
risk (Bulan et al., 2007). The influence of market sentiment (dividend premium) on 
dividend is robust after controlling the time trend and the proxy of life-cycle. As 
another recent empirical support for catering theory, Jiang et al. (2013) test the 
substitution effect between dividends and share repurchases. Jiang et al. (2013) 
divide firms’ distribution methods into eleven groups which represent different 
combinations of payout methods, and then use multinormial logistic regression to 
analyse the relation between these payout methods and their possible determinants. 
After controlling for systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk (Hoberg and Prabhala, 
2009), dividend premium (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a) still has a positive effect on 
dividend initiations and dividend increases.  
 
2.3.2. Managers’ behavioral biases: Overconfidence 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) define overconfidence as the overestimation of one’s 
own ability. However, in psychology literature, overconfidence includes 
overestimation, overplacement, and overprecision (Moore and Healy, 2008). There 
are several papers which tell different stories about the cause of managers’ 
overconfidence, but there are limited methods in estimating it. Finding a suitable and 
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specific proxy for a certain category of overconfidence is challenging. After 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) enlightened the literature by constructing 
option-holding based proxy for managers’ overconfidence, and developing a 
press-based index of confidence, some later papers extend their (Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005) main idea into larger sample size (see Campbell et al., 2011; Hirshleifer 
et al., 2012; Ahmed and Duellman, 2013). Hilary and Menzly (2006), and Hilary and 
Hsu (2011) also develop the psychology theory of “better-than-average” to form the 
proxy for managers’ overconfidence based on managers’ past excellent performance. 
Libby and Rennekamp (2011) design an experiment to collect participants’ (MBA 
students’) miscalibration (overprecision) and dispositional optimism (overplacement). 
Ben-David et al. (2013) use questionnaire to collect managers’ expectation on future 
stock market performance, and develop it to be a proxy of managers’ overconfidence 
based on the psychological theory of ‘overprecision’. 
Managers are overconfident in making financial decisions. CEOs are 
overconfident in corporate investments (Malmendier and Tate, 2005) and in making 
merger and acquisition decisions ((Malmendier and Tate, 2008). After the survey by 
Brav et al. (2005) on motives of managers’ payout policies, recent research on CEO 
overconfidence has begun to investigate CEOs’ decisions in issuing dividends 
(Deshmukh et al., 2013) and repurchasing (Banerjee et al., 2013). Managers who are 
overconfident also tend to issue overestimated management forecasts or a higher 
number of management forecasts (see Hribar and Yang, 2011; Hilary and Hsu, 2011; 
Libby and Rennekamp, 2012). 
Only a few papers discuss the relation of managers’ overconfidence and firms’ 
dividend policy. Ben-David et al. (2007) use a theoretical model to argue that an 
overconfident CEO in underestimating discounted rate tends to reduce dividends, 
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although their later working paper (Ben-David et al., 2009) finds no empirical 
support for this relation. Wu and Liu (2011) also construct a theoretical model to 
claim that a CEO who overestimates the firm’s future cash flow from current 
investment tends to increase dividends. Based on our knowledge, Deshmukh et al. 
(2013) published the first paper which successfully connects a theoretical model with 
supportive market evidence in dividend policy and CEO overconfidence. Deshmukh 
et al. (2013) follow the methods of Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) of forming 
option-holding-based and press-based proxy for managers’ overconfidence, and then 
testing the relationship between managers’ overconfidence and firms’ dividends. 
Their findings support their argument that managers who believe that the external 
finance is costly tend to reduce dividends. In summary, different definitions of 
managers’ overconfidence (e.g. optimism in forecasting future cash flow; optimism 
in believing future returns of current project) can lead to opposite results of dividend 
payment. The research topic about managers’ overconfidence on dividend decisions 
can be discussed further. 
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2.3.3. Managers’ overextrapolation on corporate decisions: a research gap 
in dividend decisions. 
Overextrapolation is different from overconfidence in several ways in terms of its 
definition and application: (1) In previous literature, the definition of overconfidence 
is applied as the overestimation of future from the current situation (Heaton, 2002), 
while the definition of overextrapolation is the applied as the overestimation of 
future from past situation (It is also one application of overestimated 
representativeness on limited samples (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) in topics of 
financial and economics); (2)As an important distinguish, overconfidence is about 
over self-assessment (overestimation and overplacement), while overextrapolation is 
the overestimation of a few observations’ representativeness (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974); (3) overconfidence can be the form of overprecision: the over 
belief in the precision of information (volatility), while overextrapolation is the over 
belief in the average performance (mean). 
Despite the difference between overconfidence and overextrapolation, it is 
surprising to find that literature about extrapolation in finance only focuses on 
investors’ extrapolation activities. There is not a systematic literature review on 
managerial overextrapolation that can be summarized. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
and Alti and Tellock (2011) discuss individuals and agents who can extrapolate the 
future from past information, and these ‘individuals’ or ‘agents’ should be able to be 
applied in the definition of both investors and managers. Therefore, when previous 
literature focuses on investors’ activities of extrapolation, we discover a research gap 
in managerial extrapolation in corporate finance.  
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2.3.3.1. Investors’ extrapolation 
It is necessary to know about theories and empirical findings of investors’ 
extrapolation before we move to the managerial extrapolation part because investors 
and managers usually partly share the same publically-available information from 
which they may extrapolate the future. The abnormal changes and phenomena in the 
financial market may be attributed to the interaction of investors’ behavioral bias and 
managers’ behavioural bias including the overextrapolation activities. The 
well-developed literature for investors’ extrapolation may enlighten the literature for 
managers’ extrapolation in the future. 
The paper by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) is the first which propose the 
“heuristic representativeness” theory, and proves this theory by using experimental 
research. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) find evidence that individuals tend to 
overweight the representativeness of small number observations, and overbelieve 
that these small number observations can represent the whole population’s 
characteristics. The “law of small numbers” theory by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
is discussed by Hirshleifer et al. (2015) as a theory which can be applied in various 
aspects of economics and finance. Hirshleifer et al. (2015) posit that a possible 
implication of this theory is that investors may inadequately believe that a firm is 
growing after observing realized growth in the firm’s earnings, although they do not 
test or try to find empirical evidence for this assumed example. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) find that glamour stocks’ performance is more 
persistent than expected, and they try to explain this finding by arguing that investors 
may extrapolate firms’ past performance into future performance and avoid the 
strategy of investing in value stocks. In the empirical findings of Lakonishok et al. 
(1994), earnings, cash flow, and sales are all used to represent firms’ ‘performance’. 
La Porta (1996) supports the argument of Lakonishok et al. (1994) by finding that 
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glamour stock overpricing is caused by investors’ overextrapolation from firms’ 
performance for the past five years.  
Another interesting argument is that of Avery and Chevalier (1999). They find 
evidence that football game gamblers’ betting activities follow the betting line, 
although the results may be random. Based on findings from the betting market, they 
argue that firms’ future prices may also be affected by the movement of past prices, 
because the football betting market has similar characteristics with the financial 
market.  
Previous literature on investors’ extrapolation is not only limited in 
investigating the influence of investors’ extrapolation on future returns of stocks. 
Greenwood and Hanson (2013) find that investors also extrapolate corporate bonds’ 
past default rate into the current default rate as well as future default probability. 
This extrapolating activity is one of the reasons for corporate bonds’ excess returns. 
Investors’ extrapolation activities are not only explained by practical evidence, 
but also theoretical models. Barberis et al. (1998) argue that investors pay more 
attention to a series of good or bad news rather than earnings announcements. They 
construct a theoretical model which assumes that investors overcare about the 
strength of evidence rather than the weight of this evidence, and then cause the 
overreaction of firms’ prices to the similar pattern of news. In other words, investors’ 
overextrapolation based on past news can lead to misprice. In the discussion by 
Barberis et al. (1998), investors may believe that a regime change in earnings is rare, 
so investors tend to update their attitude toward a company based on past 
information of a firm’s earnings. However, movements of earnings are assumed to 
follow a random walk. Therefore, an occasional stable increase in earnings could 
lead to the overreaction of investors who believe that earnings growth will be stable, 
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then leading to overprice. Specifically, they simplify the type of regimes into two 
categories: mean-reverting regime and trending regime, and they assume that 
investors will form their attitude about which regime a firm is in by observing past 
information on earnings. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) assume that investors’ views 
on certain stocks can be affected by the past performance of the same style stocks, 
and they use a theoretical model on bubble information to explain investors’ 
activities in extrapolating a stock’s future returns by using same style stocks’ past 
information on returns. 
 
2.3.3.2. Managers’ overextrapolation and overconfidence: implications of the 
research by Alti and Tellock (2014) 
In a recent study which distinguishes agents’ overconfidence and overextrapolation, 
Alti and Tellock (2014) establish a theoretical model which considers the impact of 
firms’ behaviour bias on return anomalies, and test their model empirically in the 
U.S. market to argue that overconfidence and/or overextrapolation can affect 
managers’ decisions which then affect future return anomalies. They also find 
empirical evidence that models with firms’ behaviour bias (overconfidence and/or 
overextrapolation) fit better than models without behaviour bias. In their paper, Alti 
and Tellock (2014) find that overconfident managers overbelieve soft information 
but ignore fundamental factors, while overextrapolative managers overbelieve the 
persistence of firms’ profitability. Overconfident managers tend to overfocus on soft 
information and underevaluate the importance of real profitability and then 
undervalue firms’ short-term prices, and overextrapolative managers tend to 
overprice their firms based on current information of profitability. 
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Alti and Tellock (2014) form both their proxies for agents’ overconfidence and 
overextrapolation from firms’ profitability. The persistence of profitability represents 
agents’ overextrapolation, while the degree of abnormal returns relay on profitability 
negatively reflects agents’ overconfidence. This approach indicates that managers’ 
overconfidence and overextrapolation may at least partly come from the same source 
of fundamental factors, and managers’ behaviour can be affected both by 
overconfidence and overextrapolation at the same time.  
A research gap for the literature of extrapolation is the impact of extrapolation 
on firms’ dividend policies. There is still no paper which discusses and investigates 
the relation between managers’ extrapolation and managers’ dividend decisions. As 
a conclusion of previous literature in this section, managers may have similar 
extrapolating activities as investors can have by using same publically available 
information. Thus, the research question on managers’ overextrapolation on dividend 
decisions remains unanswered and was worthwhile investigating. 
   
2.4. The covering period, sample size, and models of relevant empirical 
research 
As a summary of previous literature on determinants of dividend policy, different 
models and variables setting may lead to opposite conclusions. As has been 
discussed in section 2.3.1, the dividend premium of Baker and Wurgler (2004a) loses 
its explanatory power in the research of Hoberg and Probhala (2009) which uses 
Fama-Macbeth’s logistic regression model, but shows robust impact in the paper by 
Bulan et al. (2007) which uses moral hazard model and the multinormial regression 
model of Jiang et al. (2013). Results may also be sensitive to investigate time period, 
considering the fact that there are several drops and raise of dividends since 1963 
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(Baker and Wurgler, 2004b). It is meaningful to discover detailed differences in 
previous relevant papers’ model choosing, variable setting, and investigated time 
period, and then choose proper model(s), variables, and extended/isolated time 
period in this research.
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Table 2.1 Key empirical research (after 2000) on determinants of dividend policy: models and main results  
Literature Explanatory factors test Regression model Main results 
Fama and 
French (2001) 
profitability (E/A),  
asset growth rate (dA/A),  
market to book ratio(M/B),  
percent of NYSE firms with 
the same or lower market 
capitalization (NYP) 
Logistic regression: Firms' profitability and size is 
positively related with the 
probability of paying dividends; 
firms' investment opportunities 
and asset growth rate is 
negatively related with the 
probability of paying dividends. 
Baker, Veit, and 
Powell (2001) 
22 factors including past 
dividends, stability of 
earnings, current earnings, 
and expected future 
earnings 
Questionnaire Stability of earnings, current 
earnings, and future earnings are 
three most important 
determinants of dividend 
decisions 
Julio and 
Ikenberry 
(2004) 
Size (Market-cap),  
age,  
industry dummies 
Logistic regression Firms' size and age have 
significant impact on the 
likelihood of paying dividends; 
Firms in different industries have 
varying likelihood of paying 
dividends.  
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Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a; 
2004b) 
NYSE market capitalization 
percentile (NYP), 
market to book (M/B), 
asset growth (dA/A), 
profitability (E/A),  
catering variable (dividend 
premium: the logarithmic 
difference between the 
value-weighted M/B ratio of 
payers and nonpayers) 
Logistic regression, and then OLS regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propensity to continue dividends and propensity to list-pay dividends 
are also test. 
Firms' size and profitability have 
robust significant effect on 
propensity to 
initiate/continue/list-pay 
dividends, while investment 
opportunity and dividend 
premium have significant effect 
on propensity to initiate/list-pay 
dividends.  
Hoberg and 
Probhala (2009) 
Size (NYP),  
Market to book (M/B),  
asset growth (dA/A),  
profitability (E/A), 
Idiosyncratic risk (standard 
deviation of residuals from 
the CAPM),  
systematic factor (standard 
deviation of the predicted 
value from the CAPM) 
Logistic regression, and then OLS regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propensity to initiate dividend, and propensity to change dividends are 
also test. 
Firms' size, investment 
opportunities, profitability, and 
risk factors have robust 
significant effect on firms' 
decisions of paying/initiating 
dividends. The dividend premium 
losses its significant impact on 
firms' decisions of paying 
dividends after controlling risk 
factors. 
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Brav, Graham, 
Harvey, and 
Michaely (2005) 
23 financial executives' 
views about payout policy 
Survey and Interview Historical level of dividends, 
external funds, stable and 
positive earnings, institutions 
demand on dividends, and 
investment opportunities are 
important factors which affect 
executives' dividend decisions. 
DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and 
Stulz (2006) 
Life-cycle variable 
(RE/TE),  
Total equity to total assets 
(TE/TA),  
Profitability (ROA),  
Lagged profitability (ROA 
in prior year),  
Sales growth rate (SGR),  
Size (NYP),  
Cash holdings (Cash/TA), 
dividends in prior year 
(Indicator variable) 
Logistic regression earned/contributed capital mix, 
leverage proxy, profitability, sales 
growth, size, cash holdings, and 
whether firms pay dividends at 
prior year have robust significant 
impact on firms' decisions to pay 
dividends 
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Bulan, 
Subramanian, 
and Tanlu 
(2007) 
Size ( ln(total asset) ),  
profitability (ROA),  
sales growth rate,  
market to book (M/B),  
life-cycle variable (capital 
expenditures/assets),  
cash-holding (cash/assets),  
risk (Fama-French 
three-factor betas),  
catering variable (dividend 
premium) 
Cox-proportional hazard model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“L_” means average over the past 3 years; Bulan et al. (2007) also test 
“F_” which is the average over the headed 3 years. 
Firms' size, life-cycle, 
cash-holdings, profitabilities, 
investment opportunities, and 
dividend premium have 
significant impact on firms' 
initiation (since IPO) decisions. 
Firms' risk factor (market beta) 
does not have robust significant 
effect on firms' decisions of 
initiation. 
Banerjee, 
Gatchev, and 
Spindt (2007) 
Size (NYP),  
market to book (M/B),  
asset growth (dA/A), 
profitability (E/A),  
turnover ratio (TURN),  
traded volume in the stock 
(DVOL),  
proportion of days with zero 
traded volume (NOTRD),  
illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) 
Logistic regression 
 
 
 
 
DVOL, ILLIQ, and NOTRD are also separately test to replace TURN. 
Firms' size, investment 
opportunities, profitability, and 
alternative measurements of 
liquidity (TURN, ILLIQ, NOTRD, 
and DVOL) have robust 
significant effect on firms' 
decisions of paying dividends. 
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Denis and 
Osobov (2008) 
Size (NYP),  
Market to book (M/B),  
asset growth (dA/A), 
profitability (E/A), 
life-cycle variable (RE/BE) 
Logistic regression Dividend decisions are affected 
by firm size, profitability, 
investment opportunities, and 
life-cycle proxy cross 6 countries. 
Deshmukh, 
Goel, and Howe 
(2013) 
Stock ownership, proxies of 
CEO's overconfidence 
(Vested options, 
longholder),  
market to book (M/B),  
cash flow (operating income 
before depreciaion/assets),  
Sales,  
Size (tangible assets),  
CEO tenure,  
leverage 
Random-effect tobit regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEO’s detailed activities in holding vested but un-exercised options 
are also test as “post-longholder” and “pre-longholder”3. 
 
 
 
Firms' stock ownership, 
investment opportunities, size, 
and leverage have robust 
significant effect on firms' level of 
dividends. 
 
                                                        
3 According to Deshmukh et al. (2013): “Longholder is a binary variable that equals 1 if the CEO held an option package until the last year before expiration at least once 
during his/her tenure and the option package held was at least 40% in the money entering its final year. Post-Longholder is a binary variable that equals 1 for all CEO-years 
after the CEO, for the first time, holds the option package until expiration. Pre-Longholder is a binary variable that equals 1 for CEO-years where Post-Longholder equals 0 
and Longholder equals 1.” 
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Table 2.1 introduces the explanatory variables, key models, and main findings 
of the main literature after the year 2000 on determinants of dividend policy. Most 
papers, which investigate firms’ dividend decisions of paying or nonpaying 
dividends, follow the Fama and French (2001) format in regression function. Among 
them, Baker and Wurgler (2004a; 2004b), and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) use the 
same Fama-Macbeth logistic regression technique as Fama and French (2001), while 
others use simple logistic regression except Bulan et al. (2007), who choose to use 
the Cox-proportional Hazard Model. As the research on dividend levels, Deshmukh 
et al. (2013) use the random-effect tobit regression technique instead of the logistic 
technique. Baker et al. (2001) and Brav et al. (2005) use questionnaire or interview 
to look deep into similar research questions. As a summary of Table 2.1, it is better 
to use logistic technique for research on dividend decisions of pay or nonpay, and 
Fama-Macbeth logistic regression is suggested for large data set, and for research on 
non-fundamental behavioral factors.  
As a summary of Table 2.1, previous literature widely use logistic technique 
for research on decisions of paying dividends or non-paying dividends. Specificly, 
Fama-Macbeth logistic regression is suggested for large data set where large number 
of firms and long time length are included. As Goyal (2012) points out, 
Fama-Macbeth have its absolute advantage in dealing with unbalanced panel data. 
The use of Fama-Macbeth method in our selected data also allow us to use the 
technic of Neway-West correction and get standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity as mentioned by Baker and Wurgler (2004a). Therefore, 
Fama-Macbeth logistic method is the optimal method for this thesis in terms of 
characteristics of our data (thousands of firms with unbalanced number for each year 
and cross around fifty years). 
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Table 2.2 Key empirical research (after 2000) on determinants of dividend 
policy: sample size and sample period 
Literature Sample size Sample period 
Fama and French (2001) 3679 for CRSP firms; 2919 
for COMPUSTAT firms 
1963-1998 
Baker, Veit, and Powell (2001) 188 usable responses from 
630 firms 
1999 
Julio and Ikenberry (2004) 12073 nonutility and 
nonfinancial firms in total 
1984-2003 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a; 2004b) All U.S. firms  for 
nonfinancial and nonutility 
industries in CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT 
1963-2000 
Hoberg and Probhala (2009) All U.S. firms  for 
nonfinancial and nonutility 
industries in CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT 
1962-2004 
Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely 
(2005) 
384 for survey and 23 for 
interview 
At the 
beginning of 
21st century 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) All U.S. firms  for 
nonfinancial and nonutility 
industries in CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT 
1973-2002 
Bulan, Subramanian, and Tanlu (2007) 2333 firms from IPO 1963-2001 
Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt (2007) All U.S. firms  for 
nonfinancial and nonutility 
industries in CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT 
1963-2003 
Denis and Osobov (2008) All U.S., Canadian, UK, 
Germany, French, and 
Japanese firms  for 
nonfinancial and nonutility 
industries in Worldscope 
1989-2002 
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Table 2.2 summarizes the research sample size and sample period for literature 
in Table 2.1. It is not hard to find that the methodology of questionnaire or interview 
limits the sample size to a smaller range than research with second-hand data. 
Besides, the sample periods for these literatures are all before 2004 when the 
COMPUSTAT changed its data format from FTP to XPF. It implies that a 
comparison between conclusion from FTP data format and XPF data format may be 
valuable, especially when the XPF format of COMPUSTAT data not only extends 
the time period to recent years, but also covers the time period of the FTP format of 
COMPUSTAT data.   
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2.5. Conclusion 
This section summarizes relevant literature on determinants of dividend policy in an 
order from conventional fundamental factors to behavioral factors. After Fama and 
French (2001) launch a good example of discussing which factors can affect firms’ 
payout policy, Baker and Wurgler (2004a; 2004b), and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) 
follow regression modelling technique of Fama and French (2001) to bring in 
catering factor and risk factors separately. By using a simple logistic regression 
method, some other papers, such as Julio and Ikenberry (2004), DeAngelo et al. 
(2006), Banerjee et al. (2007), and Denis and Osobov (2008), also bring to this 
literature other explanatory factors for dividend decisions. In condition of giving up 
large sample size, several studies, such as Baker et al. (2001) and Brav et al. (2005), 
focus on a small number of firms, but have clearer and more detailed investigation 
on this research topic.  
Although behavioral factors in explaining dividend decisions exhibit mixed 
results, we can hardly completely rule out the impact from behavioral factors on 
firms’ dividend policy. It is necessary to discuss more than what can be found in 
current literature, because different design of variables, different modelling 
technique, and different time period may even lead to opposite conclusions (see 
Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009; Bulan et al., 2007). 
However, it is also necessary to be more careful in discovering the world of dividend 
policy’s determinants, because sometimes designed behavioral explanations can be 
“contaminated” by neo-classical factors as Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) have argued. 
The sensitivity of explanatory factors on the model design and sample selection is 
another good reason to dig into this topic further. Based on the analysis in previous 
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literature, a ‘suit-your-case’ methodology is suggested in the model-using on this 
topic, and it seems better to cover as large a sample size as possible. 
This literature review section opens the door on a previously undiscovered 
explanation for dividend decisions: managerial extrapolation. When investor-related 
behavioral factors like catering factor have been widely discussed and applied, and 
manager-related behavioural factors like managers’ overconfidence have been 
developed well, the seat for managerial extrapolation in the research topic of 
dividend policy’s determinants is still empty. Previous literature has built a solid 
foundation for explanatory power of extrapolation in corporate finance’s other 
aspects rather than distribution policy. It can be extended to the area of dividend 
policy as well..
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CHAPTER 3 PROFITABILITY CHANGE PERSISTENCE, 
MANAGERIAL OVERREACTION, AND DIVIDEND POLICY 
---- an in-sample test from 1963 to 2000 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Existing research argues that current profitability has impact on firms’ dividend 
policy after controlling for firms’ characteristics like size and market to book ratio 
(e.g. Fama and French, 2001). Managers whose firms have positive profits must 
decide how to use their firms’ earnings: either distribute to investors or re-invest to 
capture investment opportunities. If a firm’s positive profitability keeps growing, it 
can create high intensity for managers to pay part of the earnings to investors, 
because the firm’s cash holdings are increasing with the growth of profits. Managers 
tend to initiate dividends when they are facing large cash holdings but few 
investment opportunities (Holder, Langrehr, and Hexter, 1998). In previous literature, 
rational managers tend to pay dividends when they expect excellent future earnings 
performance (Baker, Farrelly, and Edelman, 1972), because they may want to 
convey information to investors that their firms are going to perform well in the 
future (Miller and Rock, 1985). On the other hand, rational managers may also 
reckon investors’ demand on dividends, and cater to such demand of investors 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; Baker and Wurgler, 2004b). Previous literature also 
discusses the tax clientele effect and investors’ behavioral factors on firms’ dividend 
decisions (Shefrin and Statman, 1984). A firm’s final dividend decision seems to be 
the result of a balance among fundamental factors like the firm’s size and current 
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profitability, investors’ demand on dividends, and managers’ prospects of firms’ 
future profitability.  
In this chapter, we discuss managers’ rationality in making dividend decisions 
from a different view on managers’ prospect of firms’ future profitability. This 
chapter argues that managers tend to extrapolate firms’ past earnings growth, which 
may have lasted for three or five years, into the future. Imagine the situation that 
managers have observed past growing earnings for their firms; their optimism in 
firms’ future growth in profitability may also increase by overestimating the 
representativeness of this earnings growth. These managers may overextrapolate the 
past growing profitability into the future, given that future earnings growth is not 
certain4. Therefore, these overreacting managers may try to: (i) issue dividends 
because they believe that they will have sufficient earnings to support paying 
dividends, and also (ii) use dividend payouts as the signal to convince investors that 
they have strong belief to fulfil the commitment in bringing investors large payouts 
in the future according to the dividend signalling theory (Miller and Rock, 1985). 
To address the question of whether managers can overreact in extrapolating 
past earnings growth into the future, and then make dividend decisions based on 
such beliefs, we ask two main research questions in this chapter: 
(a) Does firms’ earnings growth over the past three or five years affect the 
managers’ decisions of initiating/continuing/increasing/paying dividends, or does 
firms’ earnings decline over the past three or five years affect the managers’ 
decisions of omitting/decreasing dividends? 
                                                        
4 There is little support from previous literature for persistence in firm profitability. For example, 
Chan et al. (2003) find little evidence that firms’ profitability growth rates are persistent. In terms of 
the earnings’ levels, the conclusions on whether past earnings levels can predict future earnings levels 
are mixed at best (see, Kothari, 2001; Bradshaw et al., 2012). 
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(b) Do firms who experience growing earnings over the past three or five 
years and then initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends exhibit non-growing earnings 
in the future five years, or do firms who experience declining earnings over the past 
three or five years and then omit/decrease dividends exhibit non-decreasing earnings 
in the future five years? 
By trying to answer these two questions we can also re-examine other 
determinants of dividend decisions. After jointly testing firms’ growing profitability 
over the past three or five years with other conventional determinants, we can make 
an in-depth interpretation of significance and robustness of conventional factors and 
past growing/declining earnings’ impact on managers’ decisions in 
initiating/continuing/increasing/paying/omitting /decreasing dividends. 
We propose this theory of managerial overreaction based on the theory of 
representativeness heuristic by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), which claims that 
people may overestimate their ability in predicting the possibility of an event. 
Overreaction is derived from the violation of Bayes’ rule (De Bondt and Thale, 
1985), and is examined by many empirical studies (see, e.g., Grether, 1980; 
Williams, 1938; Shiller, 1979). In addition, Psychology studies propose that people 
tend to make decisions based on past experience (Jullisson, Karlsson, and Gӓrling, 
2005). We argue that overreacted managers may overestimate the likelihood of firms’ 
future growing profitability by overestimating past growing profitability’s 
representativeness, and then overextrapolate past earnings growth/decline into the 
future. If the pattern in a firm’s past earnings growth/decline affects the manager’s 
belief about future firm profitability, managers in firms with growing/declining past 
earnings patterns may overreact to the stream of past increasing/decreasing 
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profitability and wrongly believe that increasing/decreasing profitability can last for 
a longer time in the future, and then make decisions to initiate/continue/increase/pay 
dividends or to omit/decrease dividends. 
For connecting managers' extrapolation on future earnings with managers' 
current decisions on payout policy, we need to go back to the discussion of 
managers' incentives to pay dividends. There are severalconventional theories and 
hypothesis on the reason why managers pay dividends including dividend irrelevant 
theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1961), taxation (Brennan, 1970), signalling 
theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1961), agency theory (Easterbrook, 1984) 
Bird-in-Hand theory (Gordon, 1959), and clientele effect (Litzenberger and 
Ramasawmy, 1979). Among them, the dividend irrelevant theory, agency theory, 
and signalling theory could have direct relation with managers' expectation about 
firms' future growing earnings. Miller and Modigliani (1961) claim that dividend is 
only the residual of earnings after firms' investment through dividend irrelevant 
theory. However, Lintner (1956)'s paper finds empirical evidence that managers 
usually try to keep dividend payout ratio stable in the long-run after deciding to pay 
dividends, which means that real dividends are sticky and not only the residual after 
making investment decisions.Agency theory indicates that managers may use 
dividends as a tool to convert information to investors, when asymmetric 
information exists. Therefore, firms tend to pay dividends, if (1) managers believe 
that there will be good earnings performance (e.g. growing earnings) in the future, or 
(2) managers would like to use dividend as a signal to attract investors.  
On the other hand, managers tend to believe that firms will also have growing 
profitability in the future, if they observe the past growing earnings and 
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over-estimate the representativeness of the past growing earnings. If managers 
over-believe in future earnings' growth based on past growing earnings 
(overextrapolation), they may pay too much or initiate too early in dividends. It does 
not matter whether dividend-paying decisions are triggered by over-believing 
sufficient earnings given firms' investment opportunities (dividend irrelevant theory), 
or by the intensive of using dividends to convert information to investors and attract 
them. Managers who overextrapolate past growing earnings into the future could 
choose to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends, and then suffer by maintaining 
dividends. On the opposite, managers who overextrapolate past declining earnings 
into the future may cut too early in dividends. In summary, the mechanism that 
overextrapolated managers tend to pay too much or cut too early can be explained by 
any dividend-paying theory that connects expected future earnings performance with 
current dividend decisions. 
The main predictions of our theory are that firms with growing profitability 
over the past three or five years will: (i) initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends, and 
will (ii) not have continuous increasing profitability in the future. On the other hand, 
firms with declining profitability over the past three or five years will: (i) 
omit/decrease dividends, and will (ii) not have continuous decreasing profitability in 
the future. To test the predictions of our theory on managerial overreaction, we first 
focus on firms’ decisions of initiating dividends given the condition that firms were 
non-payers in the last fiscal year, or continuing dividends given the condition that 
firms were dividend payers in the last fiscal year (as Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). 
Then we test firms’ decisions of increasing dividend given that firms were dividend 
payers in the last fiscal year (as per Li and Lie, 2006). Next, we discuss firms’ 
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decisions of paying dividends despite the condition of whether or not firms were 
dividend payers in the last fiscal year (as per Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009). We test 
determinants of these dividend decisions by running regressions of indicators for 
firms’ dividend policy on conventional factors to get firms’ propensity to 
initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends (see Fama and French (2001) as the example 
of regression models’ constructing), then we test whether the proxy for managerial 
overreaction (overextrapolation) can explain firms’ propensity to 
initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends, after controlling for catering factors 
developed by Baker and Wurgler (2004a). On the other hand, we use the same 
methodology to test whether managerial extrapolation of past declining earnings into 
the future can explain firms’ propensity to omit/decrease dividends. 
In detail, we use firms’ growth in earnings per share (EPS) over the past three 
or five years to proxy for managers’ overreaction reflected by managers’ activities of 
extrapolating past earnings growth/decline into the future. Firms’ patterns of past 
growing EPS are defined under two definitions: year-on-year (YoY) growth in EPS 
over the past three or five years; total (general) growth in EPS over the past three or 
five years. Before testing the explanatory power of firms’ growing profitability over 
past three or five years on managers’ dividend decisions, We first estimate firms’ 
propensity to initiate dividends, propensity to continue dividends, propensity to 
increase dividends, and propensity to pay dividends, by regressing firms’ status of 
initiating/continuing/increasing/paying dividends on conventional determinants as in 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a), Li and Lie (2006), and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). We 
then jointly test impact of firms’ past growing/declining EPS and catering factor on 
firms’ propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends. 
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We find that managers’ propensity to initiate/continue/increase dividends (as 
in Fama and French (2001) Baker and Wurgler (2004a), and Li and Lie (2006)) and 
changes in propensity to pay dividends (as in Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009) are 
positively related to their beliefs that positive past long-term earnings growth can 
last for longer in the future. In contrast, catering factor proxy by dividend premium 
does not have significant impact on changes in firms’ propensity to pay. Risk, 
specifically the systematic risk factor (see Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)) does not 
have robust significant effect on firms’ dividend decisions in the robustness check. 
As a further finding, firms that decide to initiate/continue/increase/pay 
dividends do not have constant increasing earnings in the future five years. For firms 
who decide to pay/increase dividends, they even have decreasing profitability in the 
future five years. This finding provides further evidence that managers who 
extrapolate past growing/declining profitability into the future overreact. 
We then analyse determinants of ‘pessimistic’ dividend decisions including 
dividend omission and dividend decrease as the opposite to decisions of 
initiating/continuing/increasing/paying dividends. If the theory of managerial 
overreaction holds, managerial overreaction may also be found among managers 
who extrapolate past decreasing profitability into the future, because managers may 
overestimate the representativeness of past decreasing profitability. We find that 
decreasing EPS over the past three or five years can affect managers’ decisions of 
omitting dividends or reducing dividends, given other conventional determinants and 
catering factor, and firms who choose to omit/decrease dividends after observing 
past declining EPS do not have consistent decreasing profitability in the future five 
years.  
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Finally, we test the robustness of managerial overreaction’s impact on 
dividend decisions by using alternative dependent variables and different time 
periods in regression functions. The robustness check provides evidence that 
significant impact of managerial overreaction on dividend decisions is robust 
compared with the impact of catering factor.  
The theory of managerial overextrapolation provides a new view in 
understanding corporate finance. The empirical evidence in this chapter shows that 
indicators of managerial overextrapolation has significant effects on firms’ payout 
policy, after controlling for other dividend-relevant factors. These findings are 
crucial for investors in the financial market, especially for institutional investors like 
pension funds that demand stable cash inflow from their investment projects. An 
overestimation on firms managed by overreacting managers may bring these 
investors declining future income, while an underestimation on firms managed by 
overreacting managers can imply missing potential profitable investment 
opportunities for investors. Theory and findings in this chapter can also help 
regulators formulate proper policy in regulating corporate payout as well as 
protecting investors. 
The rest of Chapter 3 is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the 
motivation and hypothesis of this chapter. We explain the data and variables in 
section 3.3. Section 3.4 introduces the logistic regression models we use to test 
relations between dividend decisions and their determinants. Section 3.5 discusses 
regression results, and then tests whether managers overreacted in extrapolating 
future earnings performance. Further robustness checks for the theory of managerial 
overextrapolation are also included in section 3.5. Finally, section 3.6 concludes. 
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3.2. Motivation and hypotheses 
My theory of managerial extrapolation is different from other research related to 
managerial overconfidence on corporate financial decisions. For example, 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) develop a theory that managerial overconfidence is an 
important factor of corporate investment decisions. They analyse 477 large U.S. 
firms and find that CEOs who show their overconfidence either through the holding 
time to exercise options or through habitual acquisitions of company stocks tend to 
overestimate future returns of their investment projects, and tend to overinvest when 
their firms have sufficient funds. Malmendier and Tate (2008) extend their theory of 
overconfident CEOs to the area of mergers and acquisitions. They find that 
overconfident CEOs of acquirers tend to overestimate the value of target firms and 
invest in value-destroying M&A projects. Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2011) find 
that overconfident CEOs are more attractive than conservative CEOs to firms, and 
overconfident CEOs are more willing to take risky projects because the flatter 
compensation offered by firms encourages them to do so. Deshmukh, Goel, and 
Howe (2013) find that CEOs who are overconfident tend to overbelieve that external 
finance is more costly than internal finance, so they tend to finance their firms’ 
projects internally by lowering current dividends. 
This research contributes to the literature in corporate payout policy by 
providing a new behavioral view to analyse determinants of dividend decisions, and 
shedding light on the behaviour of firm managers. In this chapter, we propose the 
theory that managers may systematically make wrong decisions by overestimating 
firms’ future growth/decline in profitability. Different from the work of Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a;2004b), which investigates rational managers’ catering activities in 
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satisfying investors’ demand on dividends, we relax the assumption of rational 
managers and discuss overreacted managers’ activities in overextrapolating past 
growing/declining profitability into the future. Our study about managerial 
overextrapolation is also different from those studies which claim that managers are 
overconfident about their own abilities (see Billett and Qian, 2008).  
The overreaction of managers in our setting is derived from managers extrapolating 
past success in earnings increases into the future. Thus, the first testable hypothesis 
in this chapter is: 
 
        Hypothesis 1 (H1): Firms that experience past growing EPS over the past 
three or five years tend to initiate dividends, continue dividends, increase dividends, 
or pay dividends, while firms that experience past declining EPS over the past three 
or five years tend to omit dividends, or decrease dividends. 
         
If firms extrapolate past EPS growth/decline pattern into the future, even though 
the future earnings performance is uncertain, managers in these firms can overreact, 
and make wrong dividend decisions.  
 
        Hypothesis 2 (H2): Dividend initiating/continuing/increasing/paying firms 
that experience EPS growth over the past three or five years will not show future 
EPS growth, while dividend omitting/decreasing firms that experience EPS decline 
over the past three or five years will not show future EPS decline. 
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The extant research provides evidence on the relation between firms’ current 
profitability (see Fama and French, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; Hoberg and 
Prabhala, 2009) or firms’ past profitability (see Benartzi et al., 1997; Bulan et al., 
2007) and dividend policy. My research is the first to analyse whether firms 
extrapolate certain past long-term earnings pattern into the future and hence make 
decisions on dividend policy. 
In terms of the motivation of dividends, dividends are usually paid to investors 
as permanent earnings when good future earnings are expected (Dittmar and Dittmar, 
2004)). Managers tend to pay dividends when they are expecting excellent future 
earnings performance (Baker et al., 1972). The signalling theory posits that a firm 
may use dividends to convey optimistic information to investors on future 
profitability (e.g., Bhattacharya 1979). It is also well documented that firms prefer to 
keep their earnings stable (Mikhail et al., 2003) for benefits like rewards by the 
market in the form of excess returns (Benartzi et al., 1997; Barth et al., 1999). Thus, 
a continuing stable good earnings performance is expected to be followed by an 
established good past earnings pattern (Chan et al., 2003), although other previous 
literature finds limited support for this. 
 
3.3. Data and sample 
 
3.3.1. Data  
Our sample covers all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms in COMPUSTAT from 
fiscal year 1963 to 2000. This sample coverage allows us to compare with the 
findings of Fama and French (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2004a). The data of the 
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number of shares outstanding, monthly and daily returns and prices of common 
stocks are from the Center for Research in Security Price (CRSP). All firm-level 
financial data are from COMPUSTAT. 
Following the sample constructions of Fama and French (2001), Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a), and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009), the sample includes firms that 
have the following Compustat data available: total assets (DATA6), stock price 
(DATA199) and shares outstanding (DATA25) at the end of the fiscal year, income 
before extraordinary items (DATA18), interest expense (DATA15), [cash] dividends 
per share by ex-date (DATA26), preferred dividends (DATA19), and (a) preferred 
stock liquidating value (DATA10), (b) preferred stock redemption value (DATA56), 
or (c) preferred stock carrying value (DATA130). Firms must also have (a) 
stockholders’ equity (DATA216), (b) liabilities (DATA181), or (c) common equity 
(DATA60) and preferred stock par value (DATA130). 
Total assets must be available at fiscal years t and t − 1. The other items must 
be available at t. We exclude firms with book equity below $250,000 or assets below 
$500,000. The COMPUSTAT sample includes only firms with CRSP share codes of 
10 or 11. In addition, we use only the fiscal year a firm is in the CRSP database at its 
fiscal year end. Utilities firms (SIC codes 4900 to 4949) and financial firms (SIC 
codes 6000 to 6999) are excluded from the sample. 
There are total 603119 firm-year observations in the original FTP format 
COMPUSTAT file from 1963 to 2000. After the selection criteria introduced above, 
there are 110607 satisfied firm-year observations left and go into the regression 
analysis. Except our indicators of managerial overextrapolation, the summary 
statistics for other main variables used in regressions are present in Table 3.1 
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(change number of other tables). All definitions for these variables can be found at 
Appendix 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics, 1963-2000 
Variables N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
NYP 110607 0.28 0.30 0.00 1.00 
E/A 110607 0.02 0.23 -14.70 2.42 
M/B 110607 1.74 2.11 0.12 137.18 
∆A/A 96431 0.07 0.28 -17.65 0.99 
sys risk 93817 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.74 
idi risk 93817 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 
 
3.3.2. Firms’ past growing earnings and dividend decisions 
Fama and French (2001) record a decline of dividend payers from 1978 to 1999, and 
Julio and Ikenberry (2004) find that dividend payers re-appear after 2000. Panel A of 
Table 1 lists total numbers of Payer, Newpayer, and Divincrease. The number of 
Payer and Newpayer peaked in 1977 and 1976, respectively. Meanwhile, the number 
of Payer and Newpayer both reached a historical low in 2000. These patterns are 
consistent with Fama and French (2001), who document a decline of dividend payers 
from 1978 to 1999, and those reported by Julio and Ikenberry (2004). The number of 
firms who increased dividends also shows the same pattern of increase and decline. 
For firms with past EPS growth, their total number peaked around 1978, and 
dropped to a low around 2000, roughly corresponding to the peaks and troughs of 
Payer, Newpayer, and Divincrease.
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Table 3.2 Measures of dividend payment and past earnings growth/decline, 1963 to 2000 
Table 3.2’s Panel A reports the numbers of Payers, Newpayers, Nonpayers, and firms with past earnings growth 
for past five years and three years. Panel B reports the numbers of firms who omit dividend (Divomission), firms 
who decrease dividends (Divdecrease), total number of firms, and firms with past earnings decline for past five 
years and three years. Appendix 3.1 contains detailed constructions of Payer, Newpayer, Divincrease, 
Divomission and Divdecrease Appendix 3.2 presents detailed constructions of EPSG (1-5), EPSG (1-3), EPSG 
(1,5), EPSG (1,3), EPSD (1-5), EPSD (1-3), EPSD (1,5), and EPSD (1,3). 
 
Panel A 
Year Payer Newpayer Divincrease EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1,3) 
1963 531 0 345 2 2 97 108 
1964 596 5 336 2 2 94 146 
1965 657 10 393 1 2 150 203 
1966 807 6 494 0 15 160 32 
1967 936 7 519 0 218 204 411 
1968 988 16 396 7 147 31 360 
1969 1044 7 402 36 103 327 316 
1970 1077 15 359 38 108 279 314 
1971 1067 17 292 26 115 193 373 
1972 1113 46 434 33 139 246 461 
1973 1650 84 1087 42 200 452 671 
1974 1896 112 1312 61 474 654 1046 
1975 1951 131 1195 87 536 804 1027 
1976 2051 177 1348 141 366 910 950 
1977 2092 138 1523 138 431 1024 1424 
1978 2069 92 1440 144 599 1054 1599 
1979 2052 50 1411 176 793 1392 1646 
1980 1977 46 1216 262 704 1544 1528 
1981 1837 41 932 233 483 1378 1284 
1982 1714 35 873 155 323 1122 1026 
1983 1595 38 593 93 215 808 742 
1984 1524 53 820 48 187 657 831 
1985 1435 47 697 42 227 639 935 
1986 1309 37 535 32 225 605 948 
1987 1258 44 592 23 166 589 887 
1988 1225 78 763 24 183 756 864 
1989 1204 75 730 37 310 838 1147 
1990 1194 65 670 45 361 818 1208 
1991 1158 41 528 61 357 899 1254 
1992 1171 54 487 62 279 900 1071 
1993 1174 50 564 65 274 1008 1130 
1994 1182 50 613 50 281 990 1188 
1995 1195 56 666 66 442 1130 1481 
1996 1159 41 584 73 434 1236 1542 
1997 1113 38 514 94 429 1252 1602 
1998 1063 31 485 78 405 1258 1498 
1999 974 27 429 78 340 1153 1328 
2000 886 26 376 64 326 1099 1309 
Mean 1314 50 709 69 295 757 944 
SD 435 39 355 62 187 424 478 
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Table 3.2 (continue) 
Panel B 
Year Divomission Divdecrease EPSD(1-5) EPSD(1-3) EPSD(1,5) EPSD(1,3) All firms 
1963 5 123 1 1 111 107 605 
1964 3 104 0 0 126 78 678 
1965 4 123 0 0 72 75 734 
1966 5 186 0 3 64 16 923 
1967 17 228 0 17 78 181 1221 
1968 18 267 2 24 26 300 1320 
1969 23 306 1 28 261 393 1461 
1970 52 348 1 79 383 575 1596 
1971 82 358 4 128 522 796 1707 
1972 42 308 20 125 637 789 1806 
1973 24 401 7 49 686 697 2605 
1974 39 387 2 24 553 417 2953 
1975 81 412 1 43 509 486 2997 
1976 42 385 2 51 472 628 2954 
1977 34 330 3 50 372 750 2882 
1978 49 384 3 102 374 799 2792 
1979 48 431 3 78 524 710 2897 
1980 73 587 2 82 573 747 3055 
1981 91 677 4 102 697 895 3098 
1982 82 610 5 137 868 1085 3289 
1983 105 702 14 292 1117 1431 3320 
1984 50 493 20 240 1159 1351 3491 
1985 62 491 27 167 1182 1190 3466 
1986 71 511 23 180 1195 1192 3405 
1987 69 472 26 152 1163 1195 3595 
1988 63 266 12 168 1011 1312 3619 
1989 55 287 4 103 870 989 3466 
1990 59 280 11 88 1021 945 3421 
1991 76 328 5 118 994 1112 3417 
1992 66 380 10 219 1009 1413 3537 
1993 69 349 11 198 1143 1396 3830 
1994 72 301 17 186 1282 1343 4143 
1995 39 264 11 112 1128 1062 4329 
1996 56 300 8 110 1010 1071 4530 
1997 46 327 10 116 934 1090 4754 
1998 37 290 15 140 877 1234 4524 
1999 36 236 13 153 959 1359 4198 
2000 53 222 8 158 1057 1309 4028 
Mean 50 354 8 106 711 856 2912 
SD 26 141 8 72 390 430 1166 
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Panel B in Table 3.2 lists total numbers of Divomission, and Divdecrease. The 
number of firms that omit dividends and decrease dividends both peaked in 1983, 
and came to a historical low in 1999 and 2000, respectively. Meanwhile, for firms 
with previous EPS decline, their total number peaked around 1983, and dropped to a 
low around 1998, roughly corresponding to the peaks and troughs of Divomission 
and Divdecrease. 
We create four type of dummy variables to capture firms’ past 
growing/declining patterns in EPS. We use EPSG(1-3) and EPSG(1-5) to 
respectively represent firms’ year-on-year (YoY) increase in EPS over the past three 
and five year; We use EPSD(1-3) and EPSD(1-5) to respectively represent firms’ 
year-on-year (YoY) decline in EPS over the past three and five year; We use 
EPSG(1,3) and EPSG(1,5) to respectively represent firms’ general increase in EPS 
over the past three and five year despite the possible fluctuation within the time 
period; We use EPSD(1,3) and EPSD(1,5) to respectively represent firms’ general  
decline in EPS over the past three and five year. 
There are four main reasons for use to choose dummy variables instead of 
continuous variables in this thesis. The first reason is that we can not create 
continuous variables to represent firms’ past year-on-year increase/decrease in EPS; 
The second reason is that the amount of earnings itself can be affected by many other 
factors that go beyond the discussion in this thesis, but using dummy variables can at 
least partly skip the information of those factors in our analysis; Third, previous 
literature suggest the direct relation between amount of dividend and amount of 
earnings (e.g. Compbell and Shiller, 1988), but Baker and Wurgler (2004a) find that 
aggregated dividend amount is not affected by the behaviour factor which is 
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dividend premium. It suggests an insignificant relation could be found between 
dividend level and the level of growing EPS, because the level of dividends and the 
level of earnings may both contents too many other information which are hardly to 
be analysed thoroughly. At last, as a robustness check which is not shown in this 
thesis, we test the relations between firms’ dividend decisions and firms’ changes in 
EPS, and found mixed results as we expected. 
There is a positive relationship between firms’ status of being payers and firms’ 
status of experiencing past earnings growth in the U.S. market. Figure 3.1 contains 
four sub-figures which respectively show a strong positive relationship between (1) 
the proportion of dividend payers among all firms and the proportion of firms who 
experience year-on-year (YoY) increasing earnings over the past three years 
(EPSG(1-3)); (2) the proportion of dividend payers among all firms and the 
proportion of firms who experience YoY increasing earnings over the past five years 
(EPSG(1-5)); (3) the proportion of dividend payers among all firms and the 
proportion of firms who experience generally increasing earnings over the past three 
years (EPSG(1,3)); (4) the proportion of dividend payers among all firms and the 
proportion of firms who experience generally increasing earnings over the past five 
years (EPSG(1,5)). Although there is a lagged response of EPSG(1-n) on proportion 
of payers, proportion of firms with EPSG(1-n) and proportion of payers peak and 
reach sub-bottoms in many years such as 1971, 1987, 1991, and 1997. From Figure 1, 
we find that the proportion of Payer peaks around the late 1970s followed by sharp 
decreases. The graph for EPSG(1-3) shows similar trends, although EPSG(1-3) is 
more volatile than Payer. This less varied response from Payers to previous 
profitability growth can be explained by the theory that dividends are “sticky” 
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(Guttman et al., 2010). In addition, this difference in volatilities may suggest that 
dividend-paying decisions are affected by multiple factors, not by firms’ past 
earnings growth only, but dividend decisions cannot escape from the influence of 
past earnings growth. 
Partial plots are created between the detrended proportion of payers and the 
detrended proportion of EPSG among all firms. All variables that proxy for firms’ 
past growing EPS patterns explain at least 48% of firms’ decisions to be dividend 
payers. Besides, if the outlier at 1966 is deleted, the variation of EPSG(1-3) can 
explain 78% variation of dividend payers’ proportion, and the variation of EPSG(1,3) 
can explain 77% of dividend payers’ proportion.  
Figure 3.3 contains four sub-figures which respectively show a strong positive 
relationship between the proportion of Newpayer among all firms and (1) the 
proportion of firms with EPSG(1-3); (2) the proportion of firms with EPSG(1-5); (3) 
the proportion of firms with EPSG(1,3); (4) the proportion of firms with EPSG(1,5). 
Compared with the proportion of dividend payers in Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3 shows 
that the proportion of new dividend payers sharply drops slightly earlier at 1976, and 
then keeps fluctuating after 1984 rather than continuing to decrease.
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Figure 3.1 The relationship between the proportion of dividend payers and the proportion of firms with  growing EPS over past three 
years or five years. 
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Figure 3.2 Partial relationship between the proportion of payers and the proportion of firms with increases in EPS over the past three to 
five years 
First two regressions are run by using COMPUSTAT data from 1966 to 2000 for payer against EPSG(1-3) and EPSG(1,3), with the first 
three years being used to construct EPSG(1-3) and EPSG(1,3). An outlier on the left hand side is an observation for the fiscal year 1966 of 
first two figures (top left and top right). When we run regressions based on sample period from 1967 to 2000 without the outlier, the R2 
increases to 0.78 for EPSG(1-3), and 0.77 for EPSG(1,3). Last two regressions are run from 1968 to 2000 for payers against EPSG(1-5) and 
EPSG(1,5), with the first five years being used to construct EPSG(1-5) and EPSG(1,5). 
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Figure 3.3 The relationship between the proportion of new dividend payers and the proportion of firms with  growing EPS over past 
three years or five years. 
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As a summary, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 provide empirical evidence that firms’ 
dividend-paying decisions are positively related with firms’ past experience of 
growing EPS. Although the changes in the proportion of firms with EPSG(1-n) or 
EPSG(1,n) can match or be one year ahead of the change in payers’ proportion in 
most circumstances, there are still several exceptions that changes in proportion of 
EPSG(1-n) or EPSG(1,n) are lagged after changes in the proportion of payers. For 
example, in an early stage, payers’ proportion begins to increase smoothly in 1972, 
and the proportion of EPSG(1-3) firms begins to sharply increase at 1973. Later, the 
proportion of payers reaches its peak at 1978, when the proportion of firms with 
EPSG(1-3) reaches its peak at 1979. This lag for proportion of EPSG(1-3) compared 
with proportion of payers may indicate that a shorter-term increase in EPS also 
affects firms’ dividend decisions. In Figure 3.4, we compare the proportion of payers 
with the proportion of firms with one-year increase in EPS (defined as EPSG(1)) 
which represents firms’ one-year increases in EPS. We find the evidence that the 
proportion of firms with one-year growth in EPS increases begin to increase at 1971, 
and drop from 1977 which are both one-year earlier than the movement of payers. 
However, there is not a general decreasing trend after 1978 which can be observed 
for firms with EPSG(1), so the effect of a short-term increase in EPS on dividend 
decisions may be limited. Considering the fact that current profitability appears in 
Fama and French (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2004a), and Hoberg and Probhala 
(2009)’s logistic regression, the short-term impact of EPS on dividend decisions can 
be considered to be controlled5.
                                                        
5 We also run extra tests for testing whether 2-year or 1-year increase/decline in EPS can affect firms’ 
dividend decisions. We find the evidence that the firms’ dividend decisions are also affected by 
increase/decline in EPS over past two years or one year. 
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Figure 3.4 Proportion of payers and proportion of firms with current increase in EPS (to the total number of all firms) 
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Figure 3.5 is a general summary of trends as well as comparisons for dividend 
payers among all firms and dividend payers among firms with past persistent growth 
in EPS. The proportion of payers is the number of payers to the total number of firms 
at fiscal year t, when the proportion of dividend payers among EPSG(1-n) is the 
conditional proportion of dividend payers among firms who have experienced 
YoY/stable increases in EPS over the previous three/five years.  
Figure 3.5 shows that there is a predominantly higher proportion of payers 
among EPSG(1-n) firms than the proportion of payers among all firms within our 
sample period. As has been confirmed by Baker and Wurgler (2004a), the proportion 
of payers was kept at a high level before the 1980s, but drops in the late 1970s, and 
stability decreases for years, until recent years after 2004 which is out of Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a), and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) sample periods. The similar trend 
can also be observed for sub-samples of firms with past stable EPS’s increases for 
three years. Overall, Figure 3.5 suggests that past earnings growth is one factor that 
drives managers to pay dividends, and this influence is robust after controlling for 
the time effect and impacts of other possible dividend decisions’ determinants.  
Figure 3.6 reports co-movement of proportion for dividend continuation firms 
and proportion for firms with past growth in EPS, while Figure 3.7 reports 
movements of proportion for firms who increase dividends and proportion for firms 
with past growth in EPS. We find similar evidence that there are positive relations 
between firms’ past growth in EPS and firms’ decisions to continuing/increasing 
dividends.
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Figure 3.5 The relationship between the proportions of dividend payers amount all firms and the proportion of dividend payers among 
firms with growing EPS over past three years or five years. 
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Figure 3.6 The relationship between the proportion of firms who continue dividends and the proportion of firms with  growing EPS 
over past three years or five years. 
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Figure 3.7 The relationship between the proportion of firms who increase dividends and the proportion of firms with  growing EPS 
over past three years or five years. 
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The movement of proportion for dividend-omission firms and proportion for 
firms with past declining EPS are compared in Figure 8, while the movement of 
proportion for dividend-decrease firms and proportion for firms with past declining 
EPS are compared in Figure 9. Figure 8 and Figure 9 show that the proportion of 
firms who omit/decrease dividends have several matched sub-peaks and sub-bottoms 
with the proportion of firms who experience past decreasing EPS. 
As an additional evidence, we use the same method in Figure 3.5 to compare 
proportions of firms who initiate/continue/increase dividends among firms who 
experience previously growing EPS in Figure 3.10, Figure 3.11, and Figure 3.12 
respectively, and proportions of firms who omit/decrease dividends among all firms 
in Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.14 respectively, and compare proportions of firms who 
decrease dividends among firms who experience previously declining EPS and 
proportions of firms who decrease dividends among all firms in Figure 3.116.  
Although the proportion of firms initiate dividends among firms with past 
growth is not consistently higher than the proportion of new dividend payers among 
all firms, we find evidence that the proportion of firms that initiate dividends is 
mostly higher than the proportion of dividend initiators among all firms during a 
pre-crisis period from 1982 to 2007 in Figure 3.10. In addition, proportion of 
initiators among all firms and proportion of initiators among firms with past 
increasing EPS have similar degree of volatility.
                                                        
6  Because there are limited observations for dividend-initiating payers or dividend-omitting 
non-payers given EPSG or EPSD conditions, especially for firms with EPSG (1-5) or EPSD(1-5) 
(dividend initiation only has mostly less than 4 observations with EPSG (1-5) in years 1973-1981, 
1983, 1986-1995, and 1999, and 0 observation in other years) dividend omission only has less than 4 
observations with EPSD (1-5) in years 1971, 1972, 1981-1988, 1990, 1994, and 1998, and 0 
observation in other years), we delete year data with zero observations in these figures and only keep 
those that have avaliable observations. 
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Figure 3.8 The relationship between the proportion of firms who omit dividends and the proportion of firms with  decreasing EPS over 
past three years or five years. 
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Figure 3.9 The relationship between the proportion of firms who decrease dividends and the proportion of firms with decreasing EPS 
over past three years or five years. 
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Figure 3.10 The proportion of firms that initiate dividends among all firms and the proportion of firms who initiate dividends among 
firms with earnings growths over the past three years or past five years 
Figure 3.10 contains  four sub-figures that respectively show time-series movements in the intersections of firms that initiate dividend and also experience past earnings 
growths over the past three years (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3)) and past five years (EPSG(1-5), EPSG(1,5)), together with proportion of firms that initiate dividends among all firms. 
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Figure 3.11 The relationship between the percentage of firms who continue dividends among all firms and the percentage of firms who 
increase dividends among firms with earnings growths over the past three years or past five years 
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We find similar moving trend between proportion of firms that continue 
dividends among all firms and the proportion of firms that continue dividends among 
firms with past growth in EPS. Except the observation in 1994 for the figure of 
EPSG(1-5), the proportion of dividend-continuing payers among firms with EPSG is 
predominantly higher than the proportion of firms that continue dividends among all 
firms. 
Although the proportion of firms increasing dividend payments among all 
firms or among all firms with previously increasing EPS patterns show more 
fluctuation than dividend payers and dividend-increasing payers in Figure 3.12, there 
is still only one exception, from 1994, when the proportion of firms who increase 
dividends among firms with EPSG(1-5) is lower than the proportion of firms who 
increase dividends among all firms. 
Figure 3.13 exhibits that the proportion of firms that omit dividends among 
firms with previous declines in EPS is predominantly higher than the proportion of 
firms that omit dividends among all firms with only two exceptions in 1969 and 
2006 for the sub-figure with EPSG(1,5). In Figure 3.14, we delete some years’ data 
with zero observations for the sub-figure with condition of EPSG(1-5), and find that 
firms with year-on-year decreasing EPS over the past three years or five years are 
much more likely to become dividend-decreasing payers. Although in the early stage, 
the proportion of firms who decrease dividends among firms with 
EPSG(1-3)/EPSG(1,3) is not predominantly higher than the proportion of 
dividend-decreasing payers among all firms until 1984. They have similar trends and 
movement with the proportion of dividend-decreasing payers among all firms, and 
exceed for many years before 1984.
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Figure 3.12 The percentage of firms that increase dividends among all firms and the percentage of firms who increase dividends among 
firms with earnings growths over the past three years or past five years 
Figure 3.12 contains  four sub-figures that respectively show time-series movements in the intersections of firms that increase dividend and also experience past earnings 
growths over the past three years (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3)) and past five years (EPSG(1-5), EPSG(1,5)), together with proportion of firms that increase dividends among all 
firms. 
  
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
Proportion of firms
that increase dividends
among firms with
EPSG(1-3)
Proportion of firms
that increase dividends
among all firms
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
Percentage of firms that
increase dividends
among firms with
EPSG(1,3)
Percentage of firms that
increase dividends
among all firms
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
Percentage of firms
that increase dividends
among firms with
EPSG(1-5)
Percentage of firms
that increaes dividends
among all firms
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
Percentage of firms that
increase dividends
among firms with
EPSG(1,5)
Percentage of firms that
increase dividends
among all firms
Chapter 3 Profitability Change Persistence, Managerial Overreaction, and Dividend 
Policy 
 
78 
 
Figure 3.13 The percentage of firms that omit dividends among all firms and the percentage of firms that omit dividends among firms 
with earnings declines over the past three years or past five years 
Figure 3.13 contains  four sub-figures that respectively show time-series movements in the intersections of firms that omit dividend and also experience past earnings declines 
over the past three years (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3)) and past five years (EPSD(1-5), EPSD(1,5)), together with proportion of firms that omit dividends among all firms. 
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Figure 3.14 The percentage of firms that decrease dividends among all firms and the percentage of firms that decrease dividends among 
firms with earnings declines over the past three years or past five years 
Figure 3.14 contains  four sub-figures that respectively show time-series movements in the intersections of firms that decrease dividend and also experience past earnings 
declines over the past three years (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3)) and past five years (EPSD(1-5), EPSD(1,5)), together with proportion of firms that decrease dividends among all 
firms. 
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In summary, the conditional proportion of firms that make varying dividend 
decisions among firms that experience past growths/declines in EPS is usually higher 
than the unconditional proportion of firms that make these dividend decisions among 
all firms. This finding can indicate that past EPS’s growths/declines are likely to be 
one of determinants on firms’ dividend decisions. 
 
3.4. Methodology  
 
3.4.1. Firms’ paying status  
The dividend-paying status of a firm in each year is either: i) being a dividend payer 
(DATA26 > 0), ii) becoming a new dividend payer (DATA26 > 0 at fiscal year t, 
and DATA26 = 0 at fiscal year t-1), or iii) being a dividend-increasing payer 
(DATA26t > DATA26t-1 > 0). For providing comparisons with other 
dividend-paying firms, we will also analyse firms in each year who are i) being a 
dividend-decreasing payer (0 < DATA26t < DATA26t-1), and ii) dividend omissions 
(DATA26 = 0 at fiscal year t, and DATA26 > 0 at fiscal year t-1) 7. 
We mainly use four groups of dummies (Payer, Newpayer, divcontinue, and 
divincrease) to represent firms’ pay-out status at fiscal year t by following Hoberg 
and Probhala (2009) and Baker and Wurgler (2004a). As a summary, (1) Payer is the 
group of firms who pay dividends at current fiscal year t; (2) Newpayer is the group 
of firms who pay dividends at current fiscal year t, and did not pay dividends at last 
fiscal year t-1; (3) divcontinue  is the group of firms who pay dividends at current 
                                                        
7 New dividend payers who are non-payers in last fiscal year is a sub-group of current dividend 
payers who can be payers, non-payers, or did not exist at last fiscal year. 
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fiscal year t, and also pay dividends at past fiscal year t-1; (4) divincrease is the 
group of firms who increase dividends at current fiscal year t under the condition 
that they also pay dividends at last fiscal year t-1 (See Appendix 3.3 for details). 
3.4.2. Propensity to pay dividends, propensity to initiate dividends, 
propensity to continue dividends, and propensity to increase dividends. 
We run logistic regressions respectively for four groups in equation (1) to equation 
(4) to get firms’ propensity to initiate dividends, propensity to continue dividends, 
propensity to increase dividends, and propensity to pay dividends:  
 , 1 0 1 2 3 4Pr 1| 0  logit( )it i t it it
it it it
M A E
Payer Payer a a NYP a a a u
B A A


            (1) 
  0 1 2 3 4Pr 1  logit( )it it it
it it it
M dA E
b b NYDivconti P b b b
B A
e
A
nu                    (2) 
  0 1 2 3 4Pr 1  logit( )it it it
it it it
M A E
c c NYDivincrea P c c
A
s c
B A
e 

                   (3) 
  0 1 2 3 4Pr 1  logit( )it it it
it it it
M dA E
Payer d d NYP d d d
B A A
                       (4) 
where NYP is the firm’s NYSE market capitalization percentile (Fama and French 
2001; Baker and Wurgler 2004a), E/A represents firm’s profitability (Fama and 
French 2001; Baker and Wurgler 2004a), market-to-book ratio (M/B) (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004a) and asset growth (∆A/A) (Fama and French 2001; Baker and 
Wurgler 2004a) are proxies for firms’ investment opportunities. We also control for 
dividend premium which is the catering factor developed by Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a). Detailed descriptions for all the variables are in Appendix 3.3. 
Specifically, we regress binary variables of being new dividend payers, being 
dividend payers, continuing being dividend payers, or increasing dividends on 
Chapter 3 Profitability Change Persistence, Managerial Overreaction, and Dividend 
Policy 
 
82 
 
fundamental dividend policy determinants including size, profitability, investment 
opportunities, and risks for each year with Newey-West adjustment to two lags as in 
Fama and French (2001), and Baker and Wurgler (2004a). 8  In detail, (i) we 
construct the propensity to initiate (PTI) dividend, as in Baker and Wurgler (2004a), 
which is the residual 𝑢𝑖𝑡 from running logistic regression in equation (1); (ii) we 
construct the propensity to pay (PTP) dividends, as in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009), 
which is the residual 𝑢𝑖𝑡 from running logistic regression in equation (2); (iii) we 
construct the propensity to continue (PTC) dividends, as in Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a), which is the residual 𝑢𝑖𝑡 from running logistic regression in equation (3); 
(iv) we construct the propensity to increase (PTIN) dividends which is the residual 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 from running logistic regression in equation (4). 
We use the same method to test determinants of decisions on 
omitting/decreasing dividends, and then save residuals from equation (5) and 
equation (6) as propensity to omit (PTO) and propensity to decrease (PTD) 
respectively.  
 , 1 0 1 2 3 4Pr 0 | 1  logit( )it i t it it
it it it
M A E
Payer Payer i i NYP i i i
B A A


               (5) 
  0 1 2 3 4Pr 1  logit( )it it it
it it it
M A E
k k NYDivdecrea P k k
A
s k
B A
e 

                  (6) 
 
                                                        
8 Bulan et al. (2007) use the moral hazard model, and they find that dividend premium can still 
explain firms’ dividend decision after controlling risk factors. Jiang et al. (2013) also use the 
multinomial logistic regression model to test both risk factors and dividend premium’s impact on 
dividend decisions. These studies have opposite conclusions on whether dividend premium has any 
impact on dividend decisions which is the conclusion of Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) who use the 
Fama-Macbeth logistic regression. 
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3.4.3. Firms’ historical EPS growth 
The main variables of interest that may affect a firm’s dividend decision are the 
patterns of a firm’s past profitability growth. We use past earnings per share 
excluding extraordinary items (DATA58) to represent firms’ profitability. We use 
dummy variables, which is the status of EPS’s historical long-term increase, to 
represent firms’ historical long-term earnings performance. 
The variables that contain information about the trajectory of EPS increases are: i) 
EPSG(1-3) and EPSG(1-5) that represent YoY EPS increases over the past three and 
five years, respectively; and ii) EPSG(1,3) and EPSG(1,5) that represent general EPS 
increases over the past three and five years, respectively. 
We classify firms’ past long-term earnings patterns into YoY increases and 
general increases. For each increasing pattern, we use two time lengths which are 
three-year and five-year. We use the time length of three-year because investors and 
managers can usually find firms’ past three years’ accounting items in the current 
annual report. Publicly available information can remind managers more frequently 
than information with limited availability, so three-year financial information may 
affect managers more than other time lengths of financial information when 
managers are making financial decisions by considering past information. 
We classify firms’ past earnings’ pattern into four categories: five-year YoY 
growths (EPSG(1-5)), three-year YoY growths (EPSG(1-3)), five-year general EPS 
increase ignoring fluctuation within the past five years (EPSG(1,5)), and 3-year 
general EPS increase ignoring fluctuation within the past three years (EPSG(1,3)). 
Detailed definition of these variables can be found in Appendix 3.2. 
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3.4.4. Overreaction or dividend premium?   
Having constructed the propensity to initiate/pay/continue/increase dividends, we 
test the effect of past EPS growth patterns on dividend policy.  
After the first step with the Fama-Macbeth logistic regression, we jointly test 
the impact of firms’ past earnings growth and Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s catering 
theory, which is the yearly value-weighted dividend premium and is calculated as the 
difference between the log of weighted M/B ratio for payers and the log of M/B ratio 
for non-payers, on firms’ PTI, PTC, PTIN, and ∆PTP. We control for the yearly 
value-weighted dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷) of the catering theory developed by 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a). The dividend premium is the difference between the log 
of weighted M/B ratio for payers and the log of M/B ratio for non-payers. 
𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑖,?̃? 0 1 1 2 , 3 ,   P
D ND
t i t i t ite eVW e HistEPS e IND 

                                (7) 
𝑃𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡̃ 0 1 1 2 , 3 ,   P
D ND
t i t i t itf f VW f HistEPS f IND 

                              (8) 
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
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
                             (10) 
where 𝑉𝑊 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 is the book-value weighted dividend premium, which is the 
difference between the log of weighted M/B ratio for payers and the log of M/B ratio 
for non-payers. The dividend premium is a yearly variable, and hence also captures 
the yearly effect. HistEPS is the variable that contains information regarding the 
trajectory of EPS increases. EPSG(1-3) and EPSG(1-5) represent, respectively, 
year-on-year EPS increases over the previous three and five years. EPSG(1,3) and 
EPSG(1,5) represent, respectively, general EPS increases over the previous three and 
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five years. These EPS-related variables are created as alternatives to represent firms’ 
previous profitability growth. IND is the vector of industry dummies 9 . 
It should be noted that dependent variables in equation (7) to equation (9), and 
equation (10) are different. ∆PTP is the change in propensity to pay, which is used 
by Hoberg and Prabhala (2009), while PTI and PTC defined by Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a) are the propensity to pay/continue dividends for firms who are 
non-payers/payers at the last fiscal year.  
In contrast, we also test managerial extrapolation of previously declining EPS 
on firms’ propensity to omit/decrease dividends. The regression function which 
investigates behaviour determinants of PTO is shown in equation (11), while the 
function which investigates behaviour determinants of PTD is shown in equation 
(12)10. 
𝑃𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑡̃ 0 1 1 2 , 3 ,   P
D ND
t i t i t itj jVW j HistEPS j IND 

                              (11) 
𝑃𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡̃ 0 1 1 2 , 3 ,   P
D ND
t i t i t itl lVW l HistEPS l IND 

                               (12) 
 
3.5. Results  
3.5.1. Firms who choose to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends 
By following the method used by Baker and Wurgler (2004a), and Hoberg and 
Probhala (2009), we run regressions based on the sample from 1963 to 2000. Table 
3.3 to Table 3.6 give details about the Fama-Macbeth logistic relationships between 
dividend-decision variables and their determinant factors, and results are divided 
                                                        
9 The time dummy is also controlled by using dividend premium as one of the explanatory 
variables, because dividend premium is a yearly variable and all firms have the same value of 
dividend premium in the same fiscal year. 
10 As the robustness’ check of our methodology, we also tried one-step fixed-effect logistic 
regression and random-effect logistic logistic regression instead of Fama-Macbeth logistic 
regression, and find similar results. 
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respectively into several panels. The first part (Panel A) in each table is the result 
from the Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision (Newpayer in Table 
3.3, divcontinue in Table 3.4, divincrease in Table 3.5, and Payer in Table 3.6) on 
conventional factors including size, investment opportunities, profitability, and risk 
factors. NYP is the same to Fama and French (2001), and it represents a firm’s size. 
M/B ratio at fiscal year t, M/B ratio at fiscal year t-1, and ∆A/A are proxies for firms’ 
growth opportunities. E/A represents firms’ current profitability, and it could also be 
viewed as a variable of current earnings performance. We apply Hoberg and 
Prabhala (2009)’s risk factors in Baker and Wurgler (2004a) method in Panel A of 
each table, but give both results with or without controlling risk factors for checking 
robustness. Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) argue that risks are major dividend 
determinants. They found evidence that Baker and Wurgler (2004a)'s dividend 
premium could be explained by firms' risks calculated by usingfirms' market returns, 
and then they argue that risks as fundamental determinants of payout policy are 
explaining firms' changes in propensity to pay dividends,while the catering incentive 
proxy by dividend premium loss its explanatory power after controlling for risks. 
Therefore, we include Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)'s risk factors in the first stage 
regression as they do in their paper, and test dividend premium after controlling for 
risks under all different dividend decisions discussed. We completely follow Hoberg 
and Prabhala (2009)'s method in creating firm systematic risk as the standard 
deviation of the predicted value from a conventional CAPM for a firm, and 
idiosyncratic risk asthe standard deviation of the residuals from a conventional CAPM 
for a firm. Considering the factor that Baker and Wurger (2004a) mainly discuss 
propensity to initiate (PTI) and the catering theory, and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) 
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test ∆PTI’s relation with catering theory as a robustness check, we use PTI as the 
dependent variable in Panel B and Panel C of Table 3.3 and ∆PTI as a dependent 
variable in Panel D and Panel E of Table 3.3. However, Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) 
focus on changes in propensity to pay ∆PTP, so we use ∆PTP as a dependent 
variable in Table 3.7. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 use respectively PTC and PTIN as 
dependent variables in their Panel B and Panel C. All panels after Panel A in each 
table allow us to compare the effect of investors’ sentiment on firms’ pay-out 
decisions with the effect of managers’ extrapolation on firms’ pay-out decisions.
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Table 3.3 Decision of being new dividend payers and determining factors from 1963 to 2000 
Table 3.3 reports the two-step regression of firm’s’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance. In Panel A we firstly 
perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) to get firms’ 
propensity to initiate (PTI). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTI on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy variables 
which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B, Panel C, Panel D, and 
Panel E which respectively report PTI without controlling for risks, ∆PTI without controlling for risks, PTI after controlling for risks, and  ∆PTI after controlling for risks on 
VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s 
investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed 
construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Newpayer  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-3.00***(-11.07) 1.46***(6.91) 0.13(0.58) -0.92***(-3.72) 9.63***(6.14) 
  
-1.52***(-4.56) 1.06***(3.83) 0.06(0.21) -0.88***(-3.70) 9.35***(6.26) -41.93**(-2.69) -38.05***(-5.98) 
Panel B. PTI without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.021***(5.60) 0.16***(13.82) 0.01(1.28) 
   
19709 0.01 
0.06 (1.50) 0.10***(10.68) 
 
0.02***(6.65) 
  
22254 0.01 
0.02***(5.47) 0.14***(16.09) 
 
 
0.01***(3.84) 
 
28150 0.01 
3.26E-3 (1.07) 0.10***(13.01) 
 
  
0.02***(8.46) 30095 0.01 
Panel C. PTI after controlling risk factors 
0.03***(7.31) 0.17***(14.86) 0.01(0.88) 
  
 
19131 0.02 
0.02***(5.01) 0.17***(15.60) 
 
0.02***(6.37) 
  
20634 0.02 
0.02***(7.24) 0.16***(17.22) 
 
 
0.01***(3.50) 
 
27322 0.01 
0.01***(4.41) 0.16***(17.58) 
 
  
0.02***(8.06) 28220 0.02 
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Table 3.3 (continue) 
Panel D. ∆PTI without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.06***(14.75) 0.17***(14.68) 0.03***(3.88) 
   
18687 0.02 
0.04***(9.17) 0.17***(15.69) 
 
0.04***(13.37) 
  
20125 0.03 
0.05***(16.21) 0.16***(17.45) 
 
 
0.03***(9.41) 
 
26896 0.02 
0.03***(9.94) 0.16***(17.85) 
 
  
0.04***(16.44) 27746 0.03 
Panel E. ∆PTI after controlling risk factors 
0.06***(14.82) 0.16***(13.98) 0.03***(3.79) 
   
18133 0.02 
0.04***(9.56) 0.16***(14.98) 
 
0.04***(12.37) 
  
19511 0.02 
0.05***(16.1) 0.15***(16.49) 
 
 
0.03***(9.03) 
 
26099 0.02 
0.03***(10.21) 0.15***(16.90) 
 
  
0.04***(15.30) 26896 0.02 
where *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
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The first essential finding from Panel A in Table 3.3 is that all conventional 
factors show a significant impact on firms’ dividend decision of becoming new 
payers, and their correlating direction (positive or negative) are the same as was 
discussed in previous research (see Baker and Wurgler, 2004a; Hoberg and Prabhala, 
2009). Firms with large size, higher profitability, and lower idiosyncratic risk tend to 
pay dividends. Panel C and Panel E in Table 3.3 show different findings from 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) in results that dividend premium’s significant effect on 
PTI or ∆PTI are robust after controlling for risk factors in step 1. The magnitudes of 
dividend premium’s impact on PTI or ∆PTI are even mostly higher than the 
magnitudes of managers’ extrapolations on PTI or ∆PTI, although managers’ 
extrapolations also exhibit robust significant impact on PTI or ∆PTI.
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Table 3.4 Decision of continuing dividends and determining factors from 1963 to 2000 
Table 3.4 reports the two-step regression of firm’s’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance. In Panel A we firstly 
perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) to get firms’ 
propensity to continue (PTC). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTC on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy variables 
which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B and Panel C, which 
respectively report PTC without controlling for risks and PTC after controlling for risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent 
firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ 
systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Divcontinue 
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
1.25***(6.62) 3.97***(10.84) 1.70***(5.31) 0.32(1.51) 12.19***(5.53) 
  
2.70***(11.83) 3.57***(9.45) 1.38***(5.41) 0.67***(3.53) 11.63***(5.15) -58.25***(-3.94) -45.02***(-10.42) 
Dependent variable: PTC; Controlling industry fixed effect 
Panel B. PTC without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
-0.01***(-3.78) 2.31E-3 (0.34) 0.01**(1.99) 
   
32197 0.00 
-0.03***(-9.69) 2.82E-3 (0.46) 
 
0.03***(14.29) 
  
33969 0.01 
-0.01***(-5.35) -5.50E-4 (-0.09) 
 
 
0.02***(6.55) 
 
37631 0.01 
-0.03***(-11.42) -2.33E-3 (-0.40) 
 
  
0.03***(16.55) 38762 0.01 
Panel C. PTC after controlling risk factors 
-0.01***(-3.18) 0.01(1.21) 0.01*(1.65) 
   
31346 0.00 
-0.02***(-7.87) 4.56E-3 (0.72) 
 
0.02***(12.6) 
  
32703 0.01 
-0.01***(-4.70) 0.01(0.98) 
 
 
0.01***(5.89) 
 
36650 0.01 
-0.03***(-9.46) 2.95E-4 (0.05) 
 
  
0.03***(14.97) 37377 0.01 
where *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Chapter 3 Profitability Change Persistence, Managerial Overreaction, and Dividend 
Policy 
 
92 
 
In Table 3.4, all conventional variables show significant impact on firms’ 
decisions of continuing to pay dividends. Firms’ investment opportunities, as proxied 
by asset growth and M/B, exhibit significant positive relations with dividend 
continuation, consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s findings.  
Panel B of Table 3.4 shows that firms tend to continue dividends when they 
have experienced earnings growth over the past three or five years, after considering 
the impact of dividend premium. Dividend premium does not show robust and 
significantly positive effects on PTC. The coefficient magnitudes and t-values of 
these over-extrapolation variables are all higher than that of dividend premium, 
indicating the strong economic and statistical significance of managerial 
overreaction on dividend continuation. 
Another dividend decision is dividend change. Baker and Wurgler (2004a) 
report an insignificant relationship between catering factor and changes in dividend 
amounts, but Li and Lie (2006) find that managers cater for investors’ demand in 
dividends by changing dividend amounts. We test catering theory and extrapolation 
theory in terms of affecting the decision of increasing dividends at the same time by 
replacing PTI with PTIN (propensity to increase dividends). If Hypothesis 1 holds, 
past dividend-payers who extrapolate previously growing EPS into the future may 
also feel optimistic in increasing dividends, since future high-growing profitability 
can support more dividend payments.
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Table 3.5 Decision of increasing dividends and determining factors from 1963 to 2000 
Table 3.5 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance. In Panel A we firstly 
perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) to get firms’ 
propensity to increase dividends (PTIN). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTIN on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and 
dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B and 
Panel C which respectively report PTIN without controlling risks and PTIN after controlling risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to 
represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is 
firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Divincrease 
Intercept Size ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-1.08***(-8.82) 0.79***(9.15) 0.71***(4.87) -0.14***(-2.97) 9.61***(13.99) 
  
-0.77***(-5.33) 0.75***(8.62) 0.81***(6.47) -0.11**(-2.58) 9.50***(13.76) -13.94(-1.39) -11.05***(-5.16) 
Dependent variable: PTIN; Controlling industry fixed effect 
Panel B. PTIN without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01**(2.02) 0.24***(13.36) 0.09***(7.92) 
   
33119 0.01 
-0.04***(-5.03) 0.19***(11.75) 
 
0.09***(18.26) 
  
34991 0.02 
0.01**(2.08) 0.24***(14.77) 
 
 
0.11***(17.18) 
 
38852 0.02 
-0.03***(-5.06) 0.20***(12.98) 
 
  
0.12***(24.99) 40051 0.02 
Panel C. PTIN after controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3)   
0.02***(2.92) 0.26***(13.98) 0.08***(7.47) 
   
32242 0.01 
-0.03***(-3.61) 0.22***(12.51) 
 
0.09***(17.63) 
  
33654 0.02 
0.02***(2.75) 0.26***(15.4) 
 
 
0.10***(16.82) 
 
37838 0.02 
-0.03***(-3.94) 0.22***(13.81) 
 
  
0.12***(24.38) 38590 0.02 
where *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
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Table 3.5 reports that firms with past earnings growth tend to increase 
dividends, when risk factors and dividend premium are both controlled. Proxy of 
investor sentiment: dividend premium shows a robust and significant positive effect 
on PTC. In terms of fundamental factors, large and profitable firms tend to increase 
dividends, while firms with high asset growing rate tend not to increase dividends. 
Impact from M/B is not robust when risk factors are added in the regression. 
Systematic risk loses its significant impact on decisions to increase dividends, but 
idiosyncratic risk still negatively affects decisions to increase dividends.
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Table 3.6 Decision of being dividend payers and determining factors from 1963 to 2000 
Table 3.6 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance. In Panel A we firstly 
perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) to get firms’ 
propensity to pay (PTP). At second step we use pooled method to regression ∆PTP on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW PD−ND ) and dummy variables 
which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B and Panel C which 
respectively report ∆PTP without controlling risks and ∆PTP after controlling risk factors on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent 
firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ 
systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Payer  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-0.51***(-2.92) 4.29***(26.11) -0.60***(-2.92) -0.78***(-10.93) 11.43***(6.63) 
  
2.15***(6.18) 3.68***(13.23) -0.97***(-5.42) -0.47***(-6.69) 9.22***(5.83) -135.49***(-13.38) -67.89***(-12.82) 
Panel B. ∆PTP without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
2.34E-3 (0.01) 0.03***(4.04) 0.03***(5.20) 
   
51901 0.00 
-0.04***(-11.93) 0.04***(4.96) 
 
0.07***(32.61) 
  
54816 0.02 
-0.01**(-2.21) 0.02***(3.22) 
 
 
0.04***(16.26) 
 
65776 0.00 
-0.04***(-14.95) 0.02***(3.44) 
 
  
0.07***(39.56) 67439 0.02 
Panel C. ∆PTP after controlling risk factors 
-0.00(-0.74) -0.01(-1.25) 0.02***(2.94) 
   
50471 0.00 
-0.03***(-8.06) -4.84E-3 (-0.61) 
 
0.05***(19.94) 
 
 
53297 0.01 
-4.36E-3 (-1.58) -0.02***(-3.28) 
 
 
0.03***(10.83) 
 
63966 0.00 
-0.03***(-10.64) -0.02***(-3.31) 
 
  
0.06***(27.72) 65550 0.01 
where *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
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We also test determinants of dividend-paying decisions, and test the impact of 
investors’ sentiment and managers’ extrapolation on changes in propensity to pay by 
following Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)’s regression models. Panel C in Table 3.6 
reports the similar empirical evidence11 as Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) who find 
that dividend premium’s explanatory power disappears after controlling the risk 
factor in the first step of the Fama-Macbeth logistic regression. Extrapolation 
factors’ explanatory power remains after controlling the risk factors’ influence in 
changes of PTP. 
The pooled method allows us to compare catering factor’s (dividend 
premium’s) impact with the impact from managers’ extrapolation on dividend 
decisions in the same regression model in Table 3.4. No matter whether risk factors 
are controlled or not, dividend premium has a higher positive magnitude than 
extrapolation dummies. Coefficients for EPS-related dummies also have a higher 
t-value than dividend premium. It supports the argument (Hoberg and Prabhala, 
2009) that catering theory can explain managers’ decisions in becoming payers, only 
when risk factors are not controlled. As a summary of Table 3.4, managers’ 
extrapolations have significant explanatory power in ∆PTP, and this explanatory 
power is robust no matter whether risk factors are controlled, and when investors’ 
sentiments are also controlled.   
As a summary, we find supportive evidence of the catering theory in most 
circumstances albeit with several exceptions. In contrast, the significant effect of 
firms’ good previous earnings performance is robust regardless of whether risk 
factors are controlled or not, or whether PTI or ∆PTI is used. This finding implies 
                                                        
11 We find inconsistent significance for the impact of dividend premium on changes in firms’ 
propensity to pay dividend. 
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that the effect of past experiences in EPS have a more robust and significant impact 
than catering factors on firms’ dividend decisions of being dividend payers and being 
new payers, and this significant effect is not affected by risk factors.   
As has been introduced and described in section 3, we create different 
dummies to represent firms’ past profitability growth in the form of two different 
time horizons (three years and five years) and two different types of growth (YoY 
growth and general growth) for proving that our argument about firms’ previously 
growing EPS on dividend decisions is robust. We use four different dummy variables 
to represent firms’ past year-by-year increases in EPS for three years and five years 
(EPSG(1-3) and EPSG(1-5)), and past general increases in EPS which evaluate 
differences between EPS in the past three years or in the past five years and current 
EPS (EPSG(1,3) and EPSG(1,5)). We find that all of these alternative dummy 
variables, except for EPSG(1-5), have significant impact on firms’ PTI, PTC, PTIN 
and ∆PTP, after controlling firms’ characteristics including profitability, risk factors 
and dividend premium’s impact. Considering the fact that the condition used to 
create EPSG(1-5) is too strict to generate sufficient observation12, EPSG(1-5)’s 
results can roughly be ignored. We can conclude that there is a robust relation 
between firms’ historical earnings performance and managers’ propensity to pay 
dividends after all of these empirical findings.      
We find the same evidence with Fama and French (2001) and Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a) that firms’ size and profitability are significantly positively related 
to firms’ decisions of paying dividends given or without being given the condition 
that firms were non-payers at the last fiscal year. Whereas, investment opportunities 
                                                        
12 We find that there are only several or no observations for firms with historical 5-year stable 
increasing EPS in some years, so regression based on this dummy variable can generate 
unconsolidated results. 
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proxy by market to book ratio (M/B) is negatively related to firms’ decisions to pay 
dividends, while firms’ investment opportunities proxy by asset growth rate (∆A/A) 
show no significant impact on firms’ decisions of being dividend initiators, but 
significant negative relation with firms’ decisions of being dividend payers. These 
findings relating to investment opportunities are consistent with Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a) and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)’s findings. We find that risk factors are 
significantly negatively related to firms’ decisions of being dividend payers or 
initiating dividends, and it is consistent with the finding of Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009). However, we also find that risk factors’ significant negative impact may 
become weaker, when we use alternative dependent variables which record firms’ 
dividend status over the past three years or five years. In detail, firms’ systematic 
risk positively relates with firms’ decisions to initiate dividends (insignificant 
positive relationship for firms with past status of being non-dividend-payers for three 
years, and significant positive relationship for firms with past status of being 
non-dividend-payers for five years), and firms’ idiosyncratic risk only have 
insignificant negative relationship with firms’ decisions of being initiators for those 
firms with past status of being non-dividend-payers for three years. It may indicate 
relatively weak robustness of risk factors’ impacting power when they are compared 
with other determinants of dividend policy.  
 
3.5.2. Future profitability of firms who initiate/continue/increase/pay 
dividends 
As a further check concerning managers’ over-reaction which is reflected by the 
activity of over-extrapolation, we produce Table 3.7 for a clear and detailed look at 
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statistics which are descriptive of firms’ future earnings performance after managers 
make decisions to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends with positive past 
earnings performance. If a further test is conducted for examining whether managers, 
who decide to make dividend decisions based on past experience of profitability 
growth, are over-optimistic, it is reasonable to focus on the sub-group with general 
positive EPS when managers have decided to pay dividends, but not on the 
sub-group with general negative EPS when firms have to choose not to pay under the 
limitation of negative profitability. Therefore, we focus on dividend payers and new 
dividend payers, and firms who continue dividends or increase dividends for 
investigating the further relation between past earnings growth and future earnings 
performance to examine whether managers are over-optimistic in making dividend 
decisions based on previous earnings experiences13. 
Table 3.7 reports on future means of E/A and on growth rates of E/A’s means 
for Payer and Newpayer who have experienced growing profitability. Table 3.12 is 
formed by using COMPUSTAT data ranging from 1963 to 2000. There are two 
sub-periods in Table 3.12: 1963-1978 and 1979-2000 for comparison based on Fama 
and French (2001)’s argument that there is a structure break around 1978.
                                                        
13 Our method in testing whether managers are overextrapolated is different from DeAngelo et al. 
(1996) in several ways. Compared with DeAngelo et al. (1996)’s sample, (1) this research has a more 
relaxed standard for sample selection which only requires firms to have past 3-year or 5-year strict 
increase or overall increase in EPS, because recent past 5-year accounting data is more remarkable 
than accounting data 10 years ago; (2) This research tests the future earnings performance of sample 
firms up to 5 years; (3) this research also analyses new dividend payers who are not payers at the last 
fiscal year (year -1) as well as firms who continue or increase dividends, when DeAngelo et al. (1996) 
only focus on dividend payers’ dividend increases which require firms to be dividend payers in both 
current and last years. 
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Table 3.7 Future profitability of firms who have past increasing EPS and initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends 
Table 3.7 reports means and growth rates of current profitability and future 5-year profitability for Payer and Newpayer with experiences of past earnings growth. E/A represents firm’s 
profitability at current fiscal year, and E/A (n) represents firm’s profitability in n-year. Growth rate is calculated by using current E/A minus E/A at previous fiscal year all divided by previous 
fiscal years’ E/A. Means and growth rates of E/A are calculated within three groups based on the argument of Fama and French (2001) that there is a structure break around 1979: 1963-1978, 
1979-2000, and 1963-2000.  
Payer with EPSG(1-3) 
 
New Payer with EPSG(1-3) 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
E/A(-5) 0.081 
 
0.084 
 
0.083 
  
E/A(-5) 0.048 
 
0.033 
 
0.039 
 E/A(-4) 0.078 -3.634 0.078 -7.037 0.078 -5.826 
 
E/A(-4) 0.038 -21.445 0.013 -59.800 0.024 -38.387 
E/A(-3) 0.088 12.733 0.095 21.294 0.092 17.892 
 
E/A(-3) 0.066 75.515 0.061 364.705 0.063 161.403 
E/A(-2) 0.096 9.167 0.104 9.731 0.101 9.517 
 
E/A(-2) 0.083 24.848 0.086 41.101 0.085 33.429 
E/A(-1) 0.103 7.065 0.112 7.228 0.108 7.167 
 
E/A(-1) 0.100 20.189 0.111 28.858 0.106 25.029 
E/A 0.099 -4.099 0.102 -8.660 0.101 -6.934 
 
E/A 0.100 0.478 0.095 -13.873 0.097 -7.780 
E/A(+1) 0.096 -2.769 0.094 -8.089 0.095 -6.000 
 
E/A(+1) 0.092 -8.393 0.088 -8.077 0.089 -8.167 
E/A(+2) 0.095 -0.394 0.087 -7.173 0.090 -4.337 
 
E/A(+2) 0.086 -6.498 0.057 -34.524 0.071 -20.797 
E/A(+3) 0.097 1.197 0.082 -5.760 0.088 -2.652 
 
E/A(+3) 0.092 7.449 0.028 -51.456 0.060 -15.545 
E/A(+4) 0.096 -0.300 0.081 -0.917 0.088 -0.565 
 
E/A(+4) 0.087 -5.439 0.059 111.811 0.073 22.489 
E/A(+5) 0.095 -1.118 0.079 -3.139 0.086 -2.138 
 
E/A(+5) 0.085 -3.058 0.055 -5.926 0.070 -3.953 
Payer with EPSG(1,3) 
 
New Payer with EPSG(1,3) 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
E/A(-5) 0.079 
 
0.083 
 
0.082 
  
E/A(-5) 0.053 
 
0.042 
 
0.046 
 E/A(-4) 0.079 -0.722 0.078 -6.821 0.078 -4.786 
 
E/A(-4) 0.050 -4.258 0.039 -6.656 0.043 -4.814 
E/A(-3) 0.083 4.926 0.087 11.602 0.085 9.124 
 
E/A(-3) 0.056 10.772 0.047 20.884 0.051 16.299 
E/A(-2) 0.089 8.306 0.094 7.944 0.092 8.074 
 
E/A(-2) 0.068 21.744 0.063 32.939 0.065 28.081 
E/A(-1) 0.095 6.697 0.104 10.833 0.101 9.353 
 
E/A(-1) 0.091 33.945 0.100 59.944 0.097 49.219 
E/A 0.093 -2.175 0.093 -10.812 0.093 -7.797 
 
E/A 0.095 3.907 0.091 -9.187 0.092 -4.338 
E/A(+1) 0.092 -1.915 0.083 -10.035 0.086 -6.965 
 
E/A(+1) 0.087 -8.290 0.058 -36.189 0.070 -24.772 
E/A(+2) 0.091 -1.167 0.078 -5.960 0.083 -3.956 
 
E/A(+2) 0.080 -8.496 0.060 2.657 0.068 -2.546 
E/A(+3) 0.091 0.013 0.074 -5.066 0.081 -2.836 
 
E/A(+3) 0.088 10.356 0.049 -17.007 0.065 -3.585 
E/A(+4) 0.090 -0.773 0.072 -3.108 0.079 -1.965 
 
E/A(+4) 0.082 -6.992 0.051 2.869 0.064 -1.938 
E/A(+5) 0.089 -1.225 0.070 -2.617 0.078 -1.875 
 
E/A(+5) 0.083 1.337 0.057 12.359 0.068 6.493 
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Payer with EPSG(1-5) 
 
New Payer with EPSG(1-5) 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
E/A(-5) 0.085 
 
0.096 
 
0.092 
  
E/A(-5) 0.056 
 
0.050 
 
0.052 
 E/A(-4) 0.090 5.617 0.103 6.686 0.098 6.342 
 
E/A(-4) 0.065 17.172 0.056 10.619 0.059 13.293 
E/A(-3) 0.094 4.475 0.109 5.845 0.104 5.408 
 
E/A(-3) 0.072 9.581 0.094 68.096 0.085 43.403 
E/A(-2) 0.099 5.437 0.113 4.096 0.108 4.519 
 
E/A(-2) 0.082 14.142 0.100 7.161 0.093 9.412 
E/A(-1) 0.104 4.828 0.117 3.740 0.113 4.087 
 
E/A(-1) 0.094 14.267 0.119 18.870 0.109 17.321 
E/A 0.103 -1.187 0.111 -5.654 0.108 -4.220 
 
E/A 0.099 5.635 0.087 -27.111 0.091 -16.382 
E/A(+1) 0.102 -0.535 0.104 -5.652 0.104 -3.973 
 
E/A(+1) 0.091 -7.907 0.097 11.940 0.095 3.702 
E/A(+2) 0.102 -0.146 0.097 -7.013 0.099 -4.582 
 
E/A(+2) 0.080 -11.538 0.010 -89.980 0.039 -58.781 
E/A(+3) 0.103 0.922 0.093 -4.108 0.097 -2.178 
 
E/A(+3) 0.082 2.264 0.033 -433.878 0.019 -51.751 
E/A(+4) 0.103 -0.467 0.092 -1.386 0.096 -0.956 
 
E/A(+4) 0.089 8.126 0.026 -181.044 0.055 191.685 
E/A(+5) 0.100 -2.291 0.088 -4.106 0.093 -3.346 
 
E/A(+5) 0.101 13.808 0.064 143.739 0.080 46.286 
Payer with EPSG(1,5) 
 
New Payer with EPSG(1,5) 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
E/A(-5) 0.077 
 
0.083 
 
0.081 
  
E/A(-5) 0.049 
 
0.039 
 
0.042 
 E/A(-4) 0.080 3.571 0.088 5.384 0.085 4.842 
 
E/A(-4) 0.051 2.268 0.048 24.019 0.049 15.424 
E/A(-3) 0.083 3.998 0.092 4.990 0.089 4.695 
 
E/A(-3) 0.055 8.659 0.054 11.635 0.054 10.595 
E/A(-2) 0.088 5.569 0.097 4.719 0.094 4.968 
 
E/A(-2) 0.064 15.869 0.067 24.939 0.066 21.825 
E/A(-1) 0.094 6.769 0.104 7.587 0.101 7.346 
 
E/A(-1) 0.087 37.285 0.102 52.665 0.097 47.643 
E/A 0.092 -1.547 0.093 -10.679 0.093 -8.000 
 
E/A 0.093 6.825 0.094 -8.212 0.094 -3.647 
E/A(+1) 0.091 -1.301 0.085 -8.079 0.087 -5.910 
 
E/A(+1) 0.086 -7.880 0.067 -28.009 0.074 -21.149 
E/A(+2) 0.090 -0.640 0.080 -6.373 0.083 -4.361 
 
E/A(+2) 0.083 -3.745 0.060 -11.588 0.068 -8.090 
E/A(+3) 0.091 0.889 0.075 -5.762 0.081 -3.286 
 
E/A(+3) 0.088 6.277 0.052 -12.233 0.065 -4.283 
E/A(+4) 0.090 -1.495 0.073 -2.831 0.079 -2.202 
 
E/A(+4) 0.078 -11.106 0.056 7.641 0.064 -0.996 
E/A(+5) 0.086 -3.717 0.071 -2.508 0.077 -2.877 
 
E/A(+5) 0.081 4.077 0.051 -10.364 0.062 -3.700 
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Divincrease with EPSG(1-3) 
 
Divcontinue with EPSG(1-3) 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
E/A(-5) 0.081 
 
0.084 
 
0.083 
  
E/A(-5) 0.048 
 
0.033 
 
0.039 
 E/A(-4) 0.078 -3.634 0.078 -7.037 0.078 -5.826 
 
E/A(-4) 0.038 -21.445 0.013 -59.800 0.024 -38.387 
E/A(-3) 0.088 12.733 0.095 21.294 0.092 17.892 
 
E/A(-3) 0.066 75.515 0.061 364.705 0.063 161.403 
E/A(-2) 0.096 9.167 0.104 9.731 0.101 9.517 
 
E/A(-2) 0.083 24.848 0.086 41.101 0.085 33.429 
E/A(-1) 0.103 7.065 0.112 7.228 0.108 7.167 
 
E/A(-1) 0.100 20.189 0.111 28.858 0.106 25.029 
E/A 0.099 -4.099 0.102 -8.660 0.101 -6.934 
 
E/A 0.100 0.478 0.095 -13.873 0.097 -7.780 
E/A(+1) 0.096 -2.769 0.094 -8.089 0.095 -6.000 
 
E/A(+1) 0.092 -8.393 0.088 -8.077 0.089 -8.167 
E/A(+2) 0.095 -0.394 0.087 -7.173 0.090 -4.337 
 
E/A(+2) 0.086 -6.498 0.057 -34.524 0.071 -20.797 
E/A(+3) 0.097 1.197 0.082 -5.760 0.088 -2.652 
 
E/A(+3) 0.092 7.449 0.028 -51.456 0.060 -15.545 
E/A(+4) 0.096 -0.300 0.081 -0.917 0.088 -0.565 
 
E/A(+4) 0.087 -5.439 0.059 111.811 0.073 22.489 
E/A(+5) 0.095 -1.118 0.079 -3.139 0.086 -2.138 
 
E/A(+5) 0.085 -3.058 0.055 -5.926 0.070 -3.953 
Divincrease with EPSG(1,3) 
 
Divcontinue with EPSG(1,3) 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
E/A(-5) 0.079 
 
0.083 
 
0.082 
  
E/A(-5) 0.053 
 
0.042 
 
0.046 
 E/A(-4) 0.079 -0.722 0.078 -6.821 0.078 -4.786 
 
E/A(-4) 0.050 -4.258 0.039 -6.656 0.043 -4.814 
E/A(-3) 0.083 4.926 0.087 11.602 0.085 9.124 
 
E/A(-3) 0.056 10.772 0.047 20.884 0.051 16.299 
E/A(-2) 0.089 8.306 0.094 7.944 0.092 8.074 
 
E/A(-2) 0.068 21.744 0.063 32.939 0.065 28.081 
E/A(-1) 0.095 6.697 0.104 10.833 0.101 9.353 
 
E/A(-1) 0.091 33.945 0.100 59.944 0.097 49.219 
E/A 0.093 -2.175 0.093 -10.812 0.093 -7.797 
 
E/A 0.095 3.907 0.091 -9.187 0.092 -4.338 
E/A(+1) 0.092 -1.915 0.083 -10.035 0.086 -6.965 
 
E/A(+1) 0.087 -8.290 0.058 -36.189 0.070 -24.772 
E/A(+2) 0.091 -1.167 0.078 -5.960 0.083 -3.956 
 
E/A(+2) 0.080 -8.496 0.060 2.657 0.068 -2.546 
E/A(+3) 0.091 0.013 0.074 -5.066 0.081 -2.836 
 
E/A(+3) 0.088 10.356 0.049 -17.007 0.065 -3.585 
E/A(+4) 0.090 -0.773 0.072 -3.108 0.079 -1.965 
 
E/A(+4) 0.082 -6.992 0.051 2.869 0.064 -1.938 
E/A(+5) 0.089 -1.225 0.070 -2.617 0.078 -1.875 
 
E/A(+5) 0.083 1.337 0.057 12.359 0.068 6.493 
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Divincrease with EPSG(1-5) 
 
Divcontinue with EPSG(1-5) 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
E/A(-5) 0.085 
 
0.096 
 
0.092 
  
E/A(-5) 0.056 
 
0.050 
 
0.052 
 E/A(-4) 0.090 5.617 0.103 6.686 0.098 6.342 
 
E/A(-4) 0.065 17.172 0.056 10.619 0.059 13.293 
E/A(-3) 0.094 4.475 0.109 5.845 0.104 5.408 
 
E/A(-3) 0.072 9.581 0.094 68.096 0.085 43.403 
E/A(-2) 0.099 5.437 0.113 4.096 0.108 4.519 
 
E/A(-2) 0.082 14.142 0.100 7.161 0.093 9.412 
E/A(-1) 0.104 4.828 0.117 3.740 0.113 4.087 
 
E/A(-1) 0.094 14.267 0.119 18.870 0.109 17.321 
E/A 0.103 -1.187 0.111 -5.654 0.108 -4.220 
 
E/A 0.099 5.635 0.087 -27.111 0.091 -16.382 
E/A(+1) 0.102 -0.535 0.104 -5.652 0.104 -3.973 
 
E/A(+1) 0.091 -7.907 0.097 11.940 0.095 3.702 
E/A(+2) 0.102 -0.146 0.097 -7.013 0.099 -4.582 
 
E/A(+2) 0.080 -11.538 0.010 -89.980 0.039 -58.781 
E/A(+3) 0.103 0.922 0.093 -4.108 0.097 -2.178 
 
E/A(+3) 0.082 2.264 0.033 -433.878 0.019 -51.751 
E/A(+4) 0.103 -0.467 0.092 -1.386 0.096 -0.956 
 
E/A(+4) 0.089 8.126 0.026 -181.044 0.055 191.685 
E/A(+5) 0.100 -2.291 0.088 -4.106 0.093 -3.346 
 
E/A(+5) 0.101 13.808 0.064 143.739 0.080 46.286 
Divincrease with EPSG(1,5) 
 
Divcontinue with EPSG(1,5) 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
 
  Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% Mean 
Grow rates 
% 
E/A(-5) 0.077 
 
0.083 
 
0.081 
  
E/A(-5) 0.049 
 
0.039 
 
0.042 
 E/A(-4) 0.080 3.571 0.088 5.384 0.085 4.842 
 
E/A(-4) 0.051 2.268 0.048 24.019 0.049 15.424 
E/A(-3) 0.083 3.998 0.092 4.990 0.089 4.695 
 
E/A(-3) 0.055 8.659 0.054 11.635 0.054 10.595 
E/A(-2) 0.088 5.569 0.097 4.719 0.094 4.968 
 
E/A(-2) 0.064 15.869 0.067 24.939 0.066 21.825 
E/A(-1) 0.094 6.769 0.104 7.587 0.101 7.346 
 
E/A(-1) 0.087 37.285 0.102 52.665 0.097 47.643 
E/A 0.092 -1.547 0.093 -10.679 0.093 -8.000 
 
E/A 0.093 6.825 0.094 -8.212 0.094 -3.647 
E/A(+1) 0.091 -1.301 0.085 -8.079 0.087 -5.910 
 
E/A(+1) 0.086 -7.880 0.067 -28.009 0.074 -21.149 
E/A(+2) 0.090 -0.640 0.080 -6.373 0.083 -4.361 
 
E/A(+2) 0.083 -3.745 0.060 -11.588 0.068 -8.090 
E/A(+3) 0.091 0.889 0.075 -5.762 0.081 -3.286 
 
E/A(+3) 0.088 6.277 0.052 -12.233 0.065 -4.283 
E/A(+4) 0.090 -1.495 0.073 -2.831 0.079 -2.202 
 
E/A(+4) 0.078 -11.106 0.056 7.641 0.064 -0.996 
E/A(+5) 0.086 -3.717 0.071 -2.508 0.077 -2.877 
 
E/A(+5) 0.081 4.077 0.051 -10.364 0.062 -3.700 
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Table 3.7 records the past five-year earnings, current earnings and future 
five-year earnings performance for dividend payers, new dividend payers, 
dividend-continuation firms, and dividend-increase firms who experience past 
earnings growths. All Payer and Newpayer firms exhibit decreases in E/A in the five 
years except some groups with EPSG(1-5) which have a limited number of 
observations. Table 3.7 reports that future E/A for Payer within 1963-1979 are 
different from future E/A for Payer within 1979 to 2000. We can still observe 
one-to-two years increase in E/A for Payer within 1963-1978, but future E/A for 
Payer with EPSG(n) within 1979-2000 are continuing to decrease through the 
following five years. Compared with Payer with EPSG(n), Newpayer with EPSG(n) 
shows decreasing E/A for the first two years after experiencing past earnings growth, 
but usually reverses with increasing E/A in four years and/or in five years. Although 
these reverses may indicate that firms, who are affected by past experience in 
growing EPS and then decide to initiate dividends, are more rational than the group 
of Payer with EPSG(n) in forecasting future earnings performance, the aggregated 
levels of E/A are still decreasing for these Newpayer, and we cannot conclude that 
Newpayer are not over-optimistic in extrapolating future earnings performance. 
Similar to groups of Payer, groups of Divincrease within 1979-2000 have YoY 
decreasing E/A, while groups of Divincrease within 1963-1978 have not such a YoY 
decrease in E/A. However, all Divincrease groups show general decrease in E/A from 
current year t to the end of year t+5. Because Divcontinue firms also include ones 
who may be pessimistic regarding future earnings performance and choose to 
decrease dividends, no YoY decrease in E/A for Divcontinue firms can be found. 
Nevertheless, all Divcontinue groups have general decreasing future E/A from 
current year t to year t+5, too. 
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Generally Table 3.7 shows that firms’ growth in EPS cannot be stable in the 
long run. If it is true that managers are incorrect in extrapolating future earnings 
growth, and they also try to use dividends for the purpose of signalling, then they are 
over-optimistic. It seems that managers are not as over-optimistic in signalling to 
investors by using dividends during the time period of 1963-1978 as in signalling by 
using dividends in 1979-2000. Managers are becoming more sentimental and 
over-optimistic in recent years than previously. 
In summary, Table 3.7 reports managers’ over-reactions. Managers are more 
likely to over-react in the later time period than in the earlier time period. No matter 
whether it is the payout decision of being dividend payers, being new dividend 
payers, continuing dividends, or increasing dividends that is being considered, the 
statistic descriptive table with combined conditions will lead to the same conclusion. 
 
3.5.3. Other dividend decisions: dividend omission and dividend decrease 
3.5.3.1. Is dividend omission affected by decrease in past earnings? 
After we provide the empirical evidence that past earnings growth is positively 
related with managers’ decisions to begin paying dividends, we try to answer another 
interesting question: Is dividend omission also affected by long-term decrease in 
earnings over the past three years or five years? We create four new dummy 
variables which are the opposite of the EPSG series. These variables are: (1) 
five-year year-on-year decreases (YoY decreases) (EPSG(1-5)) in past earnings, 
three-year YoY decreases (EPSG(1-3)) in earnings, five-year general earnings’ 
decreases ignoring fluctuations within the past five-year period (EPSD(1,5)), and 
three-year general decreases ignoring fluctuations within the past three-year period 
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(EPSD(1,3)). (See Appendix 3.2 for details of these EPS-related dummies.) We use 
the same method in running regression models with the exception that we replace 
EPSG series variables with EPSD series variables, and replace the dependent 
variable with the dependent variable of omitting dividends or not. 
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Table 3.8 Decision of omitting payers and determining factors from 1963 to 2000 
Table 3.8 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance. In Panel A we firstly 
perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) to get firms’ 
propensity to omit dividends (PTO). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTO on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy 
variables which represent firms’ past declines in EPS (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B and Panel C which 
respectively report PTO without controlling risks and PTO after controlling risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicator of firms’ past declines in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ 
sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk 
and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Divomission 
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-0.87***(-2.89) -3.72***(-6.99) -3.08***(-5.26) -0.94**(-2.61) -11.68***(-3.31) 
  
-3.14***(-8.31) -3.29***(-5.14) -2.50***(-4.70) -1.63***(-3.83) -13.00***(-3.15) 107.25***(4.63) 77.53***(7.49) 
Panel B. PTO without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSD (5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD(1-3) EPSD(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01***(3.51) -2.40E-3 (-0.36) 0.04***(3.28) 
   
32197 0.00 
1.49E-3 (0.52) -3.08E-3 (-0.50) 
 
0.03***(13.41) 
  
33969 0.01 
0.01***(2.66) 2.38E-3 (0.38) 
 
 
0.06***(15.88) 
 
37631 0.01 
9.37E-4 (0.36) 1.88E-3 (0.32) 
 
  
0.03***(15.75) 38762 0.01 
Panel C. PTO after controlling risk factors 
0.01***(2.94) -0.01(-1.21) 0.05***(4.09) 
   
31346 0.00 
-1.33E-3 (-0.47) -4.56E-3 (-0.72) 
 
0.02***(12.6) 
  
32703 0.01 
0.01**(2.19) -4.15E-3 (-0.66) 
 
 
0.06***(15.49) 
 
36650 0.01 
-2.12E-3 (-0.82) -2.95E-4 (-0.05) 
 
  
0.03***(14.97) 37377 0.01 
where *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
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Table 3.8 shows that dividend omission is positively related to firms’ past 
decrease in earnings, after controlling for fundamental factors and risk factors. The 
impact from firms’ past depreciating performance in earnings on dividend omission 
is robust when different alternative EPSD series dummies are used, or whether risk 
factors are controlled. The catering factor has no significant impact on PTO. 
Therefore, these results suggest that decreases in past earnings have significant 
impact on managers’ decisions of omitting dividends, and this extrapolation based on 
past poor performance in earnings has a stronger explanatory power than managers’ 
catering incentive: dividend premium. 
 
3.5.3.2. Dividend decrease 
We also test whether firms with previously decreasing earnings tend to decrease 
dividends by replacing PTO with PTD (propensity to decrease dividends). Table 3.9 
shows that dividend premium has a robust and significantly negative effect on firms’ 
propensity to decrease dividends. On the other hand, the significance of managers’ 
extrapolations on explaining PTD sensitively depends on which decreasing type is 
chosen. If only groups with YoY decreases in EPS are considered, the positive 
impact of decreasing EPS on PTD is significant and robust.
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Table 3.9 Decision of decreasing determinants and determining factors from 1963 to 2000 
Table 3.9 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance. In Panel A we firstly 
perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) to get firms’ 
propensity to omit dividends (PTD). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTD on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy 
variables which represent firms’ past declines in EPS (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B and Panel C which 
respectively report PTD without controlling risk factors and PTD after controlling risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past declines in EPS. NYP is used to represent 
firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ 
systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Divdecrease 
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-0.87***(-8.71) -0.91***(-10.39) -0.28(-1.49) 0.44***(9.90) -7.30***(-7.20) 
  
-2.10***(-6.63) 0.16(0.23) -0.11(-0.37) -0.13(-0.25) 3.28(0.34) -22.22(-0.61) 27.59***(10.36) 
Panel B. PTD without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
-9.84E-4 (-0.15) -0.12***(-7.49) 0.14***(4.46) 
   
32197 0.00 
0.01 (1.58) -0.10***(-6.81) 
 
-2.22E-3 (-0.50) 
  
33969 0.00 
-4.92E-3 (-0.86) -0.10***(-7.23) 
 
 
0.09***(10.5) 
 
37631 0.01 
2.17E-3 (0.36) -0.09***(-7.02) 
 
  
0.01***(2.79) 38762 0.00 
Panel C. PTD after controlling risk factors 
0.04***(5.98) -0.19***(-11.76) 0.21***(6.65) 
   
31346 0.00 
0.03***(4.35) -0.17***(-11.07) 
 
0.03***(7.21) 
  
32703 0.01 
0.03***(5.80) -0.17***(-11.70) 
 
 
0.14***(15.35) 
 
36650 0.01 
0.02***(3.86) -0.16***(-11.06) 
 
  
0.05***(10.96) 37377 0.01 
where *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
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In summary, managers’ extrapolations proxy by firms’ previously earnings 
patterns not only have robust significant influence on managers’ decisions to 
pay/initiate/increase dividends, but also have strong explanatory power in affecting 
firms’ propensity to omit or decrease dividends. Jointly analysed with results from 
the regression of PTO on EPSD series variables, and PTD on EPSD series variables, 
managers’ activities of extrapolation play an important role in explaining managers’ 
dividend decisions. In addition, managerial extrapolation factors can win in most 
“horse races” with recently-developed explanatory factors like risk factors and the 
catering factor. 
 
3.5.4. Future profitability of firms who omit/decrease dividends 
Similar to Section 3.2, we conduct further checks regarding managers’ over-reaction 
which is reflected by the activity of extrapolating past EPS’s declines into the future. 
We produce Table 3.10 for a clear and detailed look at statistics descriptive of firms’ 
future earnings performance after managers make decision to omit/decrease 
dividends after experiencing previously persistent decreases in EPS. Since firms may 
cut dividends to invest money in extending their capitals, the means of asset growth 
from the past five years to the future five years are also listed in Table 3.10 for 
examining whether firms who omit/decrease dividends are re-investing and 
extending themselves.
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Table 3.10 Future profitability and future investment of firms who have past decreasing EPS and omit/decrease dividends 
Table 3.10 reports means and growth rates of current profitability and future 5-year profitability for Divomissions and Divdecreases with experiences of past earnings deduction. 
E/A represents firm’s profitability at current fiscal year, and E/A (n) represents firm’s profitability in n-year. Growth rate is calculated by using current E/A minus E/A at previous 
fiscal year all divided by previous fiscal years’ E/A. Means and growth rates of E/A are calculated within three groups based on the argument of Fama and French (2001) that 
there is a structure break around 1979: 1963-1978, 1979-2000, and 1963-2000. We show the same things for ∆A/A as the proxy of investment.  
Divomission with EPSG(1-3) 
 
Divdecrease with EPSG(1-3) 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
  Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % 
 
  Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.083 
 
0.097 
 
0.094 
  
E/A(-5) 0.092 
 
0.105 
 
0.102 
 E/A(-4) 0.095 14.325 0.111 14.223 0.107 13.711 
 
E/A(-4) 0.100 8.511 0.117 10.566 0.112 9.779 
E/A(-3) 0.073 -22.806 0.081 -26.996 0.079 -26.073 
 
E/A(-3) 0.085 -14.942 0.093 -19.920 0.091 -18.817 
E/A(-2) 0.052 -28.655 0.044 -46.010 0.046 -42.019 
 
E/A(-2) 0.066 -21.615 0.066 -29.687 0.066 -27.813 
E/A(-1) 0.005 -109.114 0.034 -177.409 0.027 -158.084 
 
E/A(-1) 0.029 -55.593 0.010 -84.632 0.015 -77.314 
E/A 0.013 -374.778 0.006 -81.788 0.001 -94.797 
 
E/A 0.037 25.776 0.020 101.014 0.024 63.897 
E/A(+1) 0.041 215.821 0.008 -224.751 0.017 -1314.775 
 
E/A(+1) 0.056 50.018 0.034 67.195 0.040 61.712 
E/A(+2) 0.066 58.957 0.030 286.472 0.040 137.282 
 
E/A(+2) 0.073 30.866 0.040 17.268 0.049 23.048 
E/A(+3) 0.066 1.421 0.033 9.935 0.043 7.333 
 
E/A(+3) 0.072 -1.412 0.045 13.835 0.053 8.267 
E/A(+4) 0.051 -22.897 0.040 22.350 0.044 1.847 
 
E/A(+4) 0.057 -20.215 0.051 12.664 0.053 0.198 
E/A(+5) 0.057 10.493 0.047 17.618 0.050 15.414 
 
E/A(+5) 0.063 9.765 0.054 5.257 0.056 6.956 
∆A/A(-5) 0.106 87.904 0.096 104.113 0.098 94.931 
 
∆A/A(-5) 0.091 44.421 0.104 94.435 0.101 79.340 
∆A/A(-4) 0.177 65.928 0.131 37.051 0.141 43.972 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.143 57.775 0.128 22.265 0.131 29.401 
∆A/A(-3) 0.148 -16.450 0.114 -13.432 0.122 -13.502 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.118 -17.376 0.102 -20.100 0.106 -19.143 
∆A/A(-2) 0.062 -57.774 0.055 -51.366 0.057 -53.289 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.071 -40.445 0.064 -36.761 0.066 -37.788 
∆A/A(-1) 0.021 -133.747 0.063 -213.504 0.052 -191.863 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.011 -85.097 0.019 -128.772 0.011 -117.112 
∆A/A 0.119 467.318 0.078 23.815 0.088 68.021 
 
∆A/A 0.026 -347.508 0.022 18.051 0.023 103.042 
∆A/A(+1) 0.028 -76.375 0.097 25.084 0.078 -10.897 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.014 -153.523 0.035 58.219 0.022 -4.219 
∆A/A(+2) 0.063 -322.202 0.056 -42.556 0.025 -68.081 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.067 379.411 0.007 -79.764 0.012 -155.266 
∆A/A(+3) 0.074 18.160 0.015 -127.036 0.030 -221.617 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.071 6.796 0.018 -359.095 0.032 163.120 
∆A/A(+4) 0.020 -72.448 0.031 103.091 0.028 -8.254 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.046 -35.408 0.030 67.895 0.035 8.100 
∆A/A(+5) 0.025 21.594 0.020 -35.016 0.021 -24.212  ∆A/A(+5) 0.034 -25.637 0.040 29.649 0.038 10.548 
               
Chapter 3 Profitability Change Persistence, Managerial Overreaction, and Dividend Policy 
 
112 
 
Divomission with EPSG(1,3) 
 
Divdecrease with EPSG(1,3) 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
  Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % 
 
  Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.068 
 
0.081 
 
0.078 
  
E/A(-5) 0.084 
 
0.095 
 
0.093 
 E/A(-4) 0.077 13.358 0.087 7.771 0.085 8.404 
 
E/A(-4) 0.089 5.873 0.101 6.525 0.098 6.087 
E/A(-3) 0.067 -12.333 0.072 -17.104 0.071 -16.093 
 
E/A(-3) 0.084 -4.690 0.090 -11.436 0.088 -9.869 
E/A(-2) 0.053 -20.624 0.051 -29.368 0.052 -27.429 
 
E/A(-2) 0.075 -11.751 0.077 -14.351 0.076 -13.710 
E/A(-1) 0.005 -91.196 0.020 -138.317 0.014 -126.871 
 
E/A(-1) 0.050 -32.599 0.042 -45.293 0.044 -42.082 
E/A 0.015 226.973 0.000 -102.237 0.004 -128.439 
 
E/A 0.049 -3.344 0.044 3.760 0.045 1.669 
E/A(+1) 0.037 140.291 0.019 4213.585 0.023 492.621 
 
E/A(+1) 0.062 27.156 0.054 23.318 0.056 24.529 
E/A(+2) 0.043 16.861 0.029 52.968 0.033 39.242 
 
E/A(+2) 0.067 9.152 0.054 0.138 0.058 2.987 
E/A(+3) 0.048 11.345 0.029 -1.215 0.034 3.815 
 
E/A(+3) 0.070 4.401 0.056 3.525 0.060 4.023 
E/A(+4) 0.045 -5.530 0.039 35.574 0.041 20.020 
 
E/A(+4) 0.067 -4.152 0.058 3.870 0.061 1.328 
E/A(+5) 0.051 12.561 0.039 0.258 0.042 4.319 
 
E/A(+5) 0.067 -1.012 0.059 2.542 0.062 1.466 
∆A/A(-5) 0.056 10.137 0.082 112.202 0.077 81.312 
 
∆A/A(-5) 0.081 21.800 0.096 61.102 0.092 49.809 
∆A/A(-4) 0.132 134.148 0.092 11.849 0.100 30.826 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.113 38.967 0.104 8.727 0.106 15.081 
∆A/A(-3) 0.111 -15.953 0.098 5.742 0.101 0.144 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.107 -5.069 0.099 -5.356 0.101 -5.116 
∆A/A(-2) 0.079 -28.201 0.062 -36.423 0.066 -34.304 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.087 -19.282 0.079 -19.686 0.081 -19.572 
∆A/A(-1) 0.014 -82.445 0.055 -188.229 0.039 -158.319 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.049 -43.551 0.023 -70.466 0.030 -63.024 
∆A/A 0.069 -591.478 0.095 72.906 0.088 129.474 
 
∆A/A 0.024 -49.932 0.004 -81.695 0.010 -68.288 
∆A/A(+1) 0.026 -62.387 0.066 -30.470 0.056 -36.926 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.038 57.243 0.009 119.446 0.017 80.377 
∆A/A(+2) 0.022 -186.477 0.020 -70.260 0.009 -83.190 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.052 35.899 0.018 92.455 0.027 58.686 
∆A/A(+3) 0.050 123.679 0.019 -195.294 0.026 -380.290 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.065 23.683 0.040 119.233 0.046 70.200 
∆A/A(+4) 0.007 -85.588 0.039 109.220 0.031 18.652 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.055 -15.598 0.042 5.602 0.045 -2.317 
∆A/A(+5) 0.024 228.393 0.027 -29.731 0.027 -15.052   ∆A/A(+5) 0.049 -9.394 0.045 8.446 0.046 2.682 
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Divomission with EPSG(1-5) 
 
Divdecrease with EPSG(1-5) 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
  Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % 
 
  Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.083 
 
0.108 
 
0.104 
  
E/A(-5) 0.094 
 
0.119 
 
0.113 
 E/A(-4) 0.060 -27.953 0.097 -10.595 0.090 -13.237 
 
E/A(-4) 0.083 -11.625 0.107 -10.133 0.102 -10.401 
E/A(-3) 0.068 14.311 0.074 -23.336 0.073 -18.579 
 
E/A(-3) 0.086 3.570 0.083 -22.458 0.083 -17.846 
E/A(-2) 0.049 -27.430 0.043 -42.211 0.044 -39.589 
 
E/A(-2) 0.075 -13.069 0.054 -34.995 0.058 -30.097 
E/A(-1) 0.025 -49.729 0.036 -182.972 0.024 -154.579 
 
E/A(-1) 0.032 -57.162 0.004 -106.597 0.004 -92.863 
E/A 0.041 63.133 0.009 -76.007 0.001 -103.317 
 
E/A 0.059 82.356 0.008 -327.414 0.019 355.912 
E/A(+1) 0.041 1.157 0.001 -85.182 0.008 915.912 
 
E/A(+1) 0.065 11.326 0.032 298.561 0.040 112.187 
E/A(+2) 0.083 103.312 0.006 377.994 0.018 118.911 
 
E/A(+2) 0.084 28.686 0.023 -29.969 0.038 -5.369 
E/A(+3) 0.032 -61.143 0.018 -391.580 0.022 22.918 
 
E/A(+3) 0.062 -25.616 0.039 73.522 0.045 18.882 
E/A(+4) 0.056 73.115 0.022 24.939 0.033 52.737 
 
E/A(+4) 0.075 19.974 0.037 -6.324 0.048 5.117 
E/A(+5) 0.060 7.232 0.056 152.317 0.057 71.523 
 
E/A(+5) 0.079 5.804 0.005 -86.327 0.026 -44.983 
∆A/A(-5) 0.274 356.186 0.110 96.685 0.141 145.910 
 
∆A/A(-5) 0.145 83.443 0.134 2571.358 0.136 419.612 
∆A/A(-4) 0.258 -6.167 0.091 -16.725 0.123 -12.809 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.132 -9.282 0.108 -19.438 0.113 -17.095 
∆A/A(-3) 0.039 -115.193 0.113 23.668 0.084 -31.760 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.031 -76.332 0.084 -21.523 0.073 -35.361 
∆A/A(-2) 0.182 365.026 0.103 -8.834 0.049 -42.058 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.009 -72.144 0.058 -31.252 0.047 -35.032 
∆A/A(-1) 0.035 -119.464 0.021 -120.522 0.010 -121.277 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.024 170.986 0.028 -148.318 0.017 -135.662 
∆A/A 0.020 -43.851 0.073 248.070 0.056 438.538 
 
∆A/A 0.058 144.213 0.053 90.519 0.029 74.346 
∆A/A(+1) 0.041 103.897 0.047 -36.238 0.027 -50.753 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.045 -21.145 0.048 -10.716 0.025 -15.772 
∆A/A(+2) 0.062 52.404 0.000 -100.807 0.015 -154.079 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.076 67.460 0.001 -98.298 0.016 -165.948 
∆A/A(+3) 0.005 -107.707 0.008 -2248.662 0.007 -150.256 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.043 -43.632 0.025 -3222.642 0.029 78.977 
∆A/A(+4) 0.029 -709.747 0.051 524.806 0.034 355.754 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.058 35.019 0.019 -173.779 0.001 -104.196 
∆A/A(+5) 0.021 -26.529 0.129 154.764 0.099 192.063   ∆A/A(+5) 0.057 -1.488 0.038 102.133 0.018 1325.611 
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Divomission with EPSG(1,5) 
 
Divdecrease with EPSG(1,5) 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
 
  63-78 79-00 63-00 
  Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % 
 
  Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % Mean Grow rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.067 
 
0.080 
 
0.078 
  
E/A(-5) 0.085 
 
0.094 
 
0.092 
 E/A(-4) 0.068 2.462 0.076 -5.158 0.075 -4.032 
 
E/A(-4) 0.083 -2.098 0.090 -4.609 0.088 -4.128 
E/A(-3) 0.065 -4.994 0.066 -14.005 0.066 -12.558 
 
E/A(-3) 0.081 -2.374 0.083 -6.900 0.083 -6.009 
E/A(-2) 0.052 -19.221 0.047 -27.663 0.048 -26.192 
 
E/A(-2) 0.074 -8.889 0.073 -12.580 0.073 -11.824 
E/A(-1) 0.000 -100.483 0.023 -147.480 0.019 -138.519 
 
E/A(-1) 0.050 -31.954 0.039 -46.768 0.041 -43.636 
E/A 0.014 -5448.728 0.003 -88.088 0.000 -100.906 
 
E/A 0.049 -2.334 0.041 4.351 0.042 2.644 
E/A(+1) 0.031 131.527 0.019 -790.211 0.021 12305.117 
 
E/A(+1) 0.062 27.220 0.052 28.885 0.054 28.668 
E/A(+2) 0.040 25.878 0.034 80.902 0.035 65.826 
 
E/A(+2) 0.069 11.136 0.053 2.437 0.057 4.861 
E/A(+3) 0.046 17.556 0.028 -16.910 0.032 -8.461 
 
E/A(+3) 0.073 5.080 0.054 1.219 0.059 2.591 
E/A(+4) 0.044 -4.343 0.037 33.940 0.039 22.343 
 
E/A(+4) 0.071 -2.182 0.056 3.515 0.060 2.016 
E/A(+5) 0.047 6.070 0.042 13.213 0.043 11.506 
 
E/A(+5) 0.070 -1.405 0.058 3.499 0.061 2.174 
∆A/A(-5) 0.086 82.866 0.090 113.336 0.089 106.391 
 
∆A/A(-5) 0.092 30.821 0.098 68.837 0.097 58.415 
∆A/A(-4) 0.118 36.951 0.083 -7.736 0.089 -0.215 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.102 11.408 0.089 -9.507 0.091 -5.352 
∆A/A(-3) 0.098 -17.140 0.088 5.395 0.089 0.208 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.096 -5.914 0.087 -2.338 0.089 -3.172 
∆A/A(-2) 0.079 -19.751 0.050 -42.644 0.055 -38.246 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.083 -14.101 0.069 -20.379 0.072 -18.948 
∆A/A(-1) 0.006 -91.969 0.074 -247.761 0.060 -208.858 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.042 -49.148 0.015 -78.918 0.020 -71.729 
∆A/A 0.093 -1571.992 0.102 37.175 0.100 66.818 
 
∆A/A 0.015 -63.196 0.003 -123.720 0.001 -97.431 
∆A/A(+1) 0.067 -27.789 0.070 -31.567 0.069 -30.980 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.029 90.139 0.004 -224.452 0.010 1770.734 
∆A/A(+2) 0.002 -102.548 0.030 -56.465 0.024 -64.723 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.059 99.429 0.011 158.208 0.021 120.257 
∆A/A(+3) 0.068 3891.703 0.017 -155.913 0.026 -208.412 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.070 20.144 0.035 215.372 0.043 98.645 
∆A/A(+4) 0.007 -109.889 0.026 51.230 0.020 -25.326 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.055 -22.131 0.041 17.740 0.044 3.287 
∆A/A(+5) 0.014 -313.773 0.030 17.593 0.027 38.543   ∆A/A(+5) 0.057 4.535 0.044 7.187 0.047 6.424 
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There are two main conclusions which can be made from Table 3.10: (1) if 
firms with decreasing past EPS chose to omit/decrease dividends, they may not be 
going to have decreases in future EPS; (2) if firms with decreasing past EPS chose to 
omit/decrease dividends, it is not certain that they are extending their size by 
re-investing their cash in themselves. For firms who omit/decrease dividends, they 
usually have generally increasing future E/A, although decreasing E/A at a certain 
year can be observed occasionally. The growing future E/A for firms who experience 
decreasing EPS and omit/decrease dividends is significant. For some groups of firms 
with EPSD, they even have YoY increased in future EPS. On the other hand, we 
cannot find significant and robust increases in future asset growth for these firms. 
 
3.5.5. Robustness tests 
3.5.5.1. Dividend initiators who did not pay dividend over past three or five 
years 
Since our dummies record firms’ earnings growth for the past three years or five 
years which are longer than the dependent variables of dividend status, we also 
create alternative dependent variables (S3newpayer and S5newpayer) which record 
firms’ payout status for the past three years or five years in our regression models as 
alternative dependent variables for the purpose of a robustness check.  
We create “strong” dependent variables which represent firms’ payout status at 
current fiscal year t, when firms’ payout statuses are also considered for the past 
three years and five years. Because these two “strong” dependent variables 
(S3newpayer and S5newpayer) record firms’ past dividend status for the past three 
years and five years, we apply it in Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s method of running 
regressions which use dependent variables with the condition of past payout status. 
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We only report results of running similar regression on S3newpayer by other 
explanatory variables in Table 3.11 and results of regression on S5newpayer by other 
independent variables in Table 3.12 from 1963 to 2000 by using the FTP format of 
COMPUSTAT data set. For Table 3.11 and Table 3.12, we have the first step where 
we rule out the impact of conventional factors, and the second step (Panel A, Panel 
B, Panel C, and Panel D) which test the effect of dividend premium and past 
earnings performance on propensity to be “strong” new payers (PTSI) or changes in 
propensity to be “strong” new payers (∆PTSI).
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Table 3.11 Decision of being strong new dividend payers (S3newpayer) and determining factors from 1963 to 2000 
Table 3.11 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance. In Panel A we 
firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) to get 
firms’ propensity to “strong” initiate (PTS3I). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTS3I on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and 
dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3) and EPSG(1,3)). The second stage is divided into Panels B, Panel C, Panel D, and Panel 
E which respectively report PTS3I without controlling risks, PTS3I after controlling for risks, ∆PTS3I without controlling for risks, and ∆PTS3I after controlling for risks on VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s 
investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed 
construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: S3newpayer 
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-4.11***(-14.02) 1.86***(5.01) 0.02(0.07) -0.94***(-6.22) 6.46***(5.40) 
  
-7.24*(-1.75) 3.49(1.21) -0.05(-0.17) -3.53(-1.40) 16.26*(1.72) 245.35 (1.22) 61.68 (0.66) 
Panel B. PTS3I without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐   
0.04***(14.84) 0.16***(17.74) 0.02***(5.80) 
 
28150 0.02 
 
0.03***(9.80) 0.12***(15.06) 
 
0.02***(10.95) 30095 0.02 
 
Panel C. PTS3I after controlling risk factors 
0.02***(6.59) 0.15***(14.32) 0.02***(5.51) 
 
27322 0.02 
 
0.01***(3.24) 0.15***(14.88) 
 
0.03***(9.85) 28220 0.02 
 
Panel D. ∆PTS3I without controlling risk factors 
0.05***(16.92) 0.16***(18.12) 0.03***(8.18) 
 
26896 0.02 
 
0.04***(11.56) 0.16***(18.51) 
 
0.03***(13.79) 27746 0.02 
 
Panel E. ∆PTS3I after controlling risk factors 
0.05***(14.94) 0.23***(21.41) 0.03***(8.14) 
 
26099 0.03 
 
0.04***(9.49) 0.23***(21.93) 
 
0.04***(13.86) 26896 0.03 
 
where *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
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In Table 3.11, when S3newpayer performances is the dependent variable in the 
Fama-Macbeth logistic regression, we cannot find significant differences from the 
new regression’s results to the results in Table 3.3, if risk factors are not considered. 
Firms’ size and profitability show a positive effect on firms’ decisions of being new 
dividend payers, while M/B ratio is significantly negatively related to the 
dividend-issuing decision, but asset growth does not have a significant relation with 
the status of being “strong” dividend payers. When risks are added, only 
profitability’s significance is left, which may indicate a bad model-fitting. It means 
that risks cannot explain “strong” initiation after being non-payers for three years.  
From Table 3.11, we can also find that firms’ past positive earnings growth 
plays a significant role in positively affecting managers’ decision of paying 
dividends, after firms choose to be non-payers for years. The same to results found 
in Table 3.3, investors’ requirement in receiving dividends (dividend premium) also 
play a significant role. Results in Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 imply that managers will 
also take investors’ sentiments into consideration, when managers are making 
different payout decisions, after they refuse to pay dividends for three years or five 
years.
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Table 3.12 Decision of being strong new dividend payers (S5newpayer) and determining factors from 1963 to 2000 
Table 3.12 reports the two-step regression of firms’’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance. In Panel A we 
firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) to get 
firms’ propensity to “strong” initiate (PTS5I). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTS5I on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and 
dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-5) and EPSG(1,5)). The second stage is divided into Panels B, Panel C, Panel D, and Panel 
E which respectively report PTS5I without controlling risks, PTS5I after controlling for risks, ∆PTS5I without controlling for risks, and ∆PTS5I after controlling for risks on VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s 
investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed 
construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: S5newpayer 
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-4.72***(-13.89) 2.07***(4.63) -0.02(-0.06) -1.02***(-5.64) 5.45***(5.27) 
  
-2.91***(-3.02) 0.86(0.64) 1.26(0.73) -2.18*(-1.91) 9.99*(1.80) 180.82(1.50) -140.37(-1.32) 
Panel B. PTS5I without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (1-5) EPSG(1,5) N 𝑹𝟐   
0.06***(15.19) 0.17***(15.42) 0.02**(2.44) 
 
19709 0.02 
 
0.04***(10.59) 0.12***(12.84) 
 
0.03***(9.20) 22254 0.02 
 
Panel C. PTS5I after controlling risk factors 
0.06***(16.39) 0.17***(15.26) 0.02***(2.61) 
 
19131 0.02 
 
0.05***(12.91) 0.18***(16.12) 
 
0.03***(9.19) 20634 0.02 
 
Panel D. ∆PTS5I without controlling risk factors 
0.06***(15.26) 0.17***(15.29) 0.03***(3.28) 
 
18687 0.02 
 
0.04***(10.69) 0.17***(16.28) 
 
0.03***(10.82) 20125 0.02 
 
Panel E. ∆PTS5I after controlling risk factors 
0.06***(15.25) 0.17***(14.97) 0.03***(3.47) 
 
18133 0.02 
 
0.04***(10.59) 0.17***(15.95) 
 
0.03***(10.90) 19511 0.02 
 
where *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
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When S3newpayer is replaced by S5newpayer in Table 3.12, we find the same 
conclusion made from Table 3.11. Our proxies of managers’ extrapolation based on 
positive past earnings performance survive through all models and methods. The 
conclusions we can make from the EPS-related dummy variables are the same and 
robust. 
 
3.5.5.2. Sub-sample periods: 1963-1978 and 1979-2000 
Butler et al. (2006a) suggest a structure break around 1978, and Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009) apply this structure break in testing their risk factors on Baker’s and 
Wurgler’s (2004a) PTI and ∆PTI by running regressions separately in different time 
horizons. For the purpose of robustness check, we also examine managers’ 
extrapolations on ∆PTP and ∆PTP (Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009) and PTI (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004a) in different time horizons: 1963-1978 and 1979-2000 respectively.
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Table 3.13 Decision of being dividend payers and determining factors from 1963 to 1978 
Table 3.13 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 1963 to 1978. 
At Panel A we perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) to 
get firms’ propensity to pay (PTP). At second stage we use pooled method to regression ∆PTP on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy 
variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second stage is divided into Panels B and Panel C 
which respectively report ∆PTP without controlling risk factors on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and firms’ optimistic past EPS performance, and ∆PTP after controlling risk factors on VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷  and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s 
investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed 
construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Payer 
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-0.06(-0.28) 3.88***(14.45) -0.79(-1.72) -0.82***(6.04) 18.14***(6.68) 
  
2.89***(4.20) 3.16***(6.16) -1.03**(-2.57) -0.48***(3.22) 14.95***(5.49) -142.46***(-8.78) -76.54***(-7.13) 
Step 2: Firm-year PTP as dependent variable; Pooled method by controlling industry dummy 
Panel B. ∆PTP without controlling for risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
2.53E-3 (0.32) 0.04*(1.72) 0.02**(2.41) 
   
10440 0.00 
-0.04***(-4.65) 0.07***(3.48) 
 
0.06***(12.79) 
  
11635 0.01 
-0.01(-1.22) 0.03*(1.80) 
 
 
0.04***(8.62) 
 
15545 0.00 
-0.04***(-7.02) 0.04**(2.19) 
 
  
0.07***(18.27) 16211 0.02 
Panel C. ∆PTP after controlling for risk factors 
0.01(1.62) -0.04(-1.51) 4.62E-3 (0.45) 
   
10257 0.00 
-0.01(-1.46) -0.02(-1.07) 
 
0.04***(8.31) 
  
11439 0.01 
0.02**(2.40) -0.07***(-3.59) 
 
 
0.03***(5.90) 
 
15224 0.00 
-0.02**(-2.24) -0.07***(-3.99) 
 
  
0.06***(14.33) 15873 0.01 
where *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%.  
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Table 3.14 Decision of being new dividend payers and determining factors from 1963 to 1978 
Table 3.14 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 1963 to 1978. 
In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 
2009) to get firms’ propensity to initiate (PTI). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTI and ∆PTI on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into 
Panels B, Panel C, Panel D and Panel E which respectively report PTI without controlling for risks, ∆PTI without controlling for risks, PTI after controlling for risks, and  ∆PTI 
after controlling for risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth 
(∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg 
and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Newpayer 
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-2.18***(-4.49) 1.37**(2.92) 0.60(1.22) -1.52**(-2.81) 15.00***(5.12) 
  
-0.18(-0.39) 0.65(1.12) 0.88(1.69) -1.53***(-3.04) 13.87***(4.69) -17.48(-0.56) -57.62***(-4.97) 
Panel B. PTI without controlling for risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.02(0.86) 0.04(0.44) -0.00(-0.11) 
   
2223 0.00 
0.02(1.4) -0.13***(-3.21) 
 
0.04***(3.58) 
  
2683 0.01 
0.02(1.01) 0.01(0.11) 
 
 
0.03**(2.30) 
 
3741 0.00 
0.01(0.85) -0.12***(-3.35) 
 
  
0.05***(4.71) 4157 0.01 
Panel C. PTI after controlling for risk factors 
0.04*(1.93) 0.11(1.37) -0.01(-0.22) 
  
 
2187 0.00 
4.51E-3 (0.21) 0.18**(2.45) 
 
0.06***(4.63) 
  
2379 0.01 
0.02(1.61) 0.10*(1.81) 
 
 
0.04***(2.68) 
 
3655 0.00 
-3.35E-3 (-0.22) 0.12**(2.38) 
 
  
0.06***(5.58) 3776 0.01 
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Table 3.14(continue) 
Panel D. ∆PTI without controlling for risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.12***(4.89) -0.03(-0.34) 0.08**(2.11) 
   
2028 0.00 
0.04*(1.94) 0.11(1.36) 
 
0.10***(7.15) 
  
2203 0.02 
0.09***(5.69) 0.01(0.20) 
 
 
0.09***(6.08) 
 
3429 0.01 
0.03**(2.00) 0.06(1.08) 
 
  
0.11***(9.70) 3532 0.03 
Panel E. ∆PTI after controlling for risk factors 
0.11***(4.79) 0.02(0.25) 0.06*(1.72) 
   
1993 0.00 
0.05**(2.09) 0.14*(1.83) 
 
0.09***(6.53) 
  
2165 0.02 
0.09***(5.76) 0.04(0.60) 
 
 
0.08***(5.64) 
 
3349 0.01 
0.04**(2.19) 0.09(1.52)       0.10***(9.30) 3448 0.02 
where *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%.  
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Table 3.15 Decision of being dividend payers and determining factors from 1979 to 2000 
Table 3.15 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 1979 to 2000. 
At Panel A we perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) to 
get firms’ propensity to pay (PTP). At second stage we use pooled method to regression ∆PTP on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy 
variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second stage is divided into Panels B and Panel C 
which respectively report ∆PTP without controlling risk factors on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and firms’ optimistic past EPS performance, and ∆PTP after controlling risk factors on VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷  and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s 
investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed 
construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Payer 
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-0.83***(-4.11) 4.60***(30.40) -0.45***(-4.45) -0.75***(-10.57) 6.55***(21.47) 
  
1.61***(8.10) 4.06***(16.59) -0.92***(-8.19) -0.46***(-8.01) 5.06***(14.04) -130.45***(-10.19) -61.61***(-15.97) 
Panel B. ∆PTP without controlling for risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.02***(4.72) 0.09***(6.54) 0.04***(6.04) 
   
39592 0.00 
-0.01***(-3.89) 0.09***(6.51) 
 
0.06***(25.52) 
  
41272 0.02 
0.01***(3.47) 0.08***(6.84) 
 
 
0.04***(13.05) 
 
47913 0.00 
-0.01***(-4.32) 0.08***(6.29) 
 
  
0.06***(26.6) 48888 0.02 
Panel C. ∆PTP after controlling for risk factors 
0.01*(1.92) -7.59E-4 (-0.05) 0.03***(4.37) 
   
38346 0.00 
-0.02***(-3.85) -1.77E-3 (-0.12) 
 
0.05***(17.10) 
  
39959 0.01 
6.13E-4 (0.17) -0.02(-1.18) 
 
 
0.04***(10.55) 
 
46421 0.00 
-0.02***(-5.60) -0.02(-1.50) 
 
  
0.05***(20.50) 47339 0.01 
where *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%.  
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Table 3.16 Decision of being new dividend payers and determining factors from 1979 to 2000 
Table 3.16 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 1979 to 2000. 
In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 
2009) to get firms’ propensity to initiate (PTI). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTI and ∆PTI on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into 
Panels B, Panel C, Panel D and Panel E which respectively report PTI without controlling for risks, ∆PTI without controlling for risks, PTI after controlling for risks, and ∆PTI 
after controlling for risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth 
(∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg 
and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Newpayer  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-3.56***(-17.63) 1.52***(9.23) -0.19**(-2.14) -0.52***(-4.17) 5.97***(10.18) 
  
-2.44***(-11.02) 1.34***(5.93) -0.50***(-4.51) -0.44***(-3.69) 6.27***(9.52) -58.60***(-4.13) -24.71***(-6.18) 
Panel B. PTI without controlling for risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01***(3.76) 0.03**(1.96) 0.01(1.40) 
   
17486 0.01 
0.01(1.42) 0.03**(2.21) 
 
0.01***(5.89) 
  
19571 0.01 
0.01***(3.27) 0.02**(2.08) 
  
0.01***(2.75) 
 
24409 0.00 
1.93E-3 (0.64) 0.02**(2.22) 
   
0.01***(7.04) 25938 0.01 
Panel C. PTI after controlling for risk factors 
0.01***(3.57) 0.01(0.83) 0.01(1.11) 
   
16944 0.00 
0.01*(1.85) 0.01(0.96) 
 
0.01***(5.41) 
  
18255 0.01 
0.01***(3.08) 0.01(0.91) 
 
 
0.01**(2.31) 
 
23667 0.00 
3.20E-3 (1.01) 0.01(0.85) 
 
  
0.01***(6.36) 24444 0.00 
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Table 3.16 (continue) 
Panel D. ∆PTI without controlling for risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.03***(8.74) 0.02(1.39) 0.02***(2.83) 
   
16219 0.01 
0.02***(5.03) 0.02(1.49) 
 
0.02***(9.52) 
  
17456 0.01 
0.03***(9.23) 0.02(1.57) 
 
 
0.02***(5.25) 
 
22850 0.01 
0.02***(5.34) 0.02(1.55) 
 
  
0.02***(11.05) 23579 0.01 
Panel E. ∆PTI after controlling for risk factors 
0.03***(8.41) 3.12E-3 (0.23) 0.02***(2.91) 
   
15704 0.01 
0.02***(4.75) 3.88E-3 (0.30) 
 
0.02***(9.19) 
  
16885 0.01 
0.03***(8.68) 1.71E-3 (0.16) 
 
 
0.02***(5.25) 
 
22136 0.01 
0.02***(4.89) 1.15E-3 (0.11) 
 
  
0.02***(10.65) 22817 0.01 
where *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
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Similar to Table 3.6 and Table 3.3, we design Table 3.13 and Table 3.14, and 
Table 3.15 and Table 3.16 by using the same regression models but different time 
horizons. Again, we find that conventional determinants of dividend policy are 
mostly robust across different models and different time periods, except for size, 
asset growth, and systematic risk in Table 3.14. The significant impact from dividend 
premium on ∆PTP, PTI, or ∆PTI is not robust when risk factors are controlled for, 
and it supports Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)’s findings. Except for EPSG(1-5) under 
some cases with limited number of observations, indicators of managerial 
extrapolation proxy by earnings growth for the past three years or five years are 
robust regardless of whether risk factors are controlled for, and when investors’ 
sentiment proxy by dividend premium is controlled for. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter we test the hypothesis that a firm’s dividend payout decision is 
affected by its past long-term earnings performance. In the sample of U.S. firms 
from 1963 to 2000 the proportion of payers among those firms with past EPS’s 
growth is higher than the proportion of dividend payers in the whole sample. We find 
that firms’ previous growth in EPS affects firms’ decisions of 
initiating/continuing/increasing/paying dividends. That is, firms’ excellent past 
EPS’s performance raises managers’ expectations of future EPS performance, and 
then increases managers’ will of using dividends as the signal to attract investors. 
Additionally, we find that our dummies which represent past earnings growth are 
robust in affecting managers’ decisions to initiate dividends after choosing not to pay 
dividends for several years. We find that the impact of managerial extrapolation on 
firms’ dividend decisions is robust compared with the catering factor which is proxy 
by dividend premium (Baker and Wurgler, 2004). 
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Different from previous literature which directly tests the relation between 
firms’ dividend decisions and firms’ future earnings performance (e.g. Arnott and 
Asness, 2003; Gwilym et al., 2006; Zhou and Ruland, 2006), we look for 
information from payers and new payers who may be affected by past earnings 
performance in making dividend decisions. We find that those dividend payers and 
new dividend payers, or those firms who continue/increase dividends have 
experienced positive past earnings growth are suffering non-increasing future 
profitability. This finding indicates that managers who are affected by firms’ 
previous profitability growth and decide to pay dividends have over-reacted in 
extrapolating firms’ past earnings performance into the future.  
Our main findings posit a newly developed hypothesis that managers tend to 
extrapolate firms’ past earnings performance when they are making dividend 
decisions, and firms’ past long-term earnings performance could bring managers 
optimism on firms’ future stable and excellent earnings performance. We also 
provide evidence that dividend payers and new dividend payers’ previously growing 
EPS cannot be used to predict the future earnings’ growth. On the contrary, dividend 
payers’ previously growing profitability usually indicates a decrease in future 
earnings. We use these evidences to support our argument that managers are 
over-optimistic in expecting future earnings performance, and then making dividend 
decisions for the purposes of signalling. 
As a further finding, our proxy for managers’ extrapolation can also affect 
firms’ decisions of omitting or increasing dividends. Firms tend to omit dividends 
after experiencing decreasing earnings and tend to increase dividends after 
experiencing the earnings growth over the past three years or five years. Although 
the direction of extrapolation factors can be different when propensity or changes in 
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propensity is used, the significant impact from extrapolation factors remains robust 
across different models and conditions. In summary, the influence of managerial 
extrapolation on dividend policy is significant and robust. .
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CHAPTER 4 PROFITABILITY CHANGE PERSISTENCE, 
MANAGERIAL OVERREACTION, AND REAPPEARING 
DIVIDENDS 
 ---- Evidence from 1963 to 2013 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 provided empirical evidence that managerial over-reaction can affect firms’ 
dividend decisions during the period 1963 to 2000. In an out-of-sample test, this 
chapter documents the re-appearance of dividend payers’ percentage from 23.52% 
(2002) to 38.35% (2012), while the percentage of firms with year-on-year (YoY) 
growing profitability over the past three years increases from 6.49% (2002) to 16.42% 
(2013). We find that indicators proxy for managerial over-extrapolation applied in 
Chapter 3 can explain not only the disappearance of dividends from 1978 recorded 
by Fama and French (2001) but also the re-appearance of dividends from 2002 in 
this chapter. Similar with results obtained from the sample period of 1963 to 2000, 
during the out-of-sample period from 2001 to 2013, managerial overextrapolation 
also has significant effect on firms’ dividend decisions given firms’ other 
characteristics including size, current profitability, investment opportunities, and 
catering factor (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). 
We test whether managers who observe firms’ past growing/decreasing 
profitability and make dividend decisions based on this past stream of profits are 
over-optimistic/over-pessimistic in an out-of-sample time period from 2001 to 2013 
as well as in the whole time period from 1963 to 2013. For the time period 1963 to 
2013, we find that firms that decide to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends based 
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on past growing profitability tend to have negative growth rate of profitability in the 
future five years, while firms that decide to omit/decrease dividends based on past 
decreasing profitability tend to have positive growth rate of profitability in the future 
five years. During the out-of-sample period, this finding does not hold for the last 
two or three years of the future five years, but these 
profitability-growing/profitability-deducting firms’ total growth rates of profitability 
from the current year to the end of the future five years are negative/positive. 
Therefore, we conclude that in a larger size of sample from 1963 to 2013 and in an 
out-of-sample period from 2001 to 2013, managers overreact in extrapolating past 
profitability performance into the future. 
In a topic related to managers’ dividend decisions, an out-of-sample test for 
robustness check is necessary because determinants’ impact on firms’ dividend 
decisions may change over time or change when the methodology used to analyse is 
changed. Take the catering theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a) as an example: since 
Fama and French (2001) record that firms’ propensity to pay dividends (calculated 
as the residual of logistic regression by regressing the status of whether firms are 
dividend payers or not on determining factors) decreases after 1978, literature 
tentatively looks for factors which can be used to explain this phenomena of 
disappearing dividends. Given conventional factors like firms’ size, current 
profitability, and investment opportunity, Baker and Wurgler (2004a) develop a 
catering theory that rational managers may cater to investors’ demand on dividends, 
and Baker and Wurgler (2004b) find that the onset and continuation of disappearing 
dividends is driven by the catering factor (dividend premium which is the difference 
between log of value-weighted market to book ratio for dividend payers and log of 
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value-weighted market to book ratio for non-payers) by dividing their sample time 
period from 1963 to 2000 into four trends based on movements of firms’ propensity 
to pay dividends. Later studies about catering theory on dividend policy have mixed 
conclusions. Li and Lie (2006) extend the research by Baker and Wurgler (2004a) to 
include dividend increases and dividend decreases, and they find supportive 
evidence that dividend premium can also affect firms’ decisions in changing 
dividends. However, Julio and Ikenberry (2004) claim that dividend premium’s 
explanatory power on dividend decisions becomes weaker when firms’ size and age 
are controlled for in the sample from 1984 to 2003. Denis and Osoboy (2008) also 
claim in a counter-argument to catering theory that dividend premium is more 
fluctuating than firms’ propensity to pay based on the sample from 1989 to 2002. 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) use the data from 1963 to 2004 and add risk factors into 
the logistic regression model used by Baker and Wurgler (2004a). They find that 
dividend premium only has significant positive impact on firms’ propensity to pay 
when firms’ risk factors are not considered. However, the catering theory survives 
from these counter-arguments. By using a different definition of dividend initiation, 
Bulan et al. (2007) construct a moral hazard model based on a sample from 1963 to 
2001 to provide empirical evidence that dividend premium still plays an essential 
role in explaining firms’ decisions of being dividend initiators. Jiang et al. (2013) 
extend the sample period to one from 1965 to 2010 and find that dividend premium 
is significantly positively related to firms’ decisions of paying dividends in the 
multinomial logistic regression model. 
The debate on whether catering theory can affect firms’ decisions of paying 
dividends encourages another interesting research question: are determinants of 
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dividend decisions different under different definitions of variables or during 
different time periods? Previous empirical research focuses on firms’ payout policy 
and uses samples from the U.S market; COMPUSTAT of the Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS) is widely used by these research. Using an up-to-date version 
of the COMPUSTAT data, we extend the sample period to 2013, then 2001-2013 
becomes the out-of-sample period compared with previous literature related to 
dividend decisions. We test the robustness of managerial extrapolation’s effect on 
dividend during different time periods. In detail, we continue to use a similar 
methodology as that used in Chapter 3 to analyse determinants of dividend policy, 
and we examine whether managerial extrapolation can significantly explain firms’ 
dividend decisions in the out-of-sample period as well as in the period from 1963 to 
2013. 
As a robustness test of our indicators of managerial overextrapolation, we also 
construct dummies representing firms' past EPS's growth by using alternative 
definition. We exclude observations with negative EPS during the past three years 
for EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3) or five years for EPSG(1-5) and 
EPSG(1,5). Firms' EPS' changes from one direction to its opposite direction (e.g. 
from positive to negative) may convert much more information than EPS's changes 
from one direction to the same direction (e.g. from positive to positive). Especially 
for the EPS's changes from positive to negative for firms who already pay dividends, 
these firms may loss the available source to pay dividends and decrease/omit 
dividends immediately, even though managers are not extrapolating past declining 
EPS into the future. Excluding negative EPS from our sample' observation is 
necessary in checking the robustness of previous empirical findings. 
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Another arising issue related with firms' dividend policy is that the recent 
financial crisis may have significant impact on firms' strategy of paying dividends. 
As in Floyd et al. (2015), firms can take the advantage of the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, and use dividends as the signal of strong future performance to convince 
investors. On the other hand, managers many perceive depressive earnings 
performance in the future during the financial crisis, which drives them to 
decrease/omit dividends. We also jointly test recessions or crisis with our managerial 
overextrapolation and dividend premium in same regressions as further robustness 
check for our indicators of managerial overextrapolation. 
Chapter 4 is more than a complement of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 has its 
unique empirical contribution to this thesis, because it discusses the issue of 
re-appearing dividends as well as the recent financial crisis on firms' dividend policy. 
Chapter 4 also independently discusses whether the re-appearance of dividends are 
driven or at least partly affected by our indicators of managerial overextrapolation. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the data and 
variables used in regression models which are similar to those used in Chapter 3. All 
empirical results from the whole sample period from 1963 to 2013, and 
out-of-sample period from 2001 to 2013 will be compared and analysed in Section 
4.3, and robustness test by using alternative dependent variables will be discussed in 
Section 4.3 as well. The last part of Section 4.3 will discuss whether managers who 
observed firms’ past growing/decreasing profitability tend to become 
overextrapolated and make dividend decisions based on it. Section 4.4 shows and 
shortly discusses robustness test's results by using new indicators of managerial 
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overextrapolation with non-negative EPS, and robustness test's results after 
controlling for recessions or financial crisis. Section 4.5 concludes.. 
 
4.2. Data and variables 
Similarly as in Chapter 3, this chapter’s sample covers all NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ firms in COMPUSTAT from fiscal year 1963 to 2013. The data of 
common stock returns and liquidity are from the Center for Research in Security 
Price (CRSP) database.  
We use the same constructions of variables as used in Chapter 3: we include 
firms with fiscal year ends at t, and who have the following items: total assets (AT), 
stock price (PRCC_F) and shares outstanding (CSHO) at the end of the fiscal year, 
income before extraordinary items (IB), interest expense (XINT), [cash] dividends 
per share by ex-date (DVPSX_F), preferred dividends (DVP), and (a) preferred stock 
liquidating value (PSTKL), (b) preferred stock redemption value (PSTKRV), or (c) 
preferred stock carrying value (PSTK). Firms must also have (a) stockholders’ equity 
(SEQ), (b) liabilities (LT), or (c) common equity (CEQ) and preferred stock par 
value (PSTK). Total assets must be available at fiscal years t and t − 1. The other 
items must be available at t. We exclude firms with book equity below $250,000 or 
assets below $500,000. To ensure that firms are publicly traded, the COMPUSTAT 
sample includes only firms with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11, and we use only the 
fiscal years a firm is in the CRSP database at its fiscal year end. We exclude utilities 
firms (SIC codes 4900 to 4949) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000to 6999). 
There are total 691031 firm-year observations in the original FTP format 
COMPUSTAT file from 1963 to 2013. After the selection criteria introduced above, 
there are 138127 satisfied firm-year observations left and go into the regression 
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analysis. For the out-of-sample period, there are 34408 firm-year observations are 
analysed. Except our indicators of managerial overextrapolation, the summary 
statistics for other main variables used in regressions are present in Table 4.1 
(change number of other tables). All definitions for these variables can be found at 
Appendix 3.1. 
Table 4.1 Decision to be new dividend payers and determining factors from 
1963 to 2013 
Panel A. 1963-2013 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
NYP 138127 0.28 0.30 0.00 1.00 
E/A 138127 0.01 0.25 -20.86 2.85 
M/B 138127 1.75 1.90 0.14 137.18 
∆A/A 121268 0.05 0.32 -33.99 0.99 
sys risk 118242 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.74 
idi risk 118242 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 
Panel B. 2000-2013 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
NYP 34408 0.28 0.30 0.00 1.00 
E/A 34408 -0.03 0.33 -20.86 2.85 
M/B 34408 1.92 1.62 0.14 47.06 
∆A/A 32557 0.00 0.56 -49.03 1.00 
sys risk 30947 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.40 
idi risk 30947 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 
 
We mainly focus on analysing two groups of dividend decisions: being a 
dividend payer (DVPSX_F>0) and being a new dividend payer (DVPSX_F>0 at 
fiscal year t, and DVPSX_F=0 at fiscal year t-1)14. We also analyse firms who 
continue/increase/omit/ decrease dividends. We take into consideration the same 
dividend policy’s determinants as used by Baker and Wurgler (2004a) and Hober 
and Prabhala (2009). Firm-year variables include stock exchange percentile (NYP) 
(Fama and French, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2004a) which represents a firm’s size, 
                                                        
14 Technically, current new dividend payers who must be non-payers at the last fiscal year is a sub-group 
of current dividend payers who can be payers, non-payers, or did not exist at the last fiscal year. 
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profitability (E/A) (Fama and French, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2004a), risk factors 
including idiosyncratic risk (Idi risk) and systematic risk (Sys risk) (Hoberg and 
Prabhala (2009), proxy for investment opportunities including market-to-book ratio 
(M/B) (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a), and asset growth (∆A/A) (Fama and French, 
2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). We also control dividend premium which is the 
catering factor developed by Baker and Wurgler (2004a). Detailed descriptions for 
all the variables are in appendix 3.1. 
We use the same indicators to represent firms’ dividend-paying status as in 
Chapter 3, which includes firms’ decisions to initiating dividends, increasing 
dividends, continuing dividends, paying dividends, omitting dividends, or decreasing 
dividends (see Appendix 3.2 for details). As the proxy for managerial extrapolation, 
we use the same indicators as in Chapter 3 to represent firms’ status of experiencing 
previous earnings growth (see Appendix 3.3 for details). 
We reformed our variables of EPSG and EPSD by using positive EPS only as 
robustness check, because the direction change in EPS may convert different 
information to the change in EPS without change in direction. We re-run the 
second-stage regressions for PTI, PTIN, ∆PTP, PTD and PTO (We do not show 
results based on PTC, because all coefficients for results of PTC are the same but 
opposite directions compared with results of PTO). We also test either (1) recession 
by using yearly NBER recession dummy as in Mclean and Zhao (2014), or (2) 
financial crisis dummy in our second-stage regressions as a further robustness check. 
The financial crisis dummy equals to 1 when there was the year of possible financial 
crisis that hit the U.S. market, otherwise it equals to 0. We define these years as 
years during the financial crisis: (1) 1973-1974 when oil prices soared, causing the 
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U.S. stock market crash; (2) 1989-1991 when there was the United States Saving and 
Loan crisis; (3) 2002-2003 when the early 2000 recession affect U.S. market; (4) 
2007-2008 when recent financial crisis happened. In one regression function of the 
second-stage, we either use the recession dummy or the financial crisis dummy. 
 
4.3. Results and analysis 
 
4.3.1. Firms’ previous growing/decreasing earnings and dividend 
decisions: direct evidence 
Fama and French (2001) record a decline of dividend payers from 1978 to 1999, and 
then Julio and Ikenberry (2004) claim that dividend payers reappear after 2000 based 
on their sample between 1984 and 2004. Taking a general look at the relationship 
between payers and firms with past growth in EPS, we extend the sample period to 
cover more firm-year observations after 2001 until 2013. From Figure 4.1, which 
shows comparisons between annual percentages of firms who initiate/continue 
/increase/pay dividends and firms with YoY increases in EPS over the past three 
years, we can find that the recent re-appearance of firms who continue/increase/pay 
dividend began in 2002, and the reappearance of dividend initiators began in 2001. 
This empirical finding roughly supports Julio’s and Ikenberry’s (2004) finding. 
Besides, the percentage of firms who continue/increase/pay dividends sharply 
decreases from 1978, while dividend initiators’ percentage declines from 1976, 
which is roughly consistent with Fama’s and French’s (2001) finding. 
Figure 4.1’s first figure (top left) exhibits the movement of dividend initiators’ 
percentage and the percentage of firms with YoY increases in EPS over the past 
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three years (EPSG(1-3)). The previous three-year data is used to form EPSG(1-3) 
and EPSG(1,3), and the first five-year data is used for the construction of EPSG(1-5) 
and EPSG(1,5) as the pre-window, so we standardise the starting year in Figure 4.1 
to Figure 4.3 as 196815. Figure 4.1’s first figure shows that dividend initiators’ 
percentage arrives at a peak around 1976 followed by sharp decreases, and then 
reverts again at 2001 and achieves two sub-peaks separately around 2003 and 2012. 
The percentage of EPSG(1-3) and the percentage of dividend initiators show a 
similar degree of fluctuation within the sample period, and their co-movements are 
obvious. In other words, the positive relationship between 
initiating/continuing/increasing/paying dividends and firms’ past earnings growth 
can be directly observed in the statistical data.
                                                        
15 Figure 4.1 only gives movements on percentage of dividend decisions and percentage of EPSG(1-3) as 
the example, but I find similar movement for percentage of EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5) to 
EPSG(1-3). Therefore, our finding and conclusion for Figure 4.1 can be applied to the investigation on 
movements between percentage of dividend decisions and percentage of EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and 
EPSG(1,5). 
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Figure 4.1 The relationship between the percentages of firms who initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends and the percentage of firms 
with YoY growing EPS over past three years. 
In Figure 4.1 we plot, over time, the proportion of firms (to all firms) experiencing year-on-year earnings increases (EPSG(1-3)) over the past three years from 1968 to 2013, 
together with the proportion of firms (in dashed line) that initiate, increase, or pay dividends among all firms. 
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Figure 4.1’s second figure (top right) to fourth figure (bottom right) exhibit 
movements in the percentage of EPSG(1-3) and movements in the percentages of 
firms who continue/increase/pay dividends. Similar to the first figure (top left) in 
Figure 4.1, the percentage of firms who continue/increase/pay dividends has thefirst 
peak at 1978, and also peaks around 2004 and 2012 after the “reappearance” time in 
2002. Ignoring detailed fluctuations, the numbers and percentages of EPSG(1-3) 
show similar trends, although its volatility seems to be higher than the volatility for 
movement in percentage of firms who continue/increase/pay dividends. 
For a further analysis, from 1978, the drop in the percentage of firms with 
EPSG (1-3) is sharper than the drop in the percentage of firms who 
continue/increase/pay dividends. This weaker response of firms’ decisions on 
continuing/increasing/paying dividends to previous profitability growth can be 
explained by the theory that dividends are “sticky” (Lintner, 1956; Guttman et al., 
2010). After 2002, dividends reappear with fluctuations in 2005 and 2009, but firms 
with previous profitability growth reach a sub-peak in 2006 and move to a 
sub-bottom again in 2010. This lag for EPSG(1-3)’s percentage compared with the 
percentage of firms who continue/increase/pay dividends may indicate that earnings 
performance for a shorter period than 3-years also affects firms’ dividend decisions. 
Figure 4.1 shows that dividend decisions can be affected by firms’ earnings 
performance over the past 1-year, two-year, or 3-year periods. For example: (1) 
percentage of EPSG(1-3) and percentage of new dividend-payers achieve sub-peaks 
at 1995, which implies that dividend initiation is affected by EPSG(1-3); (2) 
percentage of EPSG(1-3) has its sub-peak at 1990, while the percentage of dividend 
initiators reaches a sub-peak at 1989, which indicates the effects of the previous 
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two-year earnings performance on decisions to initiate dividends 16 . From an 
extended sample from 1963 to 2013, these effects of varying the previous time 
period of earnings performance on dividend decisions can be observed in the 
previous literature’s sample as well as in the out-of-sample period from 2001 to 2013. 
As has been discussed in Chapter 3, we use 3-years and 5-years respectively as 
representative time periods, because past earnings performance over these two time 
periods have a higher frequency to appear than during other time periods, and using 
5-year period can avoid the survivorship bias (Lakonishok et al., 1994). 
Figure 4.2’s first figure (left) shows movements for the percentage of firms 
who omit dividends and the percentage of firms with past YoY decreasing 
profitability over the past three years (EPSD(1-3)), while Figure 4.2’s second figure 
(right) shows movements for the percentage of firms who decrease dividends and the 
percentage of firms with past YoY decreasing profitability over the previous three 
years. The percentage of firms who omit/decrease dividends shares the same peaks 
with the percentage of EPSD(1,3) around 1971, 1983, 1992, 2002, and 2010. The 
correlation between firms’ decisions to omit/decrease dividends and firms’ past 
decreasing profitability is obvious.
                                                        
16 From figures which show movement on percentages of dividend decisions and percentage of firms with 
EPSG(1-5) or EPSG(1,5), I find that firms’ earnings performance over the past four-year or two-year periods can 
also affect firms’ dividend decisions. 
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Figure 4.2 The relationship between the percentage of firms who omit/decrease dividends and the percentage of firms with YoY 
decreasing EPS over past three years. 
. Figure 4.2 also shows the proportion of firms with YoY declines in EPS over the past three years (EPSD(1-3)), together with the proportion of firms that that choose to omit or 
decrease dividends among all firms from 1968 to 2013. 
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We also follow Chapter 3’s method to draw Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.8 which 
show comparisons and trends between the percentage of firms that 
initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends after experiencing growth in EPS over the 
past three or five years and the percentage of firms that initiate/continue/increase/pay 
dividends among all firms, or between the percentage of firms that omit/decrease 
dividends after experiencing decline in EPS over the past three or five years and the 
percentage of firms that omit/decrease dividends among all firms during the whole 
time period of 1963-2013 which includes the out-of-sample period from 2001 to 
2013. We use Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.8 to compare conditional (past growth in EPS) 
dividend decisions with unconditional dividend decisions. 
In Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5, Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8, during the 
out-of-sample period from 2001 to 2013, the percentage of fimrs that 
continue/increase/pay/omit dividendsafter experiencing past growth/decline in EPS 
remains at a higher level than the percentage of payers among all firms, and both of 
them move with similar trends. We find similar evidence in Figure 4.4 that the 
percentage of firms who initiate dividends after experiencing past growth in EPS is 
higher than the proportion of dividend-increasing payers among all firms, with only 
the exception of sub-figure with EPSG(1-5).
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Figure 4.3 The percentage of firms that initiate dividends among all firms and the percentage of firms who initiate dividends among 
firms with earnings growths over the past three years or past five years 
Figure 4.3 contains  four sub-figures that respectively show time-series movements in the intersections of firms that initiate dividend and also experience past earnings growths 
over the past three years (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3)) and past five years (EPSG(1-5), EPSG(1,5)), together with proportion of firms that initiate dividends among all firms. 
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Figure 4.4 The percentage of firms that continue dividends among all firms and the percentage of firms who continue dividends among 
firms with earnings growths over the past three years or past five years 
Figure 4.4 contains  four sub-figures that respectively show time-series movements in the intersections of firms that continue dividend and also experience past earnings 
growths over the past three years (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3)) and past five years (EPSG(1-5), EPSG(1,5)), together with proportion of firms that continue dividends among all 
firms. 
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Figure 4.5 The relationship between the percentage of firms who increase dividends among all firms and the percentage of firms who 
increase dividends among firms with earnings growths over the past three years or past five years 
Figure 4.5 contains  four sub-figures that respectively show time-series movements in the intersections of firms that increase dividend and also experience past earnings 
growths over the past three years (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3)) and past five years (EPSG(1-5), EPSG(1,5)), together with proportion of firms that increase dividends among all 
firms 
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Figure 4.6 The relationship between the percentage of dividend payers among all firms and the percentage of dividend payers among 
firms with earnings growths over the past three years or past five years 
Figure 4.6 contains  four sub-figures that respectively show time-series movements in the intersections of dividend payers that also experience past earnings growths over the 
past three years (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3)) and past five years (EPSG(1-5), EPSG(1,5)), together with proportion of dividend payers among all firms. 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
Percentage of
payers among
firms with
EPSG(1-3)
Percentage of
payers among
all firms
0
20
40
60
80
100
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
Percentage of
payers among
firms with
EPSG(1,3)
Percentage of
payers among all
firms
0
20
40
60
80
100
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
Percentage of
payers among
firms with
EPSG(1-5)
Percentage of
payers among
all firms
0
20
40
60
80
100
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
Percentage of
payers among
firms with
EPSG(1,5)
Percentage of
payers among all
firms
Chapter 4 Profitability Change Persistence, Managerial Overreaction, and Reappearing 
Dividends 
 
149 
 
Figure 4.7 The percentage of firms that omit dividends among all firms and the percentage of firms that omit dividends among firms 
with earnings declines over the past three years or past five years 
Figure 4.7 contains  four sub-figures that respectively show time-series movements in the intersections of firms that omit dividend and also experience past earnings declines 
over the past three years (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3)) and past five years (EPSD(1-5), EPSD(1,5)), together with proportion of firms that omit dividends among all firms. 
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Figure 4.8 The percentage of firms that decrease dividends among all firms and the percentage of firms that decrease dividends among 
firms with earnings declines over the past three years or past five years 
Figure 4.8 contains  four sub-figures that respectively show time-series movements in the intersections of firms that decrease dividend and also experience past earnings 
declines over the past three years (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3)) and past five years (EPSD(1-5), EPSD(1,5)), together with proportion of firms that decrease dividends among all 
firms. 
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4.3.2. Results of logistic regressions for the whole time period from 1963 
to 2013 
By following the method used by Baker and Wurgler (2004a) and Hoberg and 
Probhala (2009), we run regressions based on the extended sample from 1963 to 
2013. Table 4.2 to Table 4.5 give details from Fama-Macbeth logistic regressions 
between dividend-decision variables and their conventional determinant factors and 
provide relationships between residuals from these Fama-Macbeth logistic 
regressions and behavioural factors including dividend premium of Baker and 
Wurger (2004a) and indicators proxy for managerial extrapolation.  
In further detail, the first part (Panel A) in Table 4.2 is the result from the 
Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend-initiation decisions (newpayer) on 
conventional factors including size, investment opportunities, profitability, and risk 
factors. Size (NYP) is the same to the NYSE percentile as in Fama and French 
(2001), and it represents a firm’s size in the market. M/B ratio and ∆A/A are proxy 
for firms’ growth opportunities. E/A represents firms’ current profitability, and it 
could also be viewed as a variable of current earnings performance. We apply 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)’s risk factors in Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s method in 
Panel A of Table 4.1, but give both results with or without controlling risk factors for 
robustness check. We use propensity to initiate (PTI) as the dependent variable in 
Panel B and Panel C of Table 4.1. Because Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) discuss 
changes in propensity to initiate (∆PTI), we also use ∆PTI as the dependent variable 
in Panel D and Panel E of Table 4.1. All panels excluding Panel A in Table 4.2 allow 
us to compare the effect of investors’ sentiments on firms’ payout decisions with the 
effect of managers’ extrapolation on firms’ payout decisions.
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Table 4.2 Decision to be new dividend payers and determining factors from 1963 to 2013 
Table 4.2 reports the two-step regression of firm’s’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 1963 to 2013. 
In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 
2009) to get firms’ propensity to initiate (PTI). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTI on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and 
dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B, Panel 
C, Panel D, and Panel E which respectively report PTI without controlling for risks, ∆PTI without controlling for risks, PTI after controlling for risks, and  ∆PTI after 
controlling for risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are 
proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. In the table, *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the 
critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 Panel A. Dependent variable: Newpayer 
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-3.43***(-15.9) 1.5***(7.39) -0.17(-1.05) -0.84***(-3.76) 9.3***(5.41) 
  -2.76***(-14.42) 1.44***(4.63) -0.67***(-4.45) -0.45***(-3.96) 5.95***(8.61) -69.72***(-6.84) -23.21***(-7.23) 
Panel B. PTI without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.02***(5.92) 0.17***(14.91) 0.01(1.05) 
   
30198 0.01 
0.01**(2.26) 0.16***(15.58) 
 
0.02***(7.87) 
  
34429 0.01 
0.01***(5.99) 0.16***(17.51) 
  
0.01***(3.49) 
 
41198 0.01 
0.01*(1.90) 0.16***(17.81) 
 
  
0.02***(9.23) 43962 0.01 
Panel C. PTI after controlling risk factors 
0.02***(6.3) 0.18***(15.74) 0.01(0.88) 
  
 
29496 0.01 
0.01***(3.5) 0.18***(16.31) 
 
0.02***(7.15) 
  
32168 0.01 
0.02***(6.14) 0.17***(18.36) 
 
 
0.01***(3.24) 
 
40238 0.01 
0.01***(2.87) 0.17***(18.44) 
 
  
0.02***(8.48) 41584 0.01 
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Table 4.2 (continue) 
Panel D. ∆PTI without controlling risk factors 
0.05***(17.61) 0.17***(14.76) 0.02***(3.99) 
   
28960 0.01 
0.03***(11.42) 0.17***(15.75) 
 
0.03***(15.18) 
  
31530 0.02 
0.04***(18.89) 0.16***(17.53) 
  
0.03***(9.28) 
 
39703 0.02 
0.03***(12.01) 0.16***(17.75) 
 
  
0.03***(17.33) 40979 0.02 
Panel E. ∆PTI after controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.05***(17.02) 0.15***(13.18) 0.03***(4.12) 
  
 
28288 0.01 
0.03***(10.83) 0.16***(14.14) 
 
0.03***(15.04) 
  
30783 0.02 
0.05***(18.03) 0.15***(15.64) 
 
 
0.03***(9.59) 
 
38779 0.01 
0.03***(11.23) 0.15***(15.86) 
 
  
0.03***(17.25) 39996 0.02 
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In the out-of-sample testing period from 1963 to 2013, we find similar 
conclusions from Table 4.2 to conclusions in Table 3.3 in Chapter 3 which uses the 
sample from 1963 to 2000. Panel A in Table 4.2 tests relations between firms’ 
decisions to initiate dividends and conventional factors including size, 
market-to-book ratio, asset growth, profitability, and risk. Apart from the finding that 
asset growth has a significant negative effect on the decision to initiate dividends 
when risk factors are controlled, other conventional factors show similar results as in 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a). Panel B to Panel E in Table 4.2 jointly test the effects of 
investor sentiment proxy by Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium and 
managerial overextrapolation proxy by EPS growth over the past three or five years. 
Despite the fact that EPSG(1-5) has insignificant impact on the propensity to initiate 
because of the limited number of observations which we have discussed in Chapter 
3, all other proxy for managerial extrapolation have a significant positive effect on 
PTI or ∆PTI. On the other hand, dividend premium’s positive effects on both PTI 
and ∆PTI are robust.  
Table 4.3 uses the same structure as Table 4.2 in forming Panel A, Panel B, and 
Panel C. Panel A contains results of the dependent variable of dividend continuation 
(continue) on conventional factors including size, profitability, investment 
opportunity and risk. By using Panel A’s residuals as the dependent variable of 
propensity to continue dividends (PTC), Panel B and Panel C record separately the 
impacts of dividend premium and managerial extrapolation on propensity to 
continue dividends
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Table 4.3 Decision to continue dividends and determining factors from 1963 to 2013 
Table 4.3 reports the two-step regression of firm’s’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 1963 to 2013. 
In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 
2009) to get firms’ propensity to continue (PTC). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTC on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) 
and dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B 
and Panel C, which respectively report PTC without controlling for risks and PTC after controlling for risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP 
is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys 
risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. In the 
table, *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Divcontinue  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
0.9***(3.91) 3.92***(6.57) 3.02(1.3) -0.25(-0.59) 33.92(1.5) 
  
2.91***(5.83) 3.43***(5.7) 0.94(1.19) 0.28(1.24) 21.62*(1.76) -86.32**(-2.36) -56.36***(-4.9) 
Panel B. PTC without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01 (-1.45) -0.01(-1.24) 0.01 (0.51) 
   
37783 0.00 
-0.01***(-4.55) -0.01(-1.23) 
 
0.01***(6.77) 
  
39099 0.00 
-0.01***(-3.01) -0.02**(-2.01) 
 
 
0.01**(2.08) 
 
43624 0.00 
-0.02***(-6.28) -0.02**(-2.28) 
 
  
0.02***(8.12) 44362 0.00 
Panel C. PTC after controlling risk factors 
0.01 (-1.25) 0.02***(2.61) 0.01 (1.13) 
  
 
36718 0.00 
-0.01***(-4.06) 0.02**(2.32) 
 
0.02***(7.92) 
  
37591 0.00 
-0.01***(-2.73) 0.02**(2.18) 
 
 
0.01***(2.84) 
 
42416 0.00 
-0.02***(-5.7) 0.01(1.5) 
 
  
0.02**(9.2) 42781 0.00 
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Different from Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s findings, Panel A in Table 4.3 
shows that firms’ asset growth may have no significant effect on PTC. Another 
interesting finding is that dividend premium shows a negative effect on PTC when 
risk factors are not considered in Panel A’s regression, but dividend premium regains 
its positive effects on PTC when risk factors are controlled in Panel A. Considering 
the fact that risk is essential in explaining firms’ dividend decisions (Hoberg and 
Prabhala, 2009), the results for DP in Panel C are more reasonable. No matter 
whether risk factors are controlled for or not, representatives for managerial 
extrapolation show robust significant positive effects on PTC.
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Table 4.4 Decision to increase dividends and determining factors from 1963 to 2013 
Table 4.4 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 1963 to 2013. In 
Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) 
to get firms’ propensity to increase dividends (PTIN). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTIN on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 
) and dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B 
and Panel C which respectively report PTIN without controlling risks and PTIN after controlling risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used 
to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is 
firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1 In the table, 
*** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Divincrease  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-1.24***(-11.77) 1.01***(11.13) 0.36**(2.42) -0.07(-1.42) 8.91***(10.8) 
  
-0.74***(-4.54) 0.94***(9.67) 0.35**(2.05) -0.06(-1.39) 8.88***(10.62) -19.39**(-2.42) -11.62***(-4.51) 
Panel B. PTIN without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.02**(2.25) 0.31***(16.36) 0.08***(7.92) 
   
39139 0.01 
-0.04***(-5.08) 0.3***(16.09) 
 
0.10***(21.28) 
  
40589 0.02 
0.01 (0.77) 0.28***(16.48) 
 
 
0.10***(16.77) 
 
45366 0.01 
-0.04***(-6.59) 0.26***(15.53) 
 
  0.12***(26.92) 
46171 0.02 
Panel C. PTIN after controlling risk factors 
0.01(1.24) 0.33***(17.41) 0.08***(7.25) 
  
 
38036 0.01 
-0.04***(-5.71) 0.32***(17.15) 
 
0.10***(20.26) 
  
38988 0.02 
0.01 (-0.71) 0.30***(17.34) 
 
 
0.09***(16.1) 
 
44112 0.02 
-0.05***(-7.65) 0.28***(16.3) 
 
  
0.12***(25.84) 44505 0.02 
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Table 4.4 is the same as Table 4.3 except that the dependent variable in Panel A 
is replaced by indicator for increasing dividends (increase) and dependent variables 
in Panel B and Panel C are exchanged into propensity to increase dividends (PTIN). 
In Table 4.4, asset growth and profitability both positively affect firms’ decisions to 
increase dividends. This finding implies that previous dividend payers with sufficient 
funds to extend themselves also have enough cash to increase dividends. In Panel B 
and Panel C of Table 4.4, both dividend premium and proxies for managerial 
extrapolation activities keep their explanatory power in explaining firms’ 
propensities to increase dividends
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Table 4.5 Decision to be dividend payers and determining factors from 1963 to 2013 
Table 4.5 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 1963 to 2013. In 
Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) 
to get firms’ propensity to pay (PTP). At second step we use pooled method to regression ∆PTP on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy 
variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B and Panel C 
which respectively report ∆PTP without controlling risks and ∆PTP after controlling risk factors on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to 
represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is 
firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1.  In the table, 
*** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Payer 
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-1.70***(-8.97) 4.11***(23.1) -1.02***(-4.65) -0.66***(-9.66) 10.51***(6.42) 
  1.19***(4.30) 3.29***(11.08) -1.35***(-7.61) -0.44***(-7.69) 8.84***(5.42) -112.27***(-8.56) -70.13***(-14.47) 
Panel B. ∆PTP without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01***(2.65) 0.05***(6.46) 0.02***(5.14) 
  
 
67981 0.00 
-0.03***(-10.56) 0.05***(6.06) 
 
0.07***(36.04) 
  
71606 0.02 
0.01 (0.77) 0.04***(5.07) 
  
0.04***(15.55) 
 
84822 0.00 
-0.03***(-13.14) 0.03***(3.96) 
   
0.07***(41.41) 86579 0.02 
Panel C. ∆PTP after controlling risk factors 
0.01 (-1.32) -0.05***(-5.2) 0.03***(5.26) 
   
66212 0.00 
-0.03***(-10.62) -0.05***(-5.2) 
 
0.05***(25.76) 
  
69727 0.01 
-0.01**(-2.44) -0.06***(-7.48) 
  
0.03***(13.05) 
 
82652 0.00 
-0.03***(-12.14) -0.06***(-8.01) 
   
0.06***(30.63) 84327 0.01 
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Table 4.5 replaces the dependent variable in Panel A with an indicator of 
paying dividends (payer). Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) focus on changes in 
propensity to pay (∆PTP), so we only use ∆PTP as the dependent variable in Panel B 
and Panel C in Table 4.5. Table 4.5 tells the same story as in Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009)’s paper. Dividend premium has a significant positive effect on firms’ 
propensities to pay dividends despite whether or not these firms are dividend payers 
at the last fiscal year, but only before risks are controlled for. Panel C in Table 4.5 
shows that the dividend premium’s effect on changes in propensity to pay becomes 
significantly negative given risk factors in the extended sample from 1963 to 2013. 
The reverse of the impact from the dividend premium on ∆PTP from positive to 
negative is not discussed by previous literature. It could be caused by the fact that 
investors tend to purchase stocks with a high probability of paying dividends when 
more firms do not or have decreasing abilities in paying dividends after 2002, 
especially for the period of the recent financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 which may 
have reduced firms’ abilities in paying dividends and stimulated investors’ demand 
on firms’ payout as returns of investment during such a depressive period. Again, 
proxies for managers’ extrapolation activities keep their significant explanatory 
power in positively affecting ∆PTP.  
 
4.3.3. Managers’ decisions of omitting dividends and decisions of 
decreasing dividends: evidence from 1963 to 2013 
Since managerial extrapolation can be the activity that managers extrapolate past 
earnings performance into the future, and past earnings performance can be either 
positive or negative, managers can extrapolate decline in previous earnings into the 
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future as well. This extrapolation which is based on previously decreasing EPS may 
cause dividend omission or dividend decrease, as extrapolation of previously 
increasing EPS can cause dividend initiation/continuation/increase/paying. We 
examine whether earnings decline over the past three or five years can cause 
dividend omission in Table 4.6 and dividend decrease in Table 4.7.  
The structure of Table 4.6 is close to Table 4.2, Table 4.4, and Table 4.5. 
However, we use the indicator for omitting dividends as the dependent variable in 
Panel A in Table 4.6, and we use dependent variables of propensity to omit dividends 
(divomission) separately without and after controlling for risks in Panel B and Panel 
C. Different from previous tables of regression results, Panel B and Panel C in Table 
4.6 use indicators for EPS decrease over the past three or five years as proxy for 
managerial extrapolation in explaining PTO.
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Table 4.6 Decision to omit payers and determining factors from 1963 to 2013 
Table 4.6 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 1963 to 2013. In 
Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) 
to get firms’ propensity to omit dividends (PTO). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTO on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) 
and dummy variables which represent firms’ past declines in EPS (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B and Panel C 
which respectively report PTO without controlling risks and PTO after controlling risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicator of firms’ past declines in EPS. NYP is used to represent 
firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ 
systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3 .1. In the table, *** 
represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Divomission  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-0.90***(-3.91) -3.92***(-6.57) -3.02(-1.3) 0.25(0.59) -33.92(-1.5) 
  
-2.91***(-5.83) -3.43***(-5.7) -0.94(-1.19) -0.28(-1.24) -21.62*(-1.76) 86.32**(2.36) 56.36***(4.9) 
Panel B. PTO without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSD (5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD(1-3) EPSD(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01(1.38) 0.01(1.23) 0.02(1.16) 
   
37783 0.00 
0.01(0.47) 0.01(1.19) 
 
0.01***(5.69) 
  
39099 0.00 
0.01*(1.75) 0.02**(2.3) 
 
 
0.04***(9.32) 
 
43624 0.00 
0.01(1.16) 0.02**(2.2) 
 
  
0.01***(7.19) 44362 0.00 
Panel C. PTO after controlling risk factors 
0.01(1.07) -0.02***(-2.61) 0.05***(3.53) 
  
 
36718 0.00 
0.01(-1.12) -0.02**(-2.32) 
 
0.02***(7.92) 
  
37591 0.00 
0.01(1.16) -0.01*(1.86) 
 
 
0.04***(11.27) 
 
42416 0.00 
0.01(-0.47) -0.01(-1.50) 
 
  
0.02***(9.2) 42781 0.00 
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Panel A in Table 4.6 shows that factors that affect firms’ decisions to 
initiate/pay dividends can also affect firms’ decisions of omitting dividends in the 
opposite direction. Among four indicators created to represent firms’ past earnings 
decrease, except EPSD(1-5) which has limited observations, EPSD(1,5), EPSD(1-3), 
and EPSD(1,3) have robust and significantly positive effects on firms’ propensity to 
omit dividends. Besides, although dividend premium has an insignificant effect on 
PTO without controlling for risks in Panel B, its negative effect on PTO is stable 
after controlling for risks in Panel C.
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Table 4.7 Decision to decrease determinants and determining factors from 1963 to 2013 
Table 4.7 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 1963 to 2013. In 
Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) 
to get firms’ propensity to omit dividends (PTD). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTD on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and 
dummy variables which represent firms’ past declines in EPS (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B and Panel C which 
respectively report PTD without controlling risk factors and PTD after controlling risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past declines in EPS. NYP is used to represent 
firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ 
systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3 .1. In the table, *** 
represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Divdecrease  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-0.53***(-3.7) -1.31***(-8.23) -0.01(-0.05) 0.28**(2.47) -4.31**(-2.13) 
  
-1.74***(-9.85) -0.45(-1) -0.07(-0.32) -0.1(-0.23) 2.55(0.32) -15.49(-0.51) 31.27(7.04) 
Panel B. PTD without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01**(2.28) -0.16***(-10.1) 0.18***(6.51) 
   
37783 0.00 
0.01(1.4) -0.16***(-10.01) 
 
0.02***(5.39) 
  
39099 0.00 
0.01(1.64) -0.14***(9.56) 
 
 
0.12***(14.47) 
 
43624 0.00 
0.01(0.71) -0.14***(-9.49) 
 
  
0.03***(9.03) 44362 0.01 
Panel C. PTD after controlling risk factors 
0.03***(4.16) -0.17***(-10.4) 0.22***(7.76) 
  
 
36718 0.01 
0.01(1.35) -0.17***(-10.27) 
 
0.04***(9.43) 
  
37591 0.01 
0.02***(3.49) -0.15***(-10.14) 
 
 0.14***(16.83) 
 
42416 0.01 
0.01(0.86) -0.15***(-9.66) 
 
  
0.05***(13.34) 42781 0.01 
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Table 4.7 is created for the purpose similar to that used to create Table 4.6, but 
we use the indicator for decreasing dividends instead of the indicator for omitting 
dividends in Panel A, and use the propensity to decrease dividends (PTD) instead of 
PTO in Panel B and Panel C. Although Panel A in Table 4.7 claims a bad model 
fitting for the logistic regression of dividend decrease’s indicator on conventional 
factors, EPSD(1-5), EPSD(1,5), EPSD(1-3), and EPSD(1,3) all impact firms’ 
propensities to decrease dividends. Meanwhile, dividend premium also keeps its 
significant negative effect on PTD with or without controlling for risks.  
 
4.3.4. Robustness test by using alternative dependent variables: 
S3newpayer and S5newpayer’s evidence from 1963 to 2013 
We create “strong” dependent variables which represent firms’ payout status at fiscal 
year t, when firms’ payout statuses are also considered over the past three or five 
years. Because these two “strong” dependent variables (S3newpayer and 
S5newpayer) can only be applied in Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s method in setting 
the dependent variable which use dependent variables with the condition of being 
past non-payers, we only report the results of running similar regression on 
S3newpayer by using other explanatory variables in Table 4.8 and the results of 
regression on S5newpayer by other independent variables in Table 4.9 from 1963 to 
2013. 
Chapter 4 Profitability Change Persistence, Managerial Overreaction, and Reappearing 
Dividends 
 
166 
 
Table 4.8 Decision to be strong new dividend payers (S3newpayer) and determining factors from 1963 to 2013 
Table 4.8 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 1963 to 2013. In 
Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 2009) 
to get firms’ propensity to “strong” initiate (PTS3I). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTS3I on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 
) and dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3) and EPSG(1,3)). The second stage is divided into Panels B, Panel C, Panel D, and 
Panel E which respectively report PTS3I without controlling risks, PTS3I after controlling for risks, ∆PTS3I without controlling for risks, and ∆PTS3I after controlling for risks 
on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s 
investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed 
construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. In the table, *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 
5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: S3newpayer  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-4.42***(-15.35) 1.95***(5.16) -0.2(-1.05) -0.89***(-6.3) 5.05***(5.04) 
  
-3.53***(-6.37) 1.29**(2.18) -0.74**(-2.48) -0.92***(-5.66) 5.33***(4.32) 23.87(1.34) -25.2***(-3.88) 
Panel B. PTS3I without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐   
0.04***(15.85) 0.17***(17.95) 0.02***(5.79) 
 
41198 0.01 
 
0.03***(11.04) 0.16***(18.23) 
 
0.02***(12.01) 43962 0.02 
 
Panel C. PTS3I after controlling risk factors 
0.04***(15.89) 0.16***(17.35) 0.02***(5.98) 
 
40238 0.01 
 
0.03***(11.36) 0.16***(17.46) 
 
0.02***(11.7) 41584 0.02 
 
Panel D. ∆PTS3I without controlling risk factors 
0.05***(19.39) 0.16***(17.93) 0.02***(7.93) 
 
39702 0.01 
 
0.03***(13.58) 0.16***(18.13) 
 
0.03***(14.24) 40979 0.02 
 
Panel E. ∆PTS3I after controlling risk factors 
0.05***(18.97) 0.16***(17.64) 0.02***(8.11) 
 
38779 0.02 
 
0.03***(13.19) 0.16***(17.84) 
 
0.03***(14.23) 39996 0.02 
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Table 4.8 is similar to Table 4.1, but different in using the indicator for being 
initiator at current fiscal year t after being non-payers over the past three years 
(S3newpayer) as the dependent variable in Panel A, and propensity to being initiator 
after being non-payers for three years (PTS3I). Apart from systematic risk, firms’ 
size, investment opportunities and profitability have a similar impact on firms’ 
decisions of being “strong” initiators as has been found in Table 4.1. Investor 
sentiment (dividend premium) on dividends and managerial extrapolation based on 
earnings growth over the past three years have robust and significant effects of firms’ 
propensities to “strongly” initiate dividends after experiencing three years’ status of 
being non-payers. 
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Table 4.9 Decision to be strong new dividend payers (S5newpayer) and determining factors from 1963 to 2013 
Table 4.9 reports the two-step regression of firms’’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 1963 to 2013. 
In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 
2009) to get firms’ propensity to “strong” initiate (PTS5I). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTS5I on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-5) and EPSG(1,5)). The second stage is divided into Panels B, Panel C, Panel 
D, and Panel E which respectively report PTS5I without controlling risks, PTS5I after controlling for risks, ∆PTS5I without controlling for risks, and ∆PTS5I after controlling 
for risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for 
a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). 
Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. In the table, *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical 
level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: S5newpayer  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-4.95***(-13.9) 2***(4.83) -0.11(-0.5) -0.88***(-5.84) 4.66***(9.23) 
  
-3.12***(-7.21) 1.42(1.44) 0.54(0.44) -1.94(-1.82) 9.69**(2.25) 101.89(1.18) -95.9(-1.48) 
Panel B. PTS5I without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) N 𝑹𝟐   
0.05***(16.23) 0.18**(15.25) 0.02***(2.59) 
 
30198 0.01 
 
0.03***(12.02) 0.17***(15.98) 
 
0.02***(10.89) 34429 0.02 
 
Panel C. PTS5I after controlling risk factors 
0.05***(17.24) 0.17***(14.77) 0.02**(2.54) 
 
29496 0.01 
 
0.04***(13.25) 0.17***(15.37) 
 
0.02***(10.53) 32168 0.02 
 
Panel D. ∆PTS5I without controlling risk factors 
0.05***(17.85) 0.17***(14.96) 0.02***(3.42) 
 
28960 0.01 
 
0.04***(12.78) 0.17***(15.84) 
 
0.03***(12.25) 31530 0.02 
 
Panel E. ∆PTS5I after controlling risk factors 
0.05***(17.61) 0.17***(14.92) 0.02***(3.55) 
 
28288 0.01 
 
0.04***(12.44) 0.17***(15.8) 
 
0.03***(12.4) 30783 0.02 
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Table 4.9 is similar to Table 4.8, but different in using the indicator of being 
initiator at current fiscal year t after being non-payers over the past five years 
(S5newpayer) as the dependent variable in Panel A, and propensity to being initiator 
after being non-payers for three years (PTS5I). Table 4.9 shows that only M/B and 
profitability have a significant effect on firms’ decision to initiate dividends after 
being non-payers for five years. Among them, M/B proxy for the investment 
opportunity only has weak significance at the 90% critical level. It may indicate that 
only sufficient earnings can be the support to encourage managers to initiate 
dividends, when firms have been keeping their status of being non-payers for a long 
time period (5-year is longer compared with 3-year). Besides, investor sentiment 
(dividend premium) on dividends and managerial extrapolation proxy earnings 
growth over the past five years has robust and significant effects on firms’ 
propensities to initiate dividends after being non-payers for five years.  
 
4.3.5. Results of logistic regressions for the out-of-sample period from 
2001 to 2013 
It is not hard to find that some conventional factors do not have the same effect on 
firms’ dividend decisions as previous literature claims in the whole extended sample 
from 1963 to 2013. Thus, we separately run regression by only using the data of the 
out-of-sample period from 2001 to 2013. Table 4.6 to Table 4.9 are the same 
regression models as in Table 4.2 to Table 4.5, but under different time periods. 
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Table 4.10 Decision to be new dividend payers and determining factors from 2001 to 2013 
Table 4.10 reports the two-step regression of firm’s’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 2001 to 2013. 
In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 
2009) to get firms’ propensity to initiate (PTI). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTI on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and 
dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B, Panel 
C, Panel D, and Panel E which respectively report PTI without controlling for risks, ∆PTI without controlling for risks, PTI after controlling for risks, and  ∆PTI after 
controlling for risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are 
proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. In the table, *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the 
critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. dependent variable: Newpayer 
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-3.72***(-24.31) 1.11***(5.39) -0.84***(-3.72) -0.35***(-3.48) 5.33***(7.5) 
  -2.68***(-7.2) 0.74**(2.35) -2.2***(-6.28) -0.3***(-3.89) 6.67***(7.05) -31.57**(-2.95) -21.43***(-3.17) 
Panel B. PTI without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.02***(4.44) 0.11***(4.28) 0.01(0.16) 
   
12400 0.01 
0.01**(2.14) 0.11***(4.59) 
 
0.02***(4.81) 
  
14074 0.01 
0.02***(4.68) 0.12***(5.36) 
  
0.01(0.92) 
 
15547 0.01 
0.01**(2.41) 0.12***(5.36) 
 
  
0.01***(4.66) 16483 0.01 
Panel C. PTI after controlling risk factors 
0.02***(4.24) 0.12***(4.49) 0.01(0.01) 
  
 
10771 0.01 
0.01**(2.41) 0.12***(4.87) 
 
0.01***(4.22) 
  
11715 0.01 
0.02***(4.37) 0.13***(5.65) 
 
 
0.01(0.77) 
 
13457 0.01 
0.01**(2.52) 0.13***(5.74) 
 
  
0.01***(4.05) 13841 0.01 
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Table 4.10 (continue) 
Panel D. ∆PTI without controlling risk factors 
0.05***(9.53) 0.08**(2.51) 0.02(1.51)    12207 0.01 
0.03***(6.75) 0.09***(3.12)  0.03***(6.66)   13349 0.01 
0.04***(10.14) 0.09***(3.47)   0.01***(2.77)  15336 0.01 
0.03***(7.2) 0.10***(3.73)    0.02***(6.37) 15825 0.01 
Panel E. ∆PTI after controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.04***(9.01) 0.04(1.21) 0.02(1.50)    10609 0.01 
0.03***(6.43) 0.05*(1.82)  0.02***(6.31)   11549 0.01 
0.04***(9.55) 0.05**(2.05)   0.01***(2.91)  13279 0.01 
0.03***(6.72) 0.06**(2.29)    0.02***(6.21) 13662 0.01 
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Table 4.10 is the same as Table 4.2 in its structure and use of variables, but is 
based on a sample from 2001 to 2013 instead of from 1963 to 2000. It is surprising 
to find that Table 4.10 shows an insignificant impact of EPSG(1-3) on PTN. Figure 
4.1’s first (top left) figure shows that percentages of new dividend payers achieve 
sub-bottoms twice which are both 1-year before sub-bottoms of EPSG(1-3)’s 
percentage after 2000 in 2001 and 2009. This lagged response may be the cause of 
this insignificant relationship. As we standardise the definition of EPSG as EPS 
growth over the past few years which excludes the current fiscal year, but some 
dividend decisions may be made when firms’ current year’s performances are also 
taken into consideration, managers may make dividend decisions after observing 
current increases in EPS with past growth in EPS. Besides, dividend initiation is 
different from dividend continuation/increase/paying in terms of being non-payers in 
the last fiscal year. It can be harder for managers to make decisions of changing 
“non-dividend” to “positive dividends” than other dividend decisions. On the other 
hand, we have discussed in Section 4.3.1 that past two-year or four-year increases in 
EPS can also affect managers’ dividend decisions. Therefore, managers can only 
tend to initiate dividends after two-year increases in EPS with a current increase in 
EPS to make sure about their predictions on future earnings performance from 
extrapolation.17 As a summary, all EPS-related indicators have a significant impact 
on firms’ dividend decisions, except the situation that EPSG(1-5) or EPSG(1-3) has 
no significant impact on PTN, but they still show a positive relation with PTN. In 
other words, conclusions from Table 4.10 generally support conclusions from Table 
4.1.
                                                        
17 We replace EPSG(1-3) with leaded EPSG(1-3) which represents a past two-year increase in 
EPS with a current increase in EPS in Table 4.9’s Panel B and Panel C, and regression results give 
positive significance at 95% critical level for the model without controlling  risk factors, and 
positive significance at 90% critical level for the model after controlling risk factors. 
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Table 4.11 Decision to continue dividends and determining factors from 2001 to 2013 
Table 4.11 reports the two-step regression of firm’s’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 2001 to 2013. 
In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 
2009) to get firms’ propensity to continue (PTC). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTC on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) 
and dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B 
and Panel C, which respectively report PTC without controlling for risks and PTC after controlling for risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP 
is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys 
risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. In the 
table, *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Divcontinue  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
0.90***(3.23) 2.94***(14.72) 0.78(1.49) 0.32(1.73) 4.34***(5.27) 
  
3.41***(8.93) 1.84***(7.14) 0.12(0.19) 0.35(1.66) 3.73***(6.16) 1.89(0.08) -65.46***(-10.02) 
Panel B. PTC without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
-0.01**(-2.13) -0.14***(-4.33) 0.02**(2.01) 
   
8389 0.01 
-0.03***(-4.54) -0.12***(-3.8) 
 
0.03***(6.79) 
  
8715 0.01 
-0.02***(-3.03) -0.13***(-4.15) 
 
 
0.02***(3.40) 
 
8937 0.01 
-0.03***(-4.83) -0.12***(-3.88) 
 
  
0.03***(6.79) 9097 0.01 
Panel C. PTC after controlling risk factors 
-0.01**(-2.25) -0.07**(-2.24) 0.02*(1.92) 
  
 
8125 0.00 
-0.02***(-3.62) -0.05*(-1.74) 
 
0.02***(5.77) 
  
8347 0.00 
-0.02***(-2.95) -0.07**(-2.12) 
 
 
0.01***(2.67) 
 
8662 0.00 
-0.02***(-3.84) -0.06**(-2.05) 
 
  
0.02***(4.36) 8740 0.00 
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We design Table 4.11 by following Table 4.2, but run regressions in Table 4.11 
based on the sample from 2001 to 2013. We find similar findings from Table 4.11 as 
the findings from Table 4.2. except that the systematic risk does not exhibit 
significant effects on managers’ decisions on continuing dividends, all other factors’ 
results are similar between Table 4.11 and Table 4.2. However, dividend premium 
has a significant negative relation with PTC in Table 4.11. As has been discussed in 
Section 4.3.2, it may be caused by the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 when 
dividend premium was fluctuating on a sub-bottom18 while firms’ decision of 
continuing dividends are driven more by the sub-peak of EPSG indicators, although 
EPSG indicators are slightly decreasing from the sub-bottom in 2006 (see Figure 
4.1’s top right figure). Based on conventional theory and Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009)’s findings, dividend premium which is calculated by using M/B ratio, should 
be mainly explained by firms’ systematic risk. Our findings reveal that in the most 
recent period from 2001 to 2013, when dividend premium can still be 
“contaminated” by systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, there may still be 
unobserved components which can be represented by dividend premium and cannot 
be explained by risk factors in explaining firms’ decisions of continuing to pay 
dividends. We will not discuss these phenomena further because they are unrelated 
with this chapter’s main topic. This thesis focuses on the impact of managerial 
extrapolation on dividend decisions, and EPS-related indicators survive after 
controlling for risk factors and dividend premiums in the out-of-sample material 
from 2001 to 2013.
                                                        
18 We do not show the movement of dividend premiums in this chapter, but descripe the 
findings. 
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Table 4.12 Decision to increase dividends and determining factors from 2001 to 2013 
Table 4.12 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 2001 to 2013. 
In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 
2009) to get firms’ propensity to increase dividends (PTIN). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTIN on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into 
Panels B and Panel C which respectively report PTIN without controlling risks and PTIN after controlling risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. 
NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. 
Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. In 
the table, *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Divincrease  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-1.23***(-6.16) 1.21***(5.77) -0.2(-1.48) 0.17***(3.73) 5.46***(6.93) 
  
-0.15(-0.5) 1.11***(8.57) -0.48**(-2.35) 0.13***(3.08) 5.29***(7.59) -45.66***(-6.28) -19.19**(-2.83) 
Panel A. PTI without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01(0.07) 0.01(0.11) 0.08***(3.62) 
   
8886 0.01 
-0.05***(-3.73) 0.07(0.98) 
 
0.11***(11.43) 
  
9263 0.02 
-0.01(-0.74) 0.03(0.47) 
 
 
0.08***(6.63) 
 
9523 0.01 
-0.05***(-3.96) 0.06(0.85) 
 
  
0.11***(11.58) 9708 0.02 
Panel B. PTI after controlling risk factors 
0.01(1.06) 0.16**(2.14) 0.08***(3.34) 
  
 
8606 0.01 
-0.04***(-2.82) 0.23***(3.00) 
 
0.11***(10.81) 
  
8859 0.02 
0.01(0.23) 0.18**(2.36) 
 
 
0.07***(5.66) 
 
9233 0.01 
-0.03**(-2.42) 0.20***(2.66) 
 
  
0.09***(9.07) 9320 0.01 
 
Chapter 4 Profitability Change Persistence, Managerial Overreaction, and Reappearing Dividends 
 
176 
 
Table 4.12 is the same as Table 4.4, but different in the sample period which is 
2001 to 2013. In terms of the differences between Table 4.12 and Table 4.4, Panel A 
in Table 4.12 claims that the M/B rather than asset growth has significant positive 
effects on firms’ decisions of increasing dividends, which is different from the 
findings in Table 4.4. Because both asset growth and the M/B ratio are proxy for 
firms’ investment opportunities, there is no difference for the conclusions made 
based on Table 4.12 as the conclusion can also be made based on Table 4.4: past 
dividend payers who have sufficient funds tend to re-invest in themselves, while they 
are increasing dividend payments.
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Table 4.13 Decision to be dividend payers and determining factors from 2001 to 2013 
Table 4.13 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 2001 to 2013. 
In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 
2009) to get firms’ propensity to pay (PTP). At second step we use pooled method to regression ∆PTP on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW PD−ND ) and 
dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B and 
Panel C which respectively report ∆PTP without controlling risks and ∆PTP after controlling risk factors on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is 
used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk 
is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. In the table, 
*** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Payer  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-2.01***(-17.85) 3.10***(24.15) -1.09***(-4.56) -0.41***(-12.72) 6.61***(15.29) 
  1.10***(4.23) 1.39***(6.35) -1.91***(-6.46) -0.31***(-21.58) 5.82***(8.57) -16.46(-1.54) -85.68***(-10.66) 
Panel A. ∆PTP without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01*(1.96) 0.11***(3.62) 0.01(1.31) 
  
 
19090 0.00 
-0.02***(-2.85) 0.14***(4.68) 
 
0.05***(12.1) 
  
20347 0.01 
0.01*(1.75) 0.14***(4.98) 
  
0.03***(5.82) 
 
22361 0.00 
-0.02***(-3.02) 0.17***(5.98) 
   
0.05***(13.92) 22867 0.01 
Panel B. ∆PTP after controlling risk factors 
-0.01*(-1.66) -0.43***(-13.33) 0.01(1.41) 
   
18645 0.01 
-0.03***(-4.58) -0.38***(-11.98) 
 
0.03***(8.24) 
  
19890 0.01 
-0.01(-1.49) -0.39***(-13.15) 
  
0.02***(4.22) 
 
21892 0.01 
-0.02***(-4.2) -0.36***(-12.1) 
   
0.03***(8.75) 22394 0.01 
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Table 4.13 has the same structure to Table 4.5, and shows a similar relationship 
between decisions of paying dividends and their determinants. The only difference 
between the results of Table 4.13 and Table 4.5 is that systematic risk has no 
significant impact on firms’ decisions of paying dividends. Jointly considered with 
Table 4.11 which also shows the insignificant effect of systematic risk on dividend 
decisions, managers may become less concerned about compensating investors for 
their low risk related to the market than their low individual risk since 2001 when 
they are making decisions to continue/pay dividends. Dividend premium has a 
negative effect on changes in propensity to pay in Panel C in Table 4.13 when risk 
factors are controlled, which can be explained by the same reason which has been 
given in Table 4.11’s analysis as well as in Section 4.3.2. Indicators which represent 
managers’ activities show a robust significant positive effect on ∆PTP. 
 
4.3.6. Managers’ decisions of omitting dividends and decisions of 
decreasing dividends: evidence from 2001 to 2013 
We also construct Table 4.14 and Table 4.15 by following Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 as 
extended tests in the out-of-sample period. As in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7, we replace 
EPS-related dummies from indicators which represent firms’ past earnings growth to 
indicators which represent firms’ past earning declines, because we test the 
determinants of firms’ decisions in omitting/decreasing dividends in Table 
4.14/Table 4.15.
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Table 4.14 Decision to omit payers and determining factors from 2001 to 2013 
Table 4.14 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 2001 to 2013. 
In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 
2009) to get firms’ propensity to omit dividends (PTO). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTO on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy variables which represent firms’ past declines in EPS (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B and 
Panel C which respectively report PTO without controlling risks and PTO after controlling risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicator of firms’ past declines in EPS. NYP is used to 
represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is 
firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. In the table, 
*** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Divomission  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-0.9***(-3.23) -2.94***(-14.72) -0.78(-1.49) -0.32(-1.73) -4.34***(-5.27) 
  
-3.41***(-8.93) -1.84***(-7.14) -0.12(-0.19) -0.35(-1.66) -3.73(-6.16) -1.89(-0.08) 65.46***(10.02) 
Panel B. PTO without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSD (5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD(1-3) EPSD(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01*(1.83) 0.13***(4.29) 0.13***(4.77) 
   
8389 0.01 
0.01(0.12) 0.13***(3.85) 
 
0.03***(6.08) 
  
8715 0.01 
0.01*(1.73) 0.13***(4.03) 
 
 
0.05***(6.04) 
 
8937 0.01 
0.01(0.48) 0.13***(3.96) 
 
  
0.02***(5.78) 9097 0.01 
Panel C. PTO after controlling risk factors 
0.01**(2.01) 0.07**(2.22) 0.07**(2.37) 
  
 
8125 0.00 
0.01(-0.31) 0.05*(1.74) 
 
0.02***(5.77) 
  
8347 0.00 
0.01**(2.03) 0.06**(2.05) 
 
 
0.04***(4.18) 
 
8662 0.00 
0.01(0.87) 0.06**(2.05) 
 
  
0.02***(4.36) 8740 0.00 
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Based on Table 4.6, we test the determinants of decisions in omitting dividends in 
Table 4.14. Dividend-omission decisions are the opposite decisions of continuing to 
pay dividends. As shown in Table 4.6, investment opportunities proxy by asset 
growth and the M/B ratio become insignificant factors in affecting managers’ 
decisions of omitting dividends. Systematic risk also has no significant effect on 
decisions to omit dividends in the out-of-sample group, which is different from the 
results in Table 4.6. The positive relationship between dividend premium and 
dividend omission can also be explained by investors’ reliance on dividends as 
returns and firms’ declining ability in paying dividends (also see Table 4.11’s 
analysis and Section 4.3.2). Indicators which represent past earning declines have a 
robust significant positive relationship with PTO, no matter whether or not risk 
factors are given. 
Table 4.15 shows out-of-sample results of determinants in decreasing 
dividends. Although there is a bad model fitting in Panel A of Table 4.7 where risk 
factors are included, we find significant impact of size, M/B, profitability, and 
idiosyncratic risk on decisions of decreasing dividends. Unlike the relationship in 
Table 4.7 which uses the whole sample period from 1963 to 2013, it seems that 
dividend premium can positively drive propensity to change dividends in either 
direction: increase dividends (in Table 4.14) or decrease dividends (in Table 4.15). 
We attribute the positive effect of dividend premium on PTD to the same reason in 
explaining the positive relationship between dividend premium and PTO, but argue 
that managers take more complicated consideration on decisions of changing 
dividends after observing investors’ dividend requirements from the last fiscal year, 
jointly with other external factors like the financial crisis during the period 2001 to 
2013. 
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Table 4.15 Decision to decrease determinants and determining factors from 2001 to 2013 
Table 4.15 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 2001 to 2013. 
In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 
2009) to get firms’ propensity to omit dividends (PTD). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTD on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy variables which represent firms’ past declines in EPS (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). The second step is divided into Panels B 
and Panel C which respectively report PTD without controlling risk factors and PTD after controlling risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past declines in EPS. NYP 
is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys 
risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. In 
the table, *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Divdecrease  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-0.38(-1.52) -1.93***(-11.48) -0.48*(-1.83) 0.15***(3.36) -3.53***(-4.09) 
  
-2.53***(-7.67) -0.84***(-3.04) -0.24(-1.13) 0.16***(5.55) -2.8***(-4.56) 3.81(0.30) 58.18***(7.22) 
Panel B. PTD without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.03***(2.96) 0.20***(3.40) 0.19***(3.56) 
   
8389 0.01 
0.01(1.28) 0.17***(2.86) 
 
0.03***(3.99) 
  
8715 0.01 
0.02**(2.25) 0.20***(3.41) 
 
 
0.12***(6.9) 
 
8937 0.01 
0.01(0.92) 0.19***(3.22) 
 
  
0.04***(5.62) 9097 0.01 
Panel C. PTD after controlling risk factors 
0.04***(3.24) 0.11*(1.90) 0.12**(2.31) 
  
 
8125 0.01 
0.02*(1.80) 0.09(1.47) 
 
0.02***(2.82) 
  
8347 0.01 
0.03***(2.77) 0.12**(2.06) 
 
 
0.08***(4.76) 
 
8662 0.01 
0.02**(2.10) 0.12**(2.00) 
 
  
0.02***(2.99) 8740 0.01 
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4.3.7. Robustness test by using alternative dependent variables: 
S3newpayer and S5newpayer’s evidence from 2001 to 2013 
Following Section 4.3.3’s method in forming proper dependent variables which 
represent dividend initiators’ past status of being non-payers for three years or five 
years, we also create tables to report the same regression results as a robustness 
check based on the sample from 2001 to 2013.  
Table 4.16 is based on Table 4.8 in testing determinants of S3newpayer 
between 2001 and 2013. Systematic risk’s influence becomes significant again, 
which supports the finding in Table 4.10. Because of the “leading” response which 
has been discussed in Table 4.10’s analysis, EPSG(1-3) does not show a significant 
positive relationship with propensity to initiate after being non-payers over the past 
three years (PTS3I). However, EPSG(1-3) has a significant effect on ∆PTS3I with or 
without controlling risk factors.
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Table 4.16 Decision to be strong new dividend payers (S3newpayer) and determining factors from 2001 to 2013 
Table 4.16 reports the two-step regression of firms’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 2001 to 2013. 
In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and Probhala, 
2009) to get firms’ propensity to “strong” initiate (PTS3I). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTS3I on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend premium (VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-3) and EPSG(1,3)). The second stage is divided into Panels B, Panel C, 
Panel D, and Panel E which respectively report PTS3I without controlling risks, PTS3I after controlling for risks, ∆PTS3I without controlling for risks, and ∆PTS3I after 
controlling for risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset growth (∆A/A) 
are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in Hoberg and 
Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. In the table *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents 
significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: S3newpayer  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-4.07***(-21.56) 1.06***(5.36) -0.60**(-2.78) -0.39**(-2.85) 5.26***(10.05) 
  
-2.63***(-5.04) 0.34(0.87) -1.86***(-4.56) -0.37***(-3.08) 6.73***(9.03) -22.13**(-2.79) -30.8***(-3.31) 
Panel B. PTS3I without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (3) EPSG(1,3) N   𝑹𝟐   
0.03***(7.30) 0.13***(5.39) 0.01(1.30) 
 
15547 0.01 
 
0.02***(4.95) 0.12***(5.44) 
 
0.01***(5.02) 16483 0.01 
 
Panel C. PTS3I after controlling risk factors 
0.03***(6.78) 0.13***(5.52) 0.01(1.18) 
 
15336 0.01 
 
0.02***(4.76) 0.13***(5.61) 
 
0.01***(4.47) 15825 0.01 
 
Panel D. ∆PTS3I without controlling risk factors 
0.04***(10.15) 0.09***(3.29) 0.01***(2.66) 
 
13457 0.01 
 
0.03***(7.34) 0.09***(3.52) 
 
0.02***(6.04) 13841 0.01 
 
Panel E. ∆PTS3I after controlling risk factors 
0.04***(9.65) 0.06**(2.33) 0.01***(2.84) 
 
13279 0.01 
 
0.03***(6.90) 0.07***(2.55) 
 
0.02***(6.02) 13662 0.01 
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Table 4.17 Decision to be strong new dividend payers (S5newpayer) and determining factors from 2001 to 2013 
Table 4.17 reports the two-step regression of firms’’ dividend decisions on conventional factors, dividend premium and optimistic past earning performance from 2001 to 
2013. In Panel A we firstly perform a Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decision on firms’ characteristics with or without controlling risk factors (Hober and 
Probhala, 2009) to get firms’ propensity to “strong” initiate (PTS5I). At second step we use pooled method to regression PTS5I on Baker and Wurgler (2004a)’s dividend 
premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 ) and dummy variables which represent firms’ optimistic past EPS performance (EPSG(1-5) and EPSG(1,5)). The second stage is divided into Panels 
B, Panel C, Panel D, and Panel E which respectively report PTS5I without controlling risks, PTS5I after controlling for risks, ∆PTS5I without controlling for risks, and 
∆PTS5I after controlling for risks on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷 and indicators of firms’ past growths in EPS. NYP is used to represent firms’ sizes. Market-to-book ratio (M/B) and asset 
growth (∆A/A) are proxies for a firm’s investment opportunities. E/A measures a firm’s profitability. Sys risk is firms’ systematic risk and Idi risk is firms’ idiosyncratic risk in 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). Detailed construction of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. In the table, *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** 
represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: S5newpayer  
Intercept NYP ∆A/A M/B E/A Sys risk Idi risk 
-4.35***(-28.11) 1.15***(6.92) -0.59**(-2.54) -0.43**(-2.87) 5.29***(8.08) 
  
-3.07***(-6.77) 0.46(1.58) -1.79***(-4.35) -0.41**(-2.98) 6.72***(8.16) -18.73*(-2.03) -26.95**(-2.86) 
Panel B. PTS5I without controlling risk factors 
Intercept VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG (5) EPSG(1,5) N   𝑹𝟐   
0.03***(7.83) 0.11***(4.26) 0.01(0.62) 
 
12400 0.01 
 
0.02***(5.49) 0.11***(4.63) 
 
0.02***(5.43) 14074 0.01 
 
Panel C. PTS5I after controlling risk factors 
0.03***(7.51) 0.11***(4.27) 0.01(0.54) 
 
12207 0.01 
 
0.02***(5.44) 0.12***(4.68) 
 
0.02***(5.03) 13349 0.01 
 
Panel D. ∆PTS5I without controlling risk factors 
0.05***(9.51) 0.07***(2.28) 0.02(1.46) 
 
10771 0.01 
 
0.03***(6.88) 0.08***(2.84) 
 
0.02***(6.26) 11715 0.01 
 
Panel E. ∆PTS5I after controlling risk factors 
0.05***(9.19) 0.05*(1.68) 0.02(1.41) 
 
10609 0.01 
 
0.03***(6.66) 0.06**(2.23) 
 
0.02***(6.07) 11549 0.01 
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Table 4.17 follows Table 4.9 in showing regression results, but only runs 
regression during the time period of 2001-2013. We have similar conclusions from 
the comparison between results in Table 4.17 and results in Table 4.9 as the 
comparison between Table 4.16 and Table 4.8: (1) systematic risk’s significant 
impact on S5newpayer, and, (2) EPSG(1-5)’s insignificant effect on PTS5I. However, 
the insignificance of EPSG(1-5)’s results may be caused by the limited number of 
observations. 
 
4.3.8. Over-optimistic managers and over-pessimistic managers? 
As a further check on managers’ overreaction, we draw Table 4.18 for a clear and 
detailed look at future earnings performance for firms who have made dividend 
decisions. As discussed in Chapter 3, if managerial extrapolation can reflect 
managers’ overreaction to past earnings performance, firms who 
initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends after experiencing past earnings growth 
should not have future growing patterns of earnings. On the other hand, firms who 
omit/decrease dividends after experiencing past earnings decline should not have 
decreasing earnings in the future.  
By following Table 3.10 in Chapter 3, we examine future earnings 
performance and future growth for several sub-samples: firms who pay dividends at 
the current fiscal year t (payer); firms who initiate dividends at t (newpayer); firms 
who increase dividends at t (divincrease); firms who continue dividends at t 
(divcontinue); firms who omit dividends at t (divomission); and firms who decrease 
dividends at t (divdecrease) (definitions for all these sub-groups can be found at 
Chapter 4 Profitability Change Persistence, Managerial Overreaction, and Reappearing Dividends 
 
186 
 
Appendix 3.3). We only show results for payer/newpayer/divincrease/divcontinue 
with previous profitability growth, and divomission/divdecrease with previously 
declining profitability. For each sub-group with previously growing/declining 
profitability we examine their future profitability and asset growth during, (1) the 
whole time period from 1963 to 2013 and (2) the out-of-sample period from 2001 to 
2013.
Chapter 4 Profitability Change Persistence, Managerial Overreaction, and Reappearing Dividends 
 
187 
 
Table 4.18 Future profitability and future investment of firms who have past 
growing/decreasing EPS and initiate/continue/increase/pay/omit/decrease 
dividends  
Table 4.18 contains two panels. Panel A reports means and growth rates of current profitability (and 
asset growth) and future 5-year profitability (and asset growth) for firms which experience of past 
earnings growth and then choose to pay/initiate/increase/continue dividends. Panel B reports means 
and growth rates of current profitability (and asset growth) and future 5-year profitability (and asset 
growth) for firms which experience of past earnings decline and then choose to omit/decrease 
dividends. E/A represents firm’s profitability at current fiscal year, and E/A (n) represents firm’s 
profitability in n-year. Growth rate is calculated by using current E/A minus E/A at previous fiscal 
year all divided by previous fiscal years’ E/A. Means and growth rates of E/A are calculated within 
two groups with different sample period which are out-of-sample period from 2001 to 2013, and 
whole extended period from 1963 to 2013. We show the same things for ∆A/A as the proxy of 
investment.  
 
 
Panel A. dividend decisions with EPSG 
Payers with EPSG(1-3) 
 
Newpayers with EPSG(1-3) 
  01-13 63-13 
 
  01-13 63-13 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
  
Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.07 
 
0.08 
  
E/A(-5) 0.008 
 
0.027 
 E/A(-4) 0.058 -17.098 0.074 -7.886 
 
E/A(-4) 0.008 2.723 0.018 -34.014 
E/A(-3) 0.087 49.961 0.091 23.426 
 
E/A(-3) 0.058 -819.936 0.063 247.644 
E/A(-2) 0.101 16.560 0.101 10.981 
 
E/A(-2) 0.09 56.686 0.087 38.486 
E/A(-1) 0.112 10.347 0.109 7.927 
 
E/A(-1) 0.112 24.305 0.108 23.947 
E/A 0.099 -11.291 0.101 -7.666 
 
E/A 0.104 -7.620 0.101 -6.490 
E/A(+1) 0.09 -9.195 0.094 -6.566 
 
E/A(+1) 0.086 -16.816 0.09 -11.252 
E/A(+2) 0.076 -15.954 0.089 -5.568 
 
E/A(+2) 0.041 -52.754 0.072 -19.624 
E/A(+3) 0.078 3.452 0.086 -2.798 
 
E/A(+3) 0.062 51.656 0.065 -10.457 
E/A(+4) 0.076 -3.156 0.086 -0.544 
 
E/A(+4) 0.052 -15.544 0.072 10.762 
E/A(+5) 0.08 5.199 0.084 -1.968 
 
E/A(+5) 0.052 0.528 0.066 -8.250 
∆A/A(-5) 0.091 
 
0.066 
  
∆A/A(-5) 0.122 
 
0.023 
 ∆A/A(-4) 0.084 -7.927 0.06 -8.524 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.078 -36.402 0.006 -74.823 
∆A/A(-3) 0.06 -28.910 0.082 36.804 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.035 -55.214 0.028 -584.797 
∆A/A(-2) 0.033 -43.806 0.105 27.424 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.042 20.556 0.079 180.636 
∆A/A(-1) 0.051 51.425 0.117 11.841 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.001 -102.847 0.118 50.012 
∆A/A 0.074 46.138 0.102 -12.493 
 
∆A/A 0.066 -5605.149 0.105 -11.411 
∆A/A(+1) 0.06 -19.540 0.091 -11.252 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.055 -16.408 0.112 6.428 
∆A/A(+2) 0.053 -10.748 0.079 -13.284 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.027 -50.024 0.096 -13.644 
∆A/A(+3) 0.045 -16.299 0.069 -12.289 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.001 -95.660 0.039 -59.596 
∆A/A(+4) 0.049 9.115 0.071 2.179 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.05 4069.610 0.066 70.105 
∆A/A(+5) 0.042 -14.460 0.062 -12.347   ∆A/A(+5) 0.011 -78.289 0.054 -19.122 
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Table 4.18 (continue) 
Payers with EPSG(1,3) 
 
Newpayers with EPSG(1,3) 
  01-13 63-13 
 
  01-13 63-13 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.071 
 
0.08 
  
E/A(-5) 0.037 
 
0.043 
 E/A(-4) 0.061 -14.978 0.074 -6.852 
 
E/A(-4) 0.018 -51.631 0.036 -16.683 
E/A(-3) 0.075 24.168 0.083 12.305 
 
E/A(-3) 0.043 139.542 0.048 34.796 
E/A(-2) 0.087 14.811 0.091 9.527 
 
E/A(-2) 0.062 45.849 0.065 34.306 
E/A(-1) 0.098 13.463 0.1 10.229 
 
E/A(-1) 0.093 50.306 0.095 46.875 
E/A 0.085 -13.350 0.091 -9.122 
 
E/A 0.098 4.692 0.095 -0.690 
E/A(+1) 0.077 -9.127 0.085 -7.225 
 
E/A(+1) 0.074 -24.609 0.072 -24.287 
E/A(+2) 0.068 -12.539 0.081 -4.149 
 
E/A(+2) 0.033 -55.199 0.068 -5.122 
E/A(+3) 0.067 -1.580 0.078 -3.522 
 
E/A(+3) 0.044 33.803 0.062 -8.586 
E/A(+4) 0.069 2.905 0.077 -2.081 
 
E/A(+4) 0.054 22.794 0.058 -7.123 
E/A(+5) 0.073 6.500 0.075 -1.695 
 
E/A(+5) 0.062 15.273 0.06 2.999 
∆A/A(-5) 0.074 
 
0.065 
  
∆A/A(-5) 0.077 
 
0.026 
 ∆A/A(-4) 0.068 -7.454 0.065 0.228 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.047 -39.295 0.031 20.039 
∆A/A(-3) 0.051 -25.531 0.076 16.205 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.019 -58.475 0.032 3.297 
∆A/A(-2) 0.04 -22.253 0.089 17.315 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.034 73.813 0.044 36.782 
∆A/A(-1) 0.054 36.960 0.101 12.981 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.04 17.189 0.079 77.287 
∆A/A 0.056 3.827 0.088 -12.267 
 
∆A/A 0.031 -22.076 0.07 -11.530 
∆A/A(+1) 0.048 -15.122 0.078 -11.802 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.051 65.345 0.086 23.539 
∆A/A(+2) 0.049 2.759 0.069 -11.020 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.041 -19.577 0.069 -19.219 
∆A/A(+3) 0.043 -12.686 0.061 -11.796 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.038 -7.528 0.057 -17.310 
∆A/A(+4) 0.043 -0.276 0.061 -0.661 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.005 -113.811 0.042 -26.411 
∆A/A(+5) 0.045 4.457 0.057 -5.709   ∆A/A(+5) 0.001 -123.267 0.045 6.670 
       Payers with EPSG(1-5) 
 
Newpayers with EPSG(1-5) 
  01-13 63-13 
 
  01-13 63-13 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.088 
 
0.091 
  
E/A(-5) 0.027 
 
0.055 
 E/A(-4) 0.098 10.845 0.098 7.923 
 
E/A(-4) 0.047 76.379 0.075 36.971 
E/A(-3) 0.106 8.155 0.104 6.095 
 
E/A(-3) 0.083 73.995 0.096 27.686 
E/A(-2) 0.112 5.595 0.109 4.926 
 
E/A(-2) 0.105 27.498 0.104 8.408 
E/A(-1) 0.118 5.279 0.114 4.333 
 
E/A(-1) 0.12 13.779 0.114 9.662 
E/A 0.109 -7.896 0.108 -4.876 
 
E/A 0.114 -5.052 0.108 -4.732 
E/A(+1) 0.101 -7.410 0.103 -4.949 
 
E/A(+1) 0.112 -1.400 0.106 -1.935 
E/A(+2) 0.075 -25.550 0.098 -4.657 
 
E/A(+2) 0.074 -33.729 0.086 -18.531 
E/A(+3) 0.083 10.268 0.095 -2.825 
 
E/A(+3) 0.09 20.900 0.063 -27.497 
E/A(+4) 0.09 8.604 0.093 -2.377 
 
E/A(+4) 0.084 -6.621 0.068 7.771 
E/A(+5) 0.094 4.524 0.09 -3.688 
 
E/A(+5) 0.112 33.269 0.087 28.671 
∆A/A(-5) 0.093 
 
0.079 
  
∆A/A(-5) 0.167 
 
0.037 
 ∆A/A(-4) 0.104 11.268 0.095 21.194 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.124 -25.896 0.094 150.140 
∆A/A(-3) 0.095 -8.542 0.111 16.237 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.077 -37.569 0.117 25.179 
∆A/A(-2) 0.083 -12.412 0.118 6.314 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.081 4.795 0.151 28.881 
∆A/A(-1) 0.066 -21.004 0.12 1.349 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.012 -115.050 0.176 16.747 
∆A/A 0.068 3.158 0.104 -13.064 
 
∆A/A 0.031 -351.142 0.083 -53.070 
∆A/A(+1) 0.068 0.160 0.097 -7.073 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.104 238.828 0.115 38.533 
∆A/A(+2) 0.058 -14.384 0.084 -13.392 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.12 15.467 0.144 25.384 
∆A/A(+3) 0.052 -10.123 0.074 -11.235 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.06 -50.172 0.052 -63.963 
∆A/A(+4) 0.031 -39.922 0.061 -17.636 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.09 51.680 0.069 32.955 
∆A/A(+5) 0.049 55.119 0.063 2.530   ∆A/A(+5) 0.066 -26.885 0.052 -24.231 
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Table 4.18 (continue) 
Payers with EPSG(1,5) 
 
Newpayers with EPSG(1,5) 
  01-13 63-13 
 
  01-13 63-13 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.074 
 
0.08 
  
E/A(-5) 0.032 
 
0.04 
 E/A(-4) 0.077 4.222 0.084 5.016 
 
E/A(-4) 0.035 8.911 0.045 12.824 
E/A(-3) 0.082 6.545 0.088 4.923 
 
E/A(-3) 0.053 49.818 0.054 20.245 
E/A(-2) 0.09 8.927 0.093 5.871 
 
E/A(-2) 0.059 12.242 0.064 19.781 
E/A(-1) 0.1 11.478 0.101 8.355 
 
E/A(-1) 0.093 56.112 0.096 48.679 
E/A 0.087 -13.348 0.091 -9.376 
 
E/A 0.097 4.337 0.095 -0.573 
E/A(+1) 0.077 -11.552 0.085 -7.210 
 
E/A(+1) 0.072 -25.769 0.073 -23.269 
E/A(+2) 0.064 -16.119 0.082 -3.858 
 
E/A(+2) 0.028 -60.527 0.069 -5.550 
E/A(+3) 0.067 4.236 0.079 -3.718 
 
E/A(+3) 0.044 56.390 0.064 -7.063 
E/A(+4) 0.072 7.754 0.076 -2.681 
 
E/A(+4) 0.06 36.020 0.058 -10.134 
E/A(+5) 0.074 3.119 0.074 -3.087 
 
E/A(+5) 0.064 6.088 0.053 -8.588 
∆A/A(-5) 0.075 
 
0.074 
  
∆A/A(-5) 0.071 
 
0.044 
 ∆A/A(-4) 0.071 -4.534 0.077 4.446 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.044 -38.371 0.044 1.892 
∆A/A(-3) 0.06 -15.498 0.084 9.614 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.05 13.107 0.041 -7.238 
∆A/A(-2) 0.056 -6.474 0.093 9.811 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.046 -7.101 0.045 8.452 
∆A/A(-1) 0.058 3.320 0.098 6.375 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.058 25.339 0.073 63.559 
∆A/A 0.058 0.328 0.087 -12.078 
 
∆A/A 0.023 -59.833 0.056 -22.875 
∆A/A(+1) 0.047 -19.482 0.075 -13.237 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.054 133.777 0.083 47.598 
∆A/A(+2) 0.048 2.339 0.067 -11.250 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.043 -20.134 0.062 -25.308 
∆A/A(+3) 0.051 6.317 0.064 -4.303 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.066 53.079 0.067 7.683 
∆A/A(+4) 0.042 -17.233 0.057 -10.216 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.009 -86.931 0.045 -33.426 
∆A/A(+5) 0.046 7.350 0.054 -5.461   ∆A/A(+5) 0.017 98.905 0.036 -18.687 
Divincrease with EPSG(1-3) 
 
Divcontinue with EPSG(1-3) 
  01-13 63-13 
 
  01-13 63-13 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.073 
 
0.08 
  
E/A(-5) 0.075 
 
0.082 
 
E/A(-4) 0.06 -17.435 0.075 -7.350 
 
E/A(-4) 0.062 -16.777 0.076 -7.442 
E/A(-3) 0.089 48.254 0.091 22.481 
 
E/A(-3) 0.089 42.682 0.092 21.115 
E/A(-2) 0.103 16.256 0.101 11.037 
 
E/A(-2) 0.102 14.865 0.101 10.167 
E/A(-1) 0.113 9.887 0.11 8.197 
 
E/A(-1) 0.112 9.543 0.109 7.331 
E/A 0.103 -8.806 0.103 -5.890 
 
E/A 0.099 -11.531 0.101 -7.716 
E/A(+1) 0.094 -8.743 0.097 -6.047 
 
E/A(+1) 0.09 -8.669 0.094 -6.368 
E/A(+2) 0.078 -16.960 0.091 -6.014 
 
E/A(+2) 0.077 -14.295 0.089 -5.047 
E/A(+3) 0.08 1.621 0.088 -3.881 
 
E/A(+3) 0.079 2.158 0.087 -2.576 
E/A(+4) 0.079 -0.920 0.087 -0.781 
 
E/A(+4) 0.077 -2.587 0.086 -0.880 
E/A(+5) 0.084 5.830 0.086 -1.261 
 
E/A(+5) 0.081 5.511 0.085 -1.796 
∆A/A(-5) 0.088 
 
0.065 
  
∆A/A(-5) 0.089 
 
0.069 
 ∆A/A(-4) 0.08 -8.515 0.059 -8.970 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.084 -5.392 0.063 -9.183 
∆A/A(-3) 0.061 -23.514 0.081 36.571 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.061 -27.336 0.085 34.481 
∆A/A(-2) 0.036 -40.468 0.101 25.725 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.033 -46.150 0.106 25.218 
∆A/A(-1) 0.051 40.103 0.116 14.055 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.054 63.613 0.117 10.609 
∆A/A 0.069 35.762 0.101 -12.773 
 
∆A/A 0.075 38.435 0.102 -12.540 
∆A/A(+1) 0.068 -1.251 0.095 -6.277 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.06 -19.709 0.09 -12.009 
∆A/A(+2) 0.051 -25.601 0.079 -16.081 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.055 -8.863 0.078 -13.251 
∆A/A(+3) 0.045 -11.549 0.07 -12.271 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.047 -13.913 0.07 -9.868 
∆A/A(+4) 0.053 17.365 0.071 1.983 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.049 3.217 0.071 0.618 
∆A/A(+5) 0.046 -13.096 0.063 -10.688   ∆A/A(+5) 0.044 -10.236 0.062 -12.088 
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Table 4.18 (continue) 
Divincrease with EPSG(1,3) 
 
Divcontinue with EPSG(1,3) 
  01-13 63-13 
 
  01-13 63-13 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.075 
 
0.081 
  
E/A(-5) 0.074 
 
0.081 
 E/A(-4) 0.065 -13.032 0.076 -5.783 
 
E/A(-4) 0.064 -13.611 0.076 -6.537 
E/A(-3) 0.078 20.311 0.084 10.719 
 
E/A(-3) 0.078 21.597 0.085 11.745 
E/A(-2) 0.09 15.379 0.093 10.068 
 
E/A(-2) 0.089 13.607 0.093 8.850 
E/A(-1) 0.103 13.868 0.104 11.600 
 
E/A(-1) 0.099 11.443 0.101 8.873 
E/A 0.093 -9.521 0.097 -6.414 
 
E/A 0.084 -14.794 0.091 -9.612 
E/A(+1) 0.083 -10.197 0.089 -7.998 
 
E/A(+1) 0.078 -7.695 0.085 -6.278 
E/A(+2) 0.072 -13.911 0.085 -5.147 
 
E/A(+2) 0.07 -10.218 0.082 -4.170 
E/A(+3) 0.069 -3.242 0.082 -3.643 
 
E/A(+3) 0.068 -2.672 0.079 -3.384 
E/A(+4) 0.074 5.986 0.079 -2.625 
 
E/A(+4) 0.069 2.267 0.078 -1.959 
E/A(+5) 0.078 5.843 0.079 -0.949 
 
E/A(+5) 0.074 6.177 0.076 -1.848 
∆A/A(-5) 0.078 
 
0.068 
  
∆A/A(-5) 0.074 
 
0.067 
 ∆A/A(-4) 0.066 -15.993 0.068 -0.872 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.07 -4.797 0.067 -0.132 
∆A/A(-3) 0.054 -18.408 0.075 10.174 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.053 -24.048 0.078 16.571 
∆A/A(-2) 0.044 -18.099 0.086 15.603 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.04 -24.920 0.092 17.019 
∆A/A(-1) 0.056 28.091 0.103 19.056 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.055 38.532 0.102 11.340 
∆A/A 0.054 -3.911 0.09 -12.133 
 
∆A/A 0.058 4.699 0.089 -12.502 
∆A/A(+1) 0.05 -7.092 0.083 -8.081 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.047 -18.040 0.077 -13.121 
∆A/A(+2) 0.051 0.746 0.072 -13.781 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.049 4.143 0.069 -10.446 
∆A/A(+3) 0.048 -4.246 0.065 -9.486 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.043 -12.941 0.061 -11.622 
∆A/A(+4) 0.044 -10.037 0.062 -3.753 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.046 7.875 0.062 0.560 
∆A/A(+5) 0.046 5.323 0.058 -7.146   ∆A/A(+5) 0.048 4.141 0.058 -6.038 
Divincrease with EPSG(1-5) 
 
Divcontinue with EPSG(1-5) 
  01-13 63-13 
 
  01-13 63-13 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.091 
 
0.092 
  
E/A(-5) 0.091 
 
0.092 
 
E/A(-4) 0.1 9.539 0.098 7.306 
 
E/A(-4) 0.1 9.926 0.099 7.404 
E/A(-3) 0.108 8.703 0.104 6.190 
 
E/A(-3) 0.107 6.674 0.104 5.602 
E/A(-2) 0.115 6.079 0.109 4.736 
 
E/A(-2) 0.112 4.792 0.109 4.830 
E/A(-1) 0.121 5.591 0.114 4.686 
 
E/A(-1) 0.118 4.900 0.114 4.181 
E/A 0.113 -6.693 0.11 -4.216 
 
E/A 0.108 -8.034 0.108 -4.880 
E/A(+1) 0.104 -8.592 0.104 -4.802 
 
E/A(+1) 0.1 -7.674 0.103 -5.035 
E/A(+2) 0.079 -23.491 0.1 -4.181 
 
E/A(+2) 0.075 -25.150 0.098 -4.253 
E/A(+3) 0.084 6.392 0.096 -4.203 
 
E/A(+3) 0.082 9.900 0.096 -2.305 
E/A(+4) 0.091 7.492 0.093 -2.374 
 
E/A(+4) 0.09 9.195 0.094 -2.566 
E/A(+5) 0.097 7.096 0.091 -2.493 
 
E/A(+5) 0.093 3.350 0.09 -4.268 
∆A/A(-5) 0.088 
 
0.077 
  
∆A/A(-5) 0.09 
 
0.08 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.098 12.242 0.094 22.174 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.103 14.562 0.096 19.382 
∆A/A(-3) 0.092 -6.240 0.107 14.189 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.096 -6.878 0.111 15.974 
∆A/A(-2) 0.082 -10.626 0.113 5.141 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.083 -13.073 0.117 5.597 
∆A/A(-1) 0.063 -23.141 0.118 4.845 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.069 -16.647 0.118 0.751 
∆A/A 0.068 7.244 0.103 -13.261 
 
∆A/A 0.069 0.194 0.105 -11.265 
∆A/A(+1) 0.069 2.051 0.098 -4.325 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.066 -4.669 0.096 -8.132 
∆A/A(+2) 0.055 -20.580 0.083 -15.612 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.055 -16.755 0.082 -14.756 
∆A/A(+3) 0.062 11.816 0.075 -9.952 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.052 -5.800 0.075 -8.602 
∆A/A(+4) 0.049 -20.868 0.064 -14.644 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.028 -45.194 0.061 -18.601 
∆A/A(+5) 0.053 9.798 0.064 1.056   ∆A/A(+5) 0.048 67.659 0.063 3.423 
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       Table 4.18 (continue) 
Divincrease with EPSG(1,5) 
 
Divcontinue with EPSG(1,5) 
  01-13 63-13 
 
  01-13 63-13 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.076 
 
0.08 
  
E/A(-5) 0.077 
 
0.082 
 E/A(-4) 0.078 1.839 0.084 3.841 
 
E/A(-4) 0.08 4.010 0.086 4.868 
E/A(-3) 0.083 7.372 0.088 5.664 
 
E/A(-3) 0.085 5.298 0.09 4.595 
E/A(-2) 0.091 9.643 0.094 6.827 
 
E/A(-2) 0.092 8.626 0.095 5.496 
E/A(-1) 0.103 12.867 0.104 10.410 
 
E/A(-1) 0.1 9.327 0.101 7.054 
E/A 0.094 -8.509 0.097 -6.441 
 
E/A 0.086 -14.642 0.091 -9.835 
E/A(+1) 0.084 -11.122 0.09 -7.518 
 
E/A(+1) 0.077 -10.401 0.085 -6.443 
E/A(+2) 0.069 -18.265 0.086 -4.916 
 
E/A(+2) 0.066 -13.895 0.082 -3.846 
E/A(+3) 0.07 2.455 0.082 -3.825 
 
E/A(+3) 0.068 2.857 0.079 -3.657 
E/A(+4) 0.077 9.931 0.079 -3.607 
 
E/A(+4) 0.073 6.753 0.077 -2.499 
E/A(+5) 0.079 1.998 0.078 -2.293 
 
E/A(+5) 0.075 3.202 0.075 -2.919 
∆A/A(-5) 0.077 
 
0.074 
  
∆A/A(-5) 0.075 
 
0.075 
 ∆A/A(-4) 0.068 -12.347 0.076 2.849 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.074 -2.048 0.078 4.557 
∆A/A(-3) 0.061 -10.228 0.081 6.360 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.062 -16.100 0.087 10.712 
∆A/A(-2) 0.055 -9.227 0.089 10.288 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.057 -7.283 0.095 9.341 
∆A/A(-1) 0.062 12.777 0.101 12.478 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.058 1.639 0.1 5.056 
∆A/A 0.057 -7.461 0.088 -12.356 
 
∆A/A 0.061 4.595 0.088 -11.560 
∆A/A(+1) 0.053 -7.493 0.081 -8.137 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.046 -23.727 0.075 -15.292 
∆A/A(+2) 0.048 -9.758 0.069 -14.296 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.049 4.637 0.067 -10.392 
∆A/A(+3) 0.054 12.826 0.066 -5.425 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.05 3.593 0.064 -4.888 
∆A/A(+4) 0.042 -22.013 0.059 -9.977 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.045 -10.917 0.058 -9.358 
∆A/A(+5) 0.05 17.857 0.057 -4.276   ∆A/A(+5) 0.048 6.049 0.055 -4.767 
Panel B. dividend decisions with EPSD 
Divomission with EPSD(1-3) 
 
Divdecrease with EPSD(1-3) 
  01-13 63-13 
 
  01-13 63-13 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.084 
 
0.091 
  
E/A(-5) 0.092 
 
0.100 
 
E/A(-4) 0.092 8.811 0.104 14.143 
 
E/A(-4) 0.111 20.631 0.112 11.832 
E/A(-3) 0.061 -33.538 0.076 -26.800 
 
E/A(-3) 0.078 -30.185 0.089 -20.642 
E/A(-2) 0.014 -76.533 0.04 -47.122 
 
E/A(-2) 0.040 -48.599 0.062 -30.388 
E/A(-1) -0.09 -715.715 -0.04 -198.531 
 
E/A(-1) 0.044 -211.335 0.005 -91.483 
E/A -0.04 -58.559 -0.01 79.779 
 
E/A 0.007 -85.184 0.020 284.951 
E/A(+1) -0 89.013 0.013 261.730 
 
E/A(+1) 0.012 -277.111 0.035 72.653 
E/A(+2) 0.05 1352.252 0.041 215.818 
 
E/A(+2) 0.040 243.044 0.048 37.234 
E/A(+3) 0.046 -8.028 0.044 7.190 
 
E/A(+3) 0.045 12.033 0.052 8.833 
E/A(+4) 0.05 8.274 0.047 6.465 
 
E/A(+4) 0.045 0.229 0.052 -0.847 
E/A(+5) 0.049 -2.929 0.05 8.270 
 
E/A(+5) 0.042 -5.567 0.058 11.227 
∆A/A(-5) -0.21 
 
0.095 
  
∆A/A(-5) 0.124 
 
0.095 
 ∆A/A(-4) 0.003 101.405 0.125 31.657 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.015 -112.222 0.122 29.447 
∆A/A(-3) 0.066 2129.417 0.111 -11.000 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.066 333.825 0.100 -18.620 
∆A/A(-2) 0.065 -1.572 0.047 -58.160 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.083 25.970 0.058 -41.412 
∆A/A(-1) 0.084 30.217 -0.09 -285.350 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.078 -5.787 0.031 -152.403 
∆A/A -0.1 -215.472 -0.09 4.584 
 
∆A/A 0.067 -185.540 0.030 -2.845 
∆A/A(+1) -0.04 -63.294 -0.08 15.283 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.041 -38.647 0.029 -2.198 
∆A/A(+2) 0.031 186.279 -0.01 83.222 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.028 -168.839 0.017 -159.625 
∆A/A(+3) 0.084 172.496 0.045 452.858 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.068 139.331 0.041 137.254 
∆A/A(+4) 0.051 -39.300 0.013 -71.744 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.016 -76.179 0.024 -41.625 
∆A/A(+5) 0.044 -14.381 0.021 63.640   ∆A/A(+5) 0.035 120.409 0.037 55.798 
                      
           
           
Chapter 4 Profitability Change Persistence, Managerial Overreaction, and Reappearing Dividends 
 
192 
 
           
Table 4.18 (continue) 
Divomission with EPSD(1,3) 
 
Divdecrease with EPSD(1,3) 
  01-13 63-13 
 
  01-13 63-13 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.068 
 
0.076 
  
E/A(-5) 0.082 
 
0.09 
 E/A(-4) 0.077 13.067 0.083 8.957 
 
E/A(-4) 0.09 9.956 0.097 6.881 
E/A(-3) 0.052 -32.508 0.067 -19.112 
 
E/A(-3) 0.071 -21.773 0.085 -11.754 
E/A(-2) 0.013 -75.041 0.044 -34.938 
 
E/A(-2) 0.043 -38.645 0.071 -16.859 
E/A(-1) -0.06 -545.974 -0.02 -154.360 
 
E/A(-1) 0.007 -115.562 0.036 -49.668 
E/A -0.03 50.493 -0 -88.092 
 
E/A 0.003 -151.977 0.038 6.317 
E/A(+1) 0.001 104.624 0.019 -782.623 
 
E/A(+1) 0.022 536.594 0.051 33.733 
E/A(+2) 0.048 3507.005 0.03 54.104 
 
E/A(+2) 0.052 132.775 0.055 7.569 
E/A(+3) 0.033 -30.770 0.034 14.168 
 
E/A(+3) 0.048 -7.110 0.057 5.089 
E/A(+4) 0.027 -19.120 0.039 15.210 
 
E/A(+4) 0.043 -10.946 0.058 1.494 
E/A(+5) 0.027 -0.045 0.042 8.586 
 
E/A(+5) 0.041 -3.764 0.061 4.041 
∆A/A(-5) -0.15 
 
0.074 
  
∆A/A(-5) 0.084 
 
0.085 
 ∆A/A(-4) -0.01 92.351 0.095 27.789 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.014 -116.129 0.102 20.060 
∆A/A(-3) 0.062 623.644 0.093 -2.082 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.063 360.230 0.094 -7.869 
∆A/A(-2) 0.075 20.684 0.05 -45.631 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.079 25.895 0.07 -25.624 
∆A/A(-1) 0.067 -10.447 -0.07 -229.849 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.065 -17.096 0.011 -84.652 
∆A/A -0.11 -261.611 -0.1 45.478 
 
∆A/A 0.066 -200.456 0.004 -133.940 
∆A/A(+1) -0.05 54.891 -0.06 35.987 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.027 -58.647 0.007 -285.973 
∆A/A(+2) 0.003 105.386 -0.01 80.438 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.02 -172.587 0.023 237.781 
∆A/A(+3) 0.029 999.137 0.033 373.578 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.04 104.026 0.046 99.918 
∆A/A(+4) 0.035 20.348 0.027 -17.341 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.041 2.976 0.043 -5.535 
∆A/A(+5) 0.018 -48.808 0.021 -23.460  ∆A/A(+5) 0.027 -33.891 0.042 -2.913 
Divomission with EPSD(1-5) 
 
Divdecrease with EPSD(1-5) 
  01-13 63-13 
 
  01-13 63-13 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.083 
 
0.096 
  
E/A(-5) 0.093 
 
0.108 
 E/A(-4) 0.061 -26.648 0.079 -17.475 
 
E/A(-4) 0.075 -20.053 0.096 -11.226 
E/A(-3) 0.044 -28.047 0.063 -21.215 
 
E/A(-3) 0.052 -30.468 0.078 -19.178 
E/A(-2) 0.003 -93.352 0.029 -53.335 
 
E/A(-2) 0.016 -69.697 0.049 -36.213 
E/A(-1) -0.15 -5373.355 -0.07 -344.711 
 
E/A(-1) 0.082 -621.023 0.015 -130.542 
E/A -0.04 72.909 -0.01 79.448 
 
E/A 0.063 -23.127 0.001 -90.693 
E/A(+1) 0.013 130.395 0.009 164.088 
 
E/A(+1) 0.019 -129.514 0.035 -2603.587 
E/A(+2) 0.076 499.681 0.03 214.021 
 
E/A(+2) 0.066 254.726 0.037 5.904 
E/A(+3) 0.038 -50.344 0.042 42.148 
 
E/A(+3) 0.065 -1.627 0.054 44.366 
E/A(+4) 0.075 97.685 0.04 -4.753 
 
E/A(+4) 0.066 1.089 0.051 -5.924 
E/A(+5) 0.053 -29.416 0.06 50.377 
 
E/A(+5) 0.021 -68.636 0.053 5.284 
∆A/A(-5) -0.25 
 
0.14 
  
∆A/A(-5) 0.132 
 
0.131 
 ∆A/A(-4) -0.02 -91.812 0.083 -40.589 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.022 -116.820 0.1 -23.516 
∆A/A(-3) -0.01 -38.678 0.049 -41.161 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.016 -25.567 0.063 -37.745 
∆A/A(-2) 0.013 208.712 0.024 -51.702 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.043 161.413 0.042 -32.236 
∆A/A(-1) 0.138 928.628 -0.1 -506.168 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.103 138.543 0.044 -204.509 
∆A/A -0.12 -188.089 -0.08 16.987 
 
∆A/A 0.154 -249.730 0.062 39.637 
∆A/A(+1) -0 95.953 -0.02 73.470 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.029 -81.194 0.031 -49.842 
∆A/A(+2) 0.109 2308.922 0.055 360.675 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.035 -220.859 0.022 -171.720 
∆A/A(+3) 0.102 -6.215 0.026 -51.890 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.039 10.344 0.031 38.522 
∆A/A(+4) 0.003 -96.828 -0.01 -151.216 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.008 -78.253 0.002 -106.973 
∆A/A(+5) 0.141 4256.303 -0.02 44.110  ∆A/A(+5) 0.075 798.779 0.022 -1131.477 
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Table 4.18 (continue) 
Divomission with EPSD(1,5) 
 
Divdecrease with EPSD(1,5) 
  01-13 63-13 
 
  01-13 63-13 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
 
  Mean 
Grow 
rates % Mean 
Grow 
rates % 
E/A(-5) 0.065 
 
0.075 
  
E/A(-5) 0.079 
 
0.09 
 
E/A(-4) 0.062 -4.947 0.072 -4.588 
 
E/A(-4) 0.072 -9.090 0.085 -4.691 
E/A(-3) 0.042 -32.226 0.06 -16.227 
 
E/A(-3) 0.063 -11.744 0.079 -7.204 
E/A(-2) 0.005 -86.871 0.039 -35.238 
 
E/A(-2) 0.04 -37.233 0.067 -15.055 
E/A(-1) -0.06 -1151.142 -0.03 -171.740 
 
E/A(-1) 0.007 -116.822 0.033 -51.665 
E/A -0.02 59.766 -0 -83.335 
 
E/A 0.007 -198.061 0.036 11.165 
E/A(+1) 0.008 133.225 0.017 -476.009 
 
E/A(+1) 0.027 313.083 0.05 37.789 
E/A(+2) 0.052 573.469 0.03 71.863 
 
E/A(+2) 0.057 111.031 0.053 6.352 
E/A(+3) 0.036 -29.672 0.033 10.183 
 
E/A(+3) 0.05 -12.727 0.056 6.464 
E/A(+4) 0.031 -14.651 0.04 22.511 
 
E/A(+4) 0.044 -11.873 0.059 3.691 
E/A(+5) 0.023 -24.572 0.045 9.982 
 
E/A(+5) 0.039 -11.632 0.061 4.154 
∆A/A(-5) -0.14 
 
0.083 
  
∆A/A(-5) 0.079 
 
0.09 
 
∆A/A(-4) -0.01 95.809 0.081 -1.900 
 
∆A/A(-4) 0.011 -113.387 0.084 -5.984 
∆A/A(-3) 0.045 846.673 0.078 -3.329 
 
∆A/A(-3) 0.049 358.772 0.081 -4.542 
∆A/A(-2) 0.059 32.939 0.04 -48.759 
 
∆A/A(-2) 0.057 17.560 0.06 -25.233 
∆A/A(-1) 0.063 6.947 -0.08 -301.263 
 
∆A/A(-1) 0.062 9.366 0.002 -97.173 
∆A/A -0.12 -282.625 -0.11 -35.230 
 
∆A/A 0.066 -206.283 0.013 -860.616 
∆A/A(+1) -0.05 56.875 -0.07 33.254 
 
∆A/A(+1) 0.022 -66.291 0.001 -93.642 
∆A/A(+2) 0.001 102.226 -0.02 70.190 
 
∆A/A(+2) 0.013 -160.316 0.018 -2286.072 
∆A/A(+3) 0.034 2994.445 0.031 243.735 
 
∆A/A(+3) 0.038 183.042 0.041 129.478 
∆A/A(+4) 0.041 19.838 0.028 -10.844 
 
∆A/A(+4) 0.039 3.272 0.043 4.202 
∆A/A(+5) 0.031 -25.130 0.024 -15.735   ∆A/A(+5) 0.039 -1.872 0.042 -2.533 
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Table 4.18 records means and growth rate of profitability (and asset growth) 
for firms who initiate/pay/increase/continue dividends after experiencing past 
earnings growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)), and means 
and growth rate of profitability (and asset growth) for firms who omit/decrease 
dividends after experiencing past earnings decline (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), 
EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). For firms who initiate/pay/increase/decrease dividends 
in fiscal year t, their profitability will decrease from next year t+1, and they will 
have declining profitability for the future five years. Although there are some 
exceptions that firms’ future earnings performance may have 1-year or two-year 
increase in specific future years, these increases rarely seem to appear, and the 
overall increase of future profitability from current fiscal year t to the future fifth 
year is all negative. Meanwhile firms who pay/increase/continue dividends in the 
current fiscal year t also have similar decreasing asset growth rates in the future five 
years. Dividend initiators usually have increasing asset growth rate for the following 
one or two years, but their asset growth rate becomes negative again from the third 
year, and have overall negative asset growth rate over the next five years. This may 
indicate that dividend initiators have stronger expectations about firms’ future 
performance than firms who pay/increase/continue dividends. This overreaction can 
last for one to two years, and then these initiators may find that firms’ future 
performances are not as good as they expected, which causes firms’ asset growth 
rates to revert to what they should be.  
Firms’ trends of future earnings performance and future asset growth rate are 
not the same in the whole sample period from 1963 to 2013 and the out-of-sample 
period from 2001 to 2013. Firms’ decreasing future earnings performance and asset 
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growth rates have fewer violations in the sample from 1963 to 2013 than those in the 
sample from 2001 to 2013. However, overall decreasing profitability and asset 
growth rates are both negative in the different sample periods. In summary, managers 
who observe past earnings growth and then decide to initiate/pay/increase/continue 
dividends are overreacting and wrongly extrapolate past earnings growth into the 
future. This conclusion holds in the out-of-sample period.  
Panel B in Table 4.18 shows that firms who omit/decrease dividends after 
experiencing declining profitability over the previous three or five years are also 
overreacting to past earnings performance. These firms all show overall increasing 
profitability in the following five years. Especially for the next year t+1 of current 
fiscal year t, firms who omit/decrease dividends can usually revert negative 
profitability into positive in the whole sample period as well as in the out-of-sample 
period, and then the positive increasing profitability can last for years. Dividend 
omissioners/decreasers’ future asset growth tends to smoothly grow in the future 
three years, which also indicates an overreaction of managers to firms’ past earnings 
decline. Although these firms can experience a decrease in asset growth rate in the 
fourth year and/or the fifth year, the overall asset growth from the current fiscal year 
t to the future fifth year t+5 are all positive in both sample periods.   
 
4.4 Further tests: issues of positive EPS and financial crisis 
4.4.1 Positive EPS and negative EPS 
When we are using firms' past growing EPS as the proxy for managerial 
overextrapolation, it is unavoidably to discussion the issue of negative EPS. For 
some payout decisions like dividend initiating/increasing decisions, it is reasonable 
to assume that managers may make these dividend paying decisions when they are 
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foreseeing future growth in EPS, because managers may tend to use dividend as the 
signal to convey investors that their firms are going to perform excellently in the 
future, even though the current EPS are still negative. However, dividend 
decreasing/omitting decisions may only be caused by changes from positive earnings 
to negative earnings rather than managerial overextrapolation based on past decline 
in EPS. Therefore it is crucial to have robustness check on whether our indicators of 
managerial overextrapolation can still have impact on firms' dividend decisions 
especially for dividend decreasing/omitting decisions, after replacing our previous 
indicators with new ones formed by only using positive EPS. Results of 
second-stage regressions for PTI, PTIN, ΔPTP, PTD and PTO by using new 
indicators of managerial overextrapolation are shown in Table 4.19. 
Table 4.19 shows that nearly all our EPSG/EPSD indicators representing for 
managerial overextrapolation still have significant positive impact on firms' 
propensity to make different dividend decisions cross the whole time period from 
1963 to 2013 in this thesis, when only positive EPS are used. We also test the 
new-formed EPSG/EPSD indicators in the in-sample period from 1963 to 2000 (not 
shown in this thesis) and find similar results, so we conclude that using positive EPS 
only will not affect our previous conclusions based on previous indicators of 
managerial overextrapolations. 
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Table 4.19 Propensity to initiate, to increase, to pay, to omit, and to decrease 
dividend, and patterns of earnings growth or declines over the past three or five 
years formed by using positive EPS only, 1963-2013 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression of firms’ dividend decisions 
on dividend premium (𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), and new indicators of managerial overreaction based on firms’ past 
EPS growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)) formed by using positive EPS only. 
The dependent variables (PTI, PTIN, ∆PTP, PTO and PTD) are the residuals from the first stage 
Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decisions on firm characteristics (NYP, ∆A/A, M/B, and 
E/A) and risks, and results are in Panels A, B, C, D and E respectively. *** represents significance in 
the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance 
in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: PTI 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3)  Risks controlled 
0.23*** (12.98) 0.01 (0.60) 
   
No 
0.22*** (13.67) 
 
0.02*** (5.39) 
  
No 
0.22*** (14.89) 
  
1.81E-3(0.38) 
 
No 
0.18*** (16.61) 
   
0.01*** (5.39) No 
0.25*** (14.17) 3.73E-3(0.36) 
   
Yes 
0.24*** (14.69) 
 
0.02*** (4.25) 
  
Yes 
0.24*** (16.15) 
  
5.26E-4 (0.11) 
 
Yes 
0.20*** (17.87) 
   
0.01*** (4.53) Yes 
Panel B. Dependent variable: PTIN  
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3)  Risks controlled 
0.25*** (12.36) 0.07*** (6.71) 
   
No 
0.24*** (12.33) 
 
0.08*** (16.14) 
  
No 
0.23*** (12.50) 
  
0.08*** (13.18) 
 
No 
0.22*** (12.41) 
   
0.11*** (22.64) No 
0.28*** (13.84) 0.07*** (6.42) 
   
Yes 
0.27*** (13.93) 
 
0.08*** (16.22) 
  
Yes 
0.25*** (13.79) 
  
0.08*** (12.92) 
 
Yes 
0.24*** (13.81) 
   
0.11*** (22.67) Yes 
Panel C. Dependent variable: △PTP 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3)  Risks controlled 
0.05*** (6.67) 0.03*** (7.09) 
   
No 
0.04*** (5.00) 
 
0.08*** (41.04) 
  
No 
0.04*** (6.02) 
  
0.04*** (17.35) 
 
No 
0.03*** (4.33) 
   
0.08*** (47.76) No 
-0.04*** (-3.90) 0.03*** (5.73) 
   
Yes 
-0.04*** (-4.66) 
 
0.06*** (23.95) 
  
Yes 
-0.05*** (-5.62) 
  
0.04*** (12.65) 
 
Yes 
-0.06*** (-7.54)       0.06*** (29.08) Yes 
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Table 4.19 (continue) 
Panel D. Dependent variable: PTO 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSD (1-5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD(1-3) EPSD(1,3)  Risks controlled 
4.81E-3 (0.85) 0.07*** (6.31) 
   
No 
0.01* (1.73) 
 
2.66E-3 (1.30) 
  
No 
0.01 (1.55) 
  
0.04*** (14.05) 
 
No 
0.02** (2.50) 
   
0.01*** (3.10) No 
-4.68 (-0.83) 0.06*** (5.89) 
   
Yes 
-0.01 (-1.30) 
 
0.01*** (3.18) 
  
Yes 
-4.04E-4 (-0.08) 
  
0.04*** (11.53) 
 
Yes 
-3.79E-3 (-0.55) 
   
0.01*** (4.15) Yes 
Panel E. Dependent variable: PTD 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSD (1-5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD(1-3) EPSD(1,3)  Risks controlled 
-0.11*** (-6.64) 0.16*** (4.86) 
   
No 
-0.14*** (-8.17) 
 
0.02*** (4.98) 
  
No 
-0.10*** (-6.35) 
  
0.18*** (8.40) 
 
No 
-0.12*** (-7.63) 
   
0.03*** (8.21) No 
-0.14*** (-8.12) 0.15*** (4.58) 
   
Yes 
-0.17*** (-10.55) 
 
0.01** (2.32) 
  
Yes 
-0.12*** (-8.00) 
  
0.07*** (7.77) 
 
Yes 
-0.14*** (-9.45)       0.02*** (5.31) Yes 
 
 
4.4.2 The impact of financial crisis 
Recent literature (see Campello et al., 2009; Houser, 2013; Floyd and Skinner, 2014) 
have documented changes in firms' dividend policy during the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis. We use Kuo et al. (2013)'s method in testing the financial crisis or recession in 
the second-stage regression of the Fama-Macbeth logistic regression. By bringing in 
the dummies representing recession or financial crisis, we can test the potential 
impact of financial crisis on firms' propensity to make dividend decisions, and can 
also test whether our previous results for indicators of managerial overextrapolation 
are robust.  
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Table 4.20 Propensity to initiate, to increase, to pay, to omit, and to decrease 
dividend, and patterns of earnings growth or declines over the past three or five 
years after controlling for recession, 1963-2013 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression of firms’ dividend decisions 
on dividend premium (𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), recession, and new indicators of managerial overreaction based on 
firms’ past EPS growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)) formed by using 
positive EPS only. The dependent variables (PTI, PTIN, ∆PTP, PTO and PTD) are the residuals from 
the first stage Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decisions on firm characteristics (NYP, 
∆A/A, M/B, and E/A) and risks, and results are in Panels A, B, C, D and E respectively. *** represents 
significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * 
represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: PTI 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) Recession 
Risks 
controlled 
0.24*** (13.23) 0.01 (0.77) 
   
-0.02*** (-3.61) No 
0.22*** (13.94) 
 
0.02*** (5.62) 
  
-0.02*** (-3.99) No 
0.22*** (15.12) 
  
2.88E-3(0.61) 
 
-0.02*** (-4.58) No 
0.18*** (16.88) 
   
0.01*** (5.46) -0.02*** (-4.33) No 
0.25*** (14.23) 4.38E-3(0.43) 
   
-0.01 (-1.32) Yes 
0.25*** (14.77) 
 
0.02*** (4.34) 
  
-0.01 (-1.58) Yes 
0.24*** (16.22) 
  
0.97E-4 (0.20) 
 
-0.01* (-1.89) Yes 
0.20*** (17.91) 
   
0.01*** (4.55) -4.52E-3 (-1.21) Yes 
Panel B. Dependent variable: PTIN  
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) Recession 
Risks 
controlled 
0.25*** (12.41) 0.07*** (6.53) 
   
0.02*** (2.55) No 
0.24*** (12.63) 
 
0.08*** (15.96) 
  
0.01 (1.30) No 
0.23*** (12.56) 
  
0.08*** (13.03) 
 
0.01* (1.69) No 
0.22*** (12.45) 
   
0.11*** (22.55) 0.01 (1.55) No 
0.28*** (13.98) 0.07*** (5.96) 
   
0.05*** (6.86) Yes 
0.28*** (14.07) 
 
0.08*** (15.66) 
  
0.04*** (5.72) Yes 
0.25*** (14.03) 
  
0.08*** (12.45) 
 
0.04*** (6.38) Yes 
0.25*** (14.01)       0.11*** (22.36) 0.04*** (6.44) Yes 
Panel C. Dependent variable: △PTP 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) Recession 
Risks 
controlled 
0.05*** (6.68) 0.03*** (7.30) 
   
-0.01*** (-3.53) No 
0.04*** (5.01) 
 
0.08*** (41.19) 
  
-0.01*** (-3.49) No 
0.04*** (5.97) 
  
0.04*** (17.58) 
 
-0.01*** (-4.18) No 
0.03*** (4.34) 
   
0.08*** (47.79) -4.63E-3* (-1.86) No 
-0.04*** (-4.01) 0.02*** (4.39) 
   
0.07*** (21.26) Yes 
-0.04*** (-4.76) 
 
0.05*** (22.26) 
  
0.07*** (21.47) Yes 
-0.05*** (-5.38) 
  
0.03*** (11.24) 
 
0.07*** (22.41) Yes 
-0.06*** (-7.79)       0.06*** (28.53) 0.07*** (25.27) Yes 
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Table 4.20 (continue) 
Panel D. Dependent variable: PTO 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSD(1-5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD(1-3) EPSD(1,3) Recession 
Risks 
controlled 
4.93E-3 (0.88) 0.07*** (6.32) 
   
-2.04E-3 (-1.01) No 
0.01* (1.71) 
 
2.55E-3 (1.24) 
  
-2.04E-3 (-0.73) No 
0.01 (1.57) 
  
0.04*** (14.05) 
 
-6.55E-4 (-0.34) No 
0.02** (2.42) 
   
0.01*** (3.01) -0.01** (-2.22) No 
-0.01 (-0.94) 0.06*** (5.82) 
   
-0.01*** (-4.64) Yes 
-0.01 (-1.46) 
 
4.96E-3*** (2.61) 
  
-0.01*** (-7.65) Yes 
-1.38E-3 (-0.26) 
  
0.04*** (11.41) 
 
-0.01*** (-5.03) Yes 
-0.01 (-0.90) 
   
0.01*** (3.78) -0.02*** (-9.54) Yes 
Panel E. Dependent variable: PTD 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSD(1-5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD(1-3) EPSD(1,3) Recession 
Risks 
controlled 
-0.11*** (-6.68) 0.16*** (4.83) 
   
-0.01** (-2.16) No 
-0.13*** (-8.15) 
 
0.02*** (5.03) 
  
0.01 (0.88) No 
-0.10*** (-6.43) 
  
0.07*** (8.34) 
 
-0.01** (-2.24) No 
-0.12*** (-7.58) 
   
0.03*** (8.25) 0.01 (1.16) No 
-0.15*** (-8.92) 0.14*** (4.46) 
   
-0.05*** (-8.36) Yes 
-0.17*** (-10.68) 
 
0.01* (1.84) 
  
-0.04*** (-6.50) Yes 
-0.12*** (-8.33) 
  
0.07*** (7.55) 
 
-0.05*** (-8.88) Yes 
-0.15*** (-9.70)       0.02*** (5.04) -0.04*** (-6.75) Yes 
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Table 4.21 Propensity to initiate, to increase, to pay, to omit, and to decrease 
dividend, and patterns of earnings growth or declines over the past three or five 
years after controlling for financial crisis, 1963-2013 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression of firms’ dividend decisions 
on dividend premium (𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), dummy of financial crisis, and new indicators of managerial 
overreaction based on firms’ past EPS growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)) 
formed by using positive EPS only. The dependent variables (PTI, PTIN, ∆PTP, PTO and PTD) are 
the residuals from the first stage Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decisions on firm 
characteristics (NYP, ∆A/A, M/B, and E/A) and risks, and results are in Panels A, B, C, D and E 
respectively. *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the 
critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: PTI 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) FC 
Risks 
controlled 
0.24*** (12.95) 0.01 (0.59) 
   
-0.01 (-1.42) No 
0.22*** (13.69) 
 
0.02*** (5.37) 
  
-0.01* (-1.71) No 
0.23*** (14.89) 
  
1.89E-3(0.40) 
 
-0.01 (-1.57) No 
0.19*** (16.77) 
   
0.01*** (5.43) -0.01** (-2.45) No 
0.26*** (13.92) 3.68E-3(0.36) 
   
-3.22E-3 (-0.25) Yes 
0.25*** (14.49) 
 
0.02*** (4.24) 
  
-4.13E-3 (-0.90) Yes 
0.24*** (15.89) 
  
5.48E-4 (0.12) 
 
-2.01E-3 (-0.47) Yes 
0.20*** (17.84) 
   
0.01*** (4.55) -4.52E-3 (-1.52) Yes 
Panel B. Dependent variable: PTIN  
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) FC 
Risks 
controlled 
0.24*** (11.33) 0.07*** (6.77) 
   
0.02** (2.30) No 
0.23*** (11.20) 
 
0.08*** (16.22) 
  
0.02** (2.67) No 
0.21*** (11.25) 
  
0.08*** (13.20) 
 
0.03*** (3.89) No 
0.21*** (12.44) 
   
0.11*** (22.57) 0.02*** (2.95) No 
0.25*** (12.26) 0.07*** (6.53) 
   
0.03*** (4.20) Yes 
0.25*** (12.24) 
 
0.08*** (16.38) 
  
0.03*** (4.60) Yes 
0.22*** (11.94) 
  
0.08*** (12.96) 
 
0.04*** (6.32) Yes 
0.22*** (12.25)       0.11*** (22.54) 0.03*** (5.41) Yes 
Panel C. Dependent variable: △PTP 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) FC 
Risks 
controlled 
0.06*** (7.46) 0.03*** (7.00) 
   
-0.01*** (4.04) No 
0.05*** (5.53) 
 
0.08*** (40.94) 
  
-0.01*** (2.77) No 
0.05*** (6.79) 
  
0.04*** (17.34) 
 
-0.01*** (4.15) No 
0.04*** (4.90) 
   
0.08*** (47.83) -0.01*** (3.27) No 
-0.10*** (-10.36) 0.03*** (6.36) 
   
0.08*** (26.30) Yes 
-0.11*** (-11.28) 
 
0.06*** (24.87) 
  
0.08*** (27.08) Yes 
-0.10*** (-11.81) 
  
0.04*** (12.84) 
 
0.08*** (28.59) Yes 
-0.11*** (-13.51)       0.06*** (28.45) 0.08*** (29.88) Yes 
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Table 4.21 (continue) 
Panel D. Dependent variable: PTO 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSD(1-5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD(1-3) EPSD(1,3) FC 
Risks 
controlled 
0.01 （1.01） 0.07*** (6.30) 
   
-1.46E-3 (-0.72) No 
0.02*** (2.90) 
 
3.11E-3 (1.52) 
  
-0.01*** (-4.76) No 
0.01* (1.82) 
  
0.04*** (14.01) 
 
-2.55E-3 (-1.31) No 
0.03*** (3.46) 
   
0.01*** (3.09) -0.01*** (-4.54) No 
2.10E-4 (0.04) 0.06*** (5.85) 
   
-0.01*** (-3.26) Yes 
0.01 (0.85) 
 
0.01*** (3.56) 
  
-0.02*** (-8.19) Yes 
0.01 （1.01） 
  
0.04*** (11.42) 
 
-0.01*** (-4.68) Yes 
0.01 （1.31） 
   
0.01*** (4.13) -0.02*** (-8.22) Yes 
Panel E. Dependent variable: PTD 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 EPSD(1-5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD(1-3) EPSD(1,3) FC 
Risks 
controlled 
-0.09*** (-5.04) 0.15*** (4.79) 
   
-0.03*** (-5.33) No 
-0.11*** (-6.52) 
 
0.02*** (5.22) 
  
-0.03*** (-5.37) No 
-0.07*** (-4.74) 
  
0.07*** (8.25) 
 
-0.03*** (-6.21) No 
-0.09*** (-6.05) 
   
0.03*** (8.19) -0.03*** (-6.15) No 
-0.11*** (-6.37) 0.14*** (4.47) 
   
-0.05*** (-7.98) Yes 
-0.13*** (-7.13) 
 
0.01*** (2.73) 
  
-0.05*** (-8.83) Yes 
-0.08*** (-5.53) 
  
0.07*** (7.53) 
 
-0.05*** (-9.77) Yes 
-0.10*** (-6.83)       0.02*** (5.28) -0.06*** (-10.61) Yes 
 
Table 4.20 and Table 4.21 separately record results of the second-stage 
regressions by adding recession dummy and financial crisis dummy. In Table 4.20 
and Table 4.21 we test recession and financial crisis by following Section 4.4.1's 
setting that only positive EPS is used to for indicators of managerial 
overextrapolation. We also test recession and financial crisis by using previous 
indicators of managerial overextrapolation formed by using both positive and 
negative EPS, and find that the significant impact of managerial overextrapolation is 
not affected. 
Compared with dummies for recession, dummies for financial crisis have 
slightly more stable directions and significance, especially for results of PTD. We 
find inconsistence between results before and after controlling for risks, especially 
for results of ΔPTP. Considering the fact that risks as fundamental determinants of 
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dividends play an essential role in models when behavioural factors are included, we 
only pay attention to results after controlling risks. We find that recession or 
financial crisis have significant effect on firms' dividend decisions except firms' 
propensity to initiate dividends.  
Interestingly, our findings for financial crisis are inconsistent to Hauser (2013) 
and Floyd and Skinner (2014)'s findings that firms tend to reduce dividends during 
financial crisis. Table 4.20 and Table 4.21 show that firms' propensity to increase 
dividends increase during recession or financial crisis, but firms' propensity to 
omit/decrease dividends decrease during recession time or financial crisis. These 
differences between these findings and previous literature' findings may be caused 
by the difference in methodology used. We are analysing the potential impact of 
financial crisis on firms' propensity to make dividend decisions after ruling out 
fundamental determinants, while relevant previous literature directly analyse firms' 
dividend decisions during the financial crisis. We suggest that our method is 
reasonable, because we control for fundamental factors, before we go to the 
discussion of financial crisis' influence on firms' dividend policy. Our findings 
support the signal theory that managers may try to convert information of their 
positive believe in firms’ future performance to investors under the 
recession/financial crisis.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we test the hypothesis that a firm’s dividend payout decision is affected 
by its past long-term earnings performance in an extended sample of U.S. firms from 
1963 to 2013, and an out-of-sample period from 2001 to 2013. We find that firms’ 
past ESP’s performance affects firms’ dividend decisions in the sample from 
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1963-2013 and out-of-sample from 2001-2013. Managers’ overbelieves on the 
representativeness of previous stream of profitability make managers tend to 
extrapolate past earnings performance into the future. In addition, we find that 
proxies for managerial over-optimism/over-pessimism with catering factor (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2004a) jointly explains firms’ dividend decisions including 
initiating/continuing/increasing/paying/omitting/decreasing dividends, given other 
conventional determinants such as size, current profitability, investment opportunity 
and risk factors (Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009). 
As a further test on whether managers’ extrapolation activities are representing 
managerial overoptimism/overpessimism, we list annual average growth rates of 
firms’ future profitability for the following five years. In the out-of-sample data set 
from 2001 to 2013, we find that firms who choose to initiate/continue/increase/pay 
dividends after experiencing past profitability growth tend to have negative growth 
rates of profitability for the next two years, and positive growth rates of profitability 
for the future fourth and fifth years. On the other hand, firms who choose to 
omit/decrease dividends after experiencing previously decreasing profitability tend 
to have positive growth rates of profitability for the next two years and negative 
growth rates of profitability for the future fourth and fifth years. However, the 
general growth rates of profitability from the current fiscal year to the end of the 
future fifth year are negative for firms who initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends 
and are positive for firms who omit/decrease dividends. Combined with findings 
from the whole sample of 1963-2013, the same conclusion can be drawn that 
managers who extrapolate past growing/decreasing earnings into the future are 
overoptimistic/overpessimistic as is shown in Chapter 3. 
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Our main findings in this chapter support the findings and conclusions in 
Chapter 3. In the extended sample from 1963 to 2013 and out-of-sample from 2001 
to 2013, managers’ forecast on firms’ future earnings performances are significantly 
affected by previously growing/decreasing EPS, and then they make dividend 
decisions based on their over-optimism/over-pessimism. The findings in this Chapter 
support the hypothesis that the disappearance of dividends from 1978 and the 
reappearance of dividends from 2002 are significantly affected by managerial 
overextrapolation, and are inconsistent with some previous literature that claim 
decreasing dividends during financial crisis On the opposite, we find impirical 
evidence that firms tend to increase dividends and not to omit/decrease dividends 
during the recession or financial crisis time after controlling for other determinants 
of dividend decisions.  
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CHAPTER 5 MANAGERIAL OVERCONFIDENCE VS 
MANAGERIAL OVEREXTRAPOLATION 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 have provided empirical evidence that managers who 
extrapolate past earnings growth into the future tend to overreact to these increases 
and then make dividend decisions based on their overextrapolation activities. 
Managers who believe that firms will have continuing increasing earnings in the 
future after past earnings growth tend to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends, 
while managers who believe that firms will have continuing decreasing earnings in 
the future after past declines in earnings tend to omit/decrease dividends. In a further 
test of firms’ future performance after managers make their dividend decisions, we 
find that managers overreact to past earnings performance and make improper 
dividend decisions. In detail, firms that initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends after 
experiencing positive EPS growth tend to have negative EPS growth in the future 
five years, and firms who omit/decrease dividends based on past decreasing EPS 
tend to have positive EPS growth in the future five years. 
However, there are still two questions left un-answered: (1) Is Earnings per 
share a good proxy for firms’ earnings performance which is directly connected with 
cash flow that can be used to pay dividends? (2) Can the findings of Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 about managerial extrapolation hold when other forms of managerial 
behaviour bias are considered? To answer these questions, we test the robustness of 
our EPS-related indicators proxy for managerial extrapolation by using two main 
methods. The first method is that we replace EPS with other items which can 
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perform the same function to earnings that have direct relation with cash flow which 
can be used to pay dividends. The second method is that we jointly test our 
managerial extrapolation indicators with proxy for other forms of managerial 
behaviour bias in the same regressions.  
Considering the fact that we only use EPS to represent firms’ earnings 
performance in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, there may be a problem of robustness in 
using this proxy. Since cash flow which is directly related to distribution is different 
from net incomes, EPS as the proxy can be contaminated by other accounting factors 
like depreciation and capital expenditure. To answer the first question of testing the 
robustness of EPS as the proxy for earnings performance in regression models, we 
apply the method of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) in evaluating firms’ 
performance by using sales, which is a wider measurement of these available funds 
as proxy for firms’ performance, and use free cash flow (FCF), which is is a 
narrowed measurement of available funds to distribute and is based on the 
calculation of Kulchania (2013), as another alternative of firms’ performance. 
Between these two measurements, FCF is directly related to money which can be 
used to distribute profits to investors, and sales is the main stream of earnings for 
most firms. We find empirical evidence that EPS as the proxy for firms’ earnings 
performance is as good as other proxies, and EPS-related indicators as proxies for 
managerial extrapolation have significant effect on firms’ dividend decisions when 
other managerial behaviour factors are controlled. 
 The argument about managerial (over)extrapolation is based on the 
assumption that managers have behaviour bias in making decisions. Managerial 
behaviour bias has several forms, and most previous literature focuses on two forms 
of them: overconfidence and overextrapolation. Several recent papers raise the idea 
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that overextrapolation and overconfidence are two different types of explanations for 
varying financial phenomenon caused by behavioural biases. DellaVigna (2009) 
summarizes previous literature on behavioural economics, and concludes that 
overconfidence and overextrapolation are two forms of “nonstandard beliefs”. In his 
summary, DellaVigna (2009) states that overconfidence is about overestimation in 
“ability” and “precision” while overextrapolation is the “law of small numbers”. 
Barberis (2011) proposes three possible explanations for the information bubble: (1) 
disagreement among investors on firms’ future prospects under short-sale constraints; 
(2) investors’ “bad models” based on past outcomes (extrapolation); (3) investors’ 
overestimation on the precision of soft information19 when gathering and analysing 
with fundamental issues. Barberis (2011) suggests that the recent financial crisis 
from 2007 can at least partly be attribute to investors’ overextrapolation from past to 
the future (e.g. the real estate’s price) and ignore risks. 
As has been pointed out at the beginning of Chapter 2's section 2.3.3, one of 
distinguishable characteristics to define managerial overextrapolation from 
managerial overconfidence is that in most previous literature about managerial 
overconfidence, managerial overconfidence is linked to managers' own feeling about 
themselves in terms of their contribution to managing their firms or ability in 
managing firms (overconfidence of self-contribution or better-than-average). On the 
other hand, overextrapolation is purely the expectation of managers on firms' future 
performance based on observed information. It is hardly to claim that managers' 
expectation on firms future performance are not partly caused by their own feeling 
about their abilities or contribution, but we could define the left part of this 
expectation on future performance as extrapolation, if we could rule out 
                                                        
19 See Petersen (2004) for a literature review and discussion on the definition of hard and soft 
information. 
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overconfidence part away from causes of this expectation. Technically, if we jointly 
test managerial overconfidence and managerial overextrapolation in the same 
regression model, we could test the part of expectation as the pure overextrapolation 
or the expectation based on overextrapolation after controlling for overconfidence. 
In Chapter 2 Section 2.3.3.2, we discussed the paper by Alti and Tellock (2014) 
which distinguishes between agents’ overconfidence and overextrapolation. Alti and 
Tellock (2014) define overconfidence as the overestimation on precision of soft 
information and overextrapolation as the overestimation on persistence of non-soft 
information 20 . Alti and Tellock (2014) argue that overconfident agents may 
overbelieve the precision of soft information and overextrapolated agents may 
overbelieve the persistence of hard information, and they find that overconfident 
managers overreact to profit signals, while overextrapolating managers underreact to 
profit signals. Therefore, overconfidence and overextrapolation can both come from 
the same source of information, but have opposite representations. If two 
explanatory variables are calculated based on the same information, there may be the 
problem of multi-collinearity in regressions using ordinary square technique. In 
addition, as La porta (1996) points out, extrapolation is not the whole story of a 
certain financial phenomena, so all other possible explanations should be considered 
and discussed. We jointly test three alternative proxies for managerial 
overconfidence and our indicators of managerial extrapolation in the same regression, 
and we find that managerial extrapolation has robust and consistent impact on 
managers’ payout decisions given other factors including managerial 
overconfidence. 
                                                        
20 soft information is defined as information that is usually text form and can hardly be measured, while 
hard information is defined as information that usually can be observed as numbers or can easily be 
measured by numbers (see Petersen, 2004) 
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The reason why we try different proxies of managerial overconfidence in 
regressions is that overconfidence has varied types, and different indicators can 
proxy for any one type or several types of overconfidence among these types. In the 
psychology literature, overconfidence includes overestimation, overplacement (e.g. 
better-than-average) and overprecision (e.g. underestimation on volatility of 
outcome). Overestimation is the phenomenon that individuals may overestimate their 
own abilities; overplacement is overestimation of ones’ ability compared with other 
one’s; overprecision is an overestimation about the accuracy of one’s belief (see 
Moore and Healy, 2008). Among them, overestimation and overplacement both 
mention self-assessment, while overprecision is overestimation about precision of 
information (Oskamp, 1965). Most previous literature on managers’ overconfidence 
does not clearly classify the category of overconfidence investigated.  
The argument of Malmendier and Tate (2005) about overconfidence is based 
on overplacement (better-than-average), but their proxy for managerial 
overconfidence is general: they define CEOs who exercise options later than 
benchmark, or hold options to the expiration as overconfident CEOs. Detailed 
reasons why managers would like to hold options are hardly ever discussed further, 
so we do not know whether it is managers’ thought about ‘better-than-average’, or 
managers’ overestimation on their own ability, or managers’ views about the 
precision of information they have that finally causes their overconfidence. In 
previous literature, for example Malmendier and Tate (2005), Campbell et al. (2011), 
and Hirshleifer et al. (2012), option-holding based measurements of CEOs’ 
overconfidence are general measurements of overconfidence, while in Ben-David et 
al. (2013) measurement of managers’ overconfidence belongs to the category of 
‘overprecision’ of overconfidence. We use three alternative measurements to be 
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proxies for managerial overconfidence. The first measurement of overconfidence 
was launched by Malmendier and Tate (2005) who use holding activities of vested 
but unexercised options to be proxy for managers’ overconfidence. This 
option-holding based proxy for overconfidence is extended by Campbell et al. (2011) 
and is applied by Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and Ahmed and Duellman (2013) in a 
larger data set with more observations. The second measurement of managerial 
overconfidence is investment level which is connected with managers’ optimism 
about firms’ future project returns (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Campbell et al, 
2011). Since Malmendier and Tate (2005) conclude that firms’ investment level is 
theoretically and empirically related to CEO’s optimism, Campbell et al. (2011) 
argue that firms’ investment level contains information about CEO’s confidence. 
The third measurement of managerial overconfidence is CEO’s activities in 
increasing holding equity on their own firms. This activity is defined as net buyer by 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) and then applied by Campbell et al. (2011). As these 
three alternative proxies for managerial overconfidence may represent different types 
of overconfidence or combination of varied types of overconfidence (e.g. the 
option-holding activity and net buyer activity can be proxy for managerial 
overprecision where managers underestimate the volatility of future market value for 
their firms; sharp increase in investment level can be proxy for managerial 
overestimation and overplacement where managers overestimate their ability in 
managing firms’ profitability projects), we can test all main types of overconfidence 
in the regressions with our managerial extrapolation indicators. In addition to the 
argument that different causes of managerial overconfidence can lead to varied 
dividend decisions, Ben-David et al. (2007) argue that managers who are 
overperceiving future investment requirement may reduce dividends, while Wu and 
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Liu (2011) argue that managers who overestimate future cash flow from current 
investment may lead to increases in dividends. Consistent with the above arguments, 
we find mixed results for varied proxy of managerial overconfidence, while our 
indicators of managerial extrapolation keep showing significant positive effects on 
dividend decisions. 
To address the two research questions in Section 5.1 on the robustness of EPS 
in representing firms’ dividend-related earnings performance and the robustness of 
our managerial extrapolation given other managerial overoptimism factors, we ask 
four detailed research questions in this chapter: 
(a)  Does a firm’s past earnings growth proxy by increase in sales, or FCF, 
affect the firm’s propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends? 
(b) Does a firm’s past earnings decline proxy by decrease in sales, or FCF, 
affect the firm’s propensity to omit/decrease dividends? 
(c) Can our indicators of past growing earnings still have significant impact on 
firms’ propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends after controlling for 
high and low optimism derived from option-holding activity, investment ratio, or net 
buyer? 
(d) Can our indicators of past declining earnings still have significant 
impact on firms’ propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends after 
controlling for high and low optimism derived from option-holding activity, 
investment ratio or net buyer? 
By trying to answer these four questions, we can also re-examine the 
robustness of dividend premium on dividend decisions. The catering theory (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2004a) assumes that managers cater to investors’ demand on dividends, 
and ithas nothing to do with managerial overconfidence and managerial 
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extrapolation. Therefore, impact of dividend premium on dividend decisions should 
not be affected by adding indicators for managerial overconfidence and managerial 
extrapolation in regressions.   
This Chapter 5 contributes to the literature in two main ways: (1) We first 
discuss different types of managerial overconfidence on dividend decisions, and 
bring different indicators of managerial overconfidence into the regression functions 
of Fama and French (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2004a); (2) Based on the 
arguments and empirical findings in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we test the robustness 
of our indicators proxy for managerial extrapolation by using different methods of 
measurement (earnings, sales, or cash flow), and by running a ‘horse race’ with 
another widely discussed managerial behaviour bias: managerial overconfidence. We 
find strong evidence that our indicators are superior among indicators proxy for 
conventional managerial behaviour bias. 
We organise this Chapter 5 as follows. Section 5.2 gives introduction on data 
selection and variables forming, and then Section 5.3 shows all regression results 
followed by the discussion of results. In terms of detail, in Section 5.3 we will first 
test alternative measurements of firms’ past dividend-related earnings performance 
in the same regressions in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. After confirming the robustness 
of our indicators formed by using EPS, we will continue to use EPS-related 
indicators in later joint tests which compare impact of catering theory, managerial 
overconfidence and managerial extrapolation. The last section, Section 5.4, 
concludes. 
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5.2. Data and sample 
 
5.2.1. Data  
The same as in Chapter 4, our sample in Chapter 5 covers all NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ firms in COMPUSTAT from fiscal year 1963 to 2013 which includes the 
out-of-sample period from 2001 to 2013. The data of number of shares outstanding, 
monthly and daily returns and prices of common stocks are from the Center for 
Research in Security Price (CRSP). All firm-level financial data are from 
COMPUSTAT. 
We use the same sample constructions as was the case in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 which are from Fama and French (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2004a) and 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). All firms with the following available COMPUSTAT 
data are included: “total assets (AT), stock price (PRCC_F) and shares outstanding 
(CSHO) at the end of the fiscal year, income before extraordinary items (IB), interest 
expense (XINT), [cash] dividends per share by ex-date (DVPSX_F), preferred 
dividends (DVP), and (a) preferred stock liquidating value (PSTKL), (b) preferred 
stock redemption value (PSTKRV), or (c) preferred stock carrying value (PSTK). 
Firms must also have (a) stockholders’ equity (SEQ), (b) liabilities (LT), or (c) 
common equity (CEQ) and preferred stock par value (PSTK).” A firm must have 
total assets (AT) at its fiscal years t and t – 1 and have other items at fiscal year t. We 
exclude firms with book equity below $250,000 or assets below $500,000. We only 
include the COMPUSTAT sample with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11, and we use 
the fiscal years where a firm is in the CRSP database at its fiscal year end. All 
utilities firms (SIC codes 4900 to 4949) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) 
are excluded from our sample. 
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There are total 691031 firm-year observations in the original FTP format 
COMPUSTAT file from 1963 to 2013. After the selection criteria introduced above, 
there are 138127 satisfied firm-year observations left and go into the regression 
analysis. Except our indicators of managerial overextrapolation, the summary 
statistics for some main variables used in regressions have been present in Table 4.1. 
All definitions for these variables can be found at Appendix 3.1. 
We use EXECUCOMP of WRDS to form option-holding-based managerial 
overconfidence. EXECUCOMP only records managers’ compensation data 
from 1992, so our indicator for managerial overconfidence based on managers’ 
option-holding activities has value from 1992 to 2013. Other estimations of 
managerial overconfidence, which records the changes in firms’ shares owned 
by CEOs, also use EXECUCOMP’s data from 1992 to 2013. The investment 
ratio proxy for managerial overconfidence is calculated by using COMPUSTAT 
from 1963 to 2013. We list descriptive statistics for all three alternatives 
measurements of managerial overconfidence in table 5.1. .Table 5.1 Descriptive 
statistics for managerial overconfidence, 1992-2013 for option-holding activities 
and net-buying activities, 1963-2013 for investment ratio. 
Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics for three alternative measurements of managerial 
overconfidence. Highopt and lowopt are proxy for managerial overconfidence based on 
option-holding activities, highinvest and lowinvest are proxy for managerial overconfidence based on 
investment ratio, and highnet and lownet are proxy for managerial overconfidence based on 
net-buying activities. 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
highopt 69195 0.07 0.25 0 1 
lowopt 69195 0.01 0.08 0 1 
highinvest 138128 0.04 0.19 0 1 
lowinvest 138128 0.04 0.19 0 1 
highnet 69195 0.02 0.14 0 1 
lownet 69195 0.01 0.10 0 1 
 
 
5.2.2. Variables 
As has been discussed in Section 5.1, we apply Lakonishok et al. (1994)’s method in 
forming alternative measurements of firms’ past performance. We also use Campbell 
et al. (2011)’s method in measuring managerial overconfidence based on different 
managers’ activities. Besides, we use the same indicators of firms’ past 
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growing/declining EPS and dividend decisions as used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
Definitions for other used variables can be found in Appendix 3.1 and Appendix 3.2 
respectively. 
5.2.2.1. Firms’ performance measures 
The first alternative measurement of firms’ past performance is sales. Sales is 
calculated as sales (SALE) divided by capital at the last fiscal-year-end (PPENT) as 
in Lakonishok et al. (1994). Because the usage of money from sales can vary apart 
from issuing as dividends, we use free cash flow as another alternative measurement 
of firms’ performance. There are various definitions of free cash flow in accounting 
literature. Maksy and Chen (2014) summarize these definitions and have a 
discussion on free cash flow with different methods in calculating functions. In terms 
of payout policy, Kulchania (2013) calculates free cash flow by using operating 
income before depreciation (OIBDP), minus depreciation (DP), income tax (TXT), 
interest and related expense (XINT) and sum of dividends (DVC plus DVP) all 
divided by total assets (AT). Because we are investigating whether firms’ past 
performance in cash flow, which can be used to distribute dividends, we add 
common dividends (DVC) back based on Kulchania (2013)’s function in calculating 
FCF. Definitions for these two variables can be found in Appendix 5.1.  
We form dummies to represent firms’ earnings growth/decline over the past 
three or five years by using the same method to form indicators of EPS 
growth/decline over the past three/five years. Firms’ patterns of past 
growing/declining Sales/FCF are defined under two definitions: year-on-year (YoY) 
growth/decline in Sales/FCF over the past three or five years; total (general) growth 
in Sales/FCF over the past three or five years. We give value 1 to indicators whose 
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firms have such growth/decline in Sales/FCF, and value 0 otherwise. Definitions of 
these indicators can be found in Appendix 5.2. 
 
5.2.2.2. Managerial overconfidence measures 
There are three alternative measurements for managerial overconfidence referred to 
in this chapter which can proxy for varying types of overconfidence. The first 
method is based on managers’ option-holding activities and is widely applied in 
previous literature (see Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; 
Campbell, et al., 2011; Malmendier et al., 2011; Ahmed and Duellman, 2013). We 
use the method developed by Campbell et al. (2011) who follow Malmendier and 
Tate (2005). Malmendier and Tate define managers as overconfident ones when they 
are holding vested but unexercised options which are 67% in-the-money (the stock’s 
market price is 67% higher than the option’s exercise price), but Campbell et al. 
(2011) use 100% in the money instead of 67% to classify managers with very high 
optimism21. We follow Campbell et al. (2011)’s method in forming this indicator of 
managerial overconfidence, because of the availability of the data base and a larger 
size of data than Malmendier and Tate (2005)’s sample. We use this method also 
because Campbell et al. (2011) have a discussion about the validity of their method 
compared with Malmendier and Tate (2005)’s method, and they find that their 
methods based on EXECUCOMP are consistent with Malmendier and Tate (2005)’s 
indicators of managerial overconfidence. Therefore, they suggest that the basis of 
their overconfidence indicators are empirically useful. Following Campbell et al. 
(2011), highly optimistic CEOs should exhibit this option-holding activity at least 
                                                        
21 We also test 67%, 200%, and 250% to cut-off in the money option-holding behavior for 
managers, and find that they give similar results. 
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twice within the whole sample period, but are defined as highly optimistic ones from 
the first time they show this activity.  
Following Campbell et al. (2011), we first calculate the realizable value of 
each option as the estimated value of in-the-money unexercised exercisable options 
(OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL) divided by the number of unexercised exercisable 
options (OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM). We then use stock price at fiscal year-end 
(PRCC_F) minus this realizable value per option to get the average exercise price 
per option. Because the average exercise price is the unit cost spent to exercise 
options, the option’s moneyness equals to the unit realizable value of option 
dividend by the average exercise price. We focus on results based on the cut-off of 
100% in defining highly optimistic managers. 
As the opposite of managers’ high-optimism, we also use Campbell et al. 
(2011)’s method in defining low-optimism managers. The option moneyness for 
low-optimism managers is calculated as the unit realized value of options by 
exercising divided by the average exercise price. The average exercise price equals 
to the stock price at current fiscal year-end (RPCC_F) minus unit realized value 
option by exercising, and the unit realized value option by exercising is calculated by 
using the value realized on option exercise (OPT_EXER_VAL) divided by the 
number of shares acquired on option exercise (OPT_EXER_NUM).  Compared to 
the definition of the indicator for high-optimism, the indicator for low-optimism has 
two conditions: (1) CEOs should exercise vested and exercisable options which are 
less than 30% in unit option moneyness, and (2) CEOs should not hold any 
unexercised exercisable options which are more than 30% in-the-money. Besides, 
CEOs must exhibit at least twice the low-optimistic option-holding activities within 
the sample period, but we record managers as low-optimistic from the first time they 
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exhibit the option exercise behavior. For distinguishing managerial overconfidence 
based on option-holding activities from the other proxies of managerial 
overconfidence, we give the variable the name Highopt for high-optimism based on 
option-holding activities, and Lowopt for low-optimism based on such behaviour. 
The detailed description for these variables can be found in Appendix 5.3. 
The first proxy for managerial overconfidence is directly related to managers' 
expectation on their own firms' future market value. Managers who overestimate the 
future market value may make their forecast based on their overestimation in firms' 
future investment need or based on their over-believes in firms' future cash flow. We 
can not exclusively clarify whether this managerial overconfidence is caused by 
managers' believe in high future investment needs as in Deshmukh et al. (2013) or 
caused by managers' believe in high future cash flow as in Wu and Liu (2011). 
However, these two causes could lead to opposite decisions in paying dividends: 
managers who over-believe in future investment needs may omit/decrease dividends 
and managers who over-believe in future cash flow may initiate/increase dividends 
as what we have discussed in section 1.2.2. The discussion about the impact of this 
proxy for managerial overconfidence on firms' dividend decisions is not the 
concentration of this thesis. Therefore, we can only give any prediction before we 
finish the empirical test by using this managerial overconfidence. 
Another proxy for managerial overconfidence is formed by using investment 
ratio. Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that investment has significant correlation 
with managers’ overconfidence, and Campbell et al. (2011) directly use investment 
ratio as a proxy for managerial overconfidence. We follow Campbell et al. (2011) in 
calculating investment ratio which equals to capital expenditure (CAPX) divided by 
last fiscal-year-end property, plant, and equipment (PPENT). High/low optimistic 
 Chapter 5   Managerial Overconfidence vs Managerial Overextrapolation 
 
220 
 
CEOs are those whose firms have industry-adjusted investment level at the 
top/bottom quintile for two continuing years. We give the variable the name 
Highinvest for high-optimism based on option-holding activities, and Lowinvest for 
low-optimism based on such investment behavior. The detailed description for these 
variables can be found in Appendix 5.3. 
The investment ratio used as a proxy for managerial overconfidence can not 
only be defined as the proxy for managers' expectation on future investment needs, 
either. High investment in current year does not necessary mean high investment 
needs in the future, but may represent managers' believe in current investment 
projects' future cash flow. However, over-investing in current projects may indicate 
that managers are overconfident in their ability in managing future investment 
projects, which could lead to high investment in future. Thus, we can not give any 
exclusive prediction before we have empirical test's results by using investment ratio 
like by using option-holding activities to form the indicator of managerial 
overconfidence. 
Because of the accessibility of the data, we cannot calculate CEOs’ 
net-purchase based on CEOs’ detailed buying and selling activities in their own 
firms’ shares as Campbell et al. (2011) do. However, we use changes in shares 
owned excluding options (SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS) to estimate CEO’s net-buying 
from the last fiscal year to the current fiscal year. We use the same logic as Campbell 
et al. (2011) in excluding the first time when a CEO is classified as overconfident 
and repeat the procedure. High-optimistic/Low-optimistic CEOs should satisfy two 
conditions: (1) a CEO must increase/decrease his (her) shares owned by at least 10% 
compared with the holding in the last fiscal years, and (2) his (her) shares owned 
must be ranked at the top/bottom quintile among all CEOs in the current fiscal year. 
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With the help of this “dirty” proxy for CEOs’ activities in net-buying their own firms’ 
shares, we can have access to CEOs’ optimism in their firms’ future performance. 
We give the variable the name Highnet for high-optimism based on net-buying 
activities, and Lowighnet for low-optimism based on such activities. See Appendix 
5.3 for detailed descriptions of these variables. 
The "net-purchase" as a proxy of managerial overconfidence is similar to the 
"option-holding activity" as a proxy of managerial overconfidence. Both of them 
directly represent managers' expectation on firms' future market value. CEO's net 
purchase on their own firms' stocks can also further represent managers' expectation 
on future general benefits of holding firms' stocks. We can not justify these expected 
future benefits may come from managers' overconfidence in future stock prices 
which may be affected by both expectation on future investment needs and future 
cash flow, or managers' overconfidence in future cash flow partly generated by 
current investment project. 
Compared with these proxy of managerial overconfidence, our indicators for 
managerial overextrapolation are clear in predicting their impact on firms' dividend 
decisions. Managerial overextrapolation in this thesis is defined as managers' 
expectation on future earnings' growth/decline. An overextrapolated manager tends 
to "pay too much" or "cut too early", when he (she) overextrapolate past earnings' 
growth or decline into the future. Although we can not ignore the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on managers' expectation of future earnings' 
growth/decline when we are arguing that managerial overextrapolation can lead to 
overestimation of firms' future earnings' growth/decline, we argue that the role of 
managerial overextrapolation in determining firms' dividend decisions can be 
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separately analysed when proxy of managerial overconfidence is included in the 
same regression function. 
         
5.3. Results  
 
5.3.1. Alternative measurements of firms’ past performance 
We use two alternative measurements to evaluate firms’ past performance which are 
related to the cash flow which can be distributed to investors as dividends. The first 
alternative is a wide definition of earnings which can be distributed to investors: 
sales and the second alternative is a narrow definition of earnings which can be 
distributed to investors: free cash flow. As has been described in Section 5.2.2.1, we 
apply the same method to form indicators proxy for firms’ earning performance over 
the past three or five years, and we then apply these indicators in the same 
regressions as in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 to replace previous indicators formed by 
using EPS.  
Table 5.2 illustrates the relationship between propensities to 
initiate/continue/increase/ pay dividends without controlling risks and indicators of 
managerial extrapolation calculated based on Sales or FCF. Firms’ patterns of past 
growing Sales/FCF are classified as (1) year-on-year (YoY) growth in Sales/FCF 
over the past three or five years, and (2) general growth in Sales/FCF over the past 
three or five years. We find that firms’ past patterns of increasing Sales/FCF mostly 
also have a positive and significant effect on PTI, ∆PTI, PTC, PTIN, and ∆PTP, 
except the group of firms with EPSG(1-5) which have a limited number of 
observations and the results of FCF on PTC. Because risks are essential 
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determinants in affecting firms’ dividend decisions, we will discuss issues about 
FCF’s results under PTC later in results after controlling for risks.
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Table 5.2 Propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends without 
controlling for risks and indicators based on sales/FCF instead of EPS, 
1963-2013 
Table 5.2 reports the regression of firms’ dividend decisions on their determinants. This table only 
reports the regression results of propensity to initiate(PTI)/continue(PTC)/increase(PTIN) and 
changes in propensity to pay (∆PTP) on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷) , and indicators of 
managerial extrapolation which from firms’ past sales growth (SaleG(1-3), SaleG(1,3), SaleG(1-5), 
and SaleG(1,5)), or free cash flow growth ((FCFG(1-3), FCFG(1,3), FCFG(1-5), and FCFG(1,5)),  
after  the first stage regression without controlling for risks (See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4’s results’ 
sections for details). This table is divided into five panels which respectively report PTI (Panel A), 
∆PTI (Panel B), PTC (Panel C), PTIN (Panel D) and ∆PTP (Panel E) on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷and indicators of 
firms’ past sales/cash flow growth. Detailed definition for indicators of managerial extrapolation can 
be found in Appendix 5.2, while definition for other variable above can be found in Appendix 3.1 and 
Appendix 3.3. *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the 
critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. PTI as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5) SaleG(1-3) SaleG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.17(14.90)*** 0.01 (2.30)** 
  
 
30198 0.01 
0.16(15.29)*** 
 
0.01(2.67)*** 
  
34429 0.01 
0.16(17.52)*** 
 
 
0.01(2.68)*** 
 
41198 0.01 
0.16(17.72)***       0.01(2.97)*** 43962 0.01 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5) FCFG(1-3) FCFG(1,3)   
0.17(14.91)*** -0.01(-0.26) 
  
 
30198 0.01 
0.16(15.43)*** 
 
0.02(7.13)*** 
  
34429 0.01 
0.16(17.50)*** 
 
 
0.01(3.62)*** 
 
41198 0.01 
0.16(17.71)***       0.01(7.76)*** 43962 0.01 
Panel B. ∆PTI as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5) SaleG(1-3) SaleG(1,3)   
0.17(14.75)*** 0.01(2.80)*** 
  
 
28960 0.01 
0.17(15.25)*** 
 
0.01(2.60)*** 
  
31530 0.01 
0.16(17.60)*** 
 
 
0.01(4.46)*** 
 
39702 0.01 
0.16(17.62)***       0.01(4.12)*** 40979 0.01 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5) FCFG(1-3) FCFG(1,3)   
0.17(14.76)*** 0.01(0.44) 
  
 
28960 0.01 
0.17(15.38)*** 
 
0.02(8.60)*** 
  
31530 0.01 
0.16(17.57)*** 
 
 
0.02(6.28)*** 
 
39702 0.01 
0.16(17.57)***       0.02(10.77)*** 40979 0.01 
Panel C. PTC as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5) SaleG(1-3) SaleG(1,3)   
-0.01(-1.24) 0.01(0.40) 
  
 
37783 0.00 
-0.01(-1.10) 
 
0.00(1.77)* 
  
38099 0.00 
-0.01(-1.97)** 
 
 
0.00(1.82)* 
 
43624 0.00 
-0.02(2.07)**       0.01(3.74)*** 44362 0.00 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5) FCFG(1-3) FCFG(1,3)   
-0.01(-1.23) 0.01(0.12) 
  
 
37783 0.00 
-0.01(-0.98) 
 
0.01(1.47) 
  
38099 0.00 
-0.01(-1.90)** 
 
 
0.01(1.51) 
 
43624 0.00 
-0.01(-1.81)**       0.01(4.11)*** 44362 0.00 
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Table 5.2 (continue) 
Panel D. PTIN as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5) SaleG(1-3) SaleG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.31(16.36)*** 0.07(6.50)*** 
  
 
39139 0.01 
0.29(15.57)*** 
 
0.07(14.47)*** 
  
40589 0.01 
0.29(16.94)*** 
 
 
0.07(12.39)*** 
 
45366 0.01 
0.26(15.48)***       0.07(16.48)*** 46171 0.01 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5) FCFG(1-3) FCFG(1,3)   
0.31(16.47)*** 0.04(1.30) 
  
 
39139 0.01 
0.31(16.59)*** 
 
0.07(14.86)*** 
  
40589 0.01 
0.30(17.39)*** 
 
 
0.11(11.21)*** 
 
45366 0.01 
0.28(16.74)***       0.09(19.09)*** 46171 0.01 
Panel E. ∆PTP as dependent variable without controlling for risk   
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5) SaleG(1-3) SaleG(1,3)   
0.05(6.49)*** 0.01(2.53)** 
  
 
67981 0.00 
0.05(6.20)*** 
 
0.01(5.59)*** 
  
71606 0.00 
0.04(5.63)*** 
 
 
0.01(5.56)*** 
 
84822 0.00 
0.04(4.98)***       0.02(9.49)*** 86579 0.00 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5) FCFG(1-3) FCFG(1,3)   
0.05(6.51)*** 0.02(1.90)* 
  
 
67981 0.00 
0.05(6.41)*** 
 
0.04(17.83)*** 
  
71606 0.00 
0.04(5.66)*** 
 
 
0.04(10.65)*** 
 
84822 0.00 
0.04(5.18)***       0.04(21.99)*** 86579 0.00 
. 
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Table 5.3 illustrates the relationship between propensity to 
initiate/continue/increase/ pay dividends after controlling for risks and indicators of 
managerial extrapolation calculated based on Sales or FCF. The only difference in 
regression models between Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 is that all dependent variables in 
Table 5.3 are residuals after considering risks in the first-stage regression, while we 
do not rule out risks to get dependent variables in Table 5.1. We find that firms’ past 
patterns of increasing Sales/FCF mostly also have a positive and significant effect 
on PTI, ∆PTI, PTC, PTIN, and ∆PTP, and this signal is even stronger than that 
which is shown in Table 5.2 in the case that FCF has a positive and significant effect 
on firms’ propensity to continue dividends. As a conclusion, firms’ decisions of 
initiating/continuing/increasing/paying dividends are affected by their past earnings 
performance, no matter whether we use a wide definition of earnings (Sales) or a 
narrow definition of earnings (FCF) which is directly related with firms’ available 
funds which can be used to finance any payout. 
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Table 5.3 Propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends after controlling 
for risks and indicators based on sales/FCF instead of EPS, 1963-2013. 
Table 5.3 reports the regression of firms’ dividend decisions on their determinants. This table only 
reports the regression results of propensity to initiate(PTI)/continue(PTC)/increase(PTIN) and 
changes in propensity to pay (∆PTP) on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷) , and indicators of 
managerial extrapolation which from firms’ past sales growth (SaleG(1-3), SaleG(1,3), SaleG(1-5), 
and SaleG(1,5)), or free cash flow growth ((FCFG(1-3), FCFG(1,3), FCFG(1-5), and FCFG(1,5)),  
after  the first stage regression after controlling for risks (See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4’s results’ 
sections for details). This table is divided into five panels which respectively report PTI (Panel A), 
∆PTI (Panel B), PTC (Panel C), PTIN (Panel D) and ∆PTP (Panel E) on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷and indicators of 
firms’ past sales/cash flow growth. Detailed definition for indicators of managerial extrapolation can 
be found in Appendix 5.2, while definition for other variable above can be found in Appendix 3.1 and 
Appendix 3.3. *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the 
critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. PTI as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5) SaleG(1-3) SaleG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.18(15.74)*** 0.01(2.47)** 
  
 
29496 0.01 
0.18(16.05)*** 
 
0.01(2.32)** 
  
32168 0.01 
0.17(18.37)*** 
 
 
0.01(2.61)*** 
 
40238 0.01 
0.17(18.35)***       0.01(2.14)** 41584 0.01 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5) FCFG(1-3) FCFG(1,3)   
0.18(15.74)*** -0.01(-0.18) 
  
 
29496 0.01 
0.18(16.17)*** 
 
0.01(6.25)*** 
  
32168 0.01 
0.17(18.35)*** 
 
 
0.01(3.35)*** 
 
40238 0.01 
0.17(18.34)***       0.01(6.79)*** 41584 0.01 
Panel B. ∆PTI as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5) SaleG(1-3) SaleG(1,3)   
0.15(13.17)*** 0.02(3.03)*** 
  
 
28288 0.01 
0.15(13.65)*** 
 
0.01(2.71)** 
  
30783 0.01 
0.15(15.71)*** 
 
 
0.01(4.60)*** 
 
38779 0.01 
0.15(15.72)***       0.01(3.86)** 39996 0.01 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5) FCFG(1-3) FCFG(1,3)   
0.15(13.18)*** 0.01(0.49) 
  
 
28288 0.01 
0.15(13.78)*** 
 
0.02(8.23)*** 
  
30783 0.01 
0.15(15.67)*** 
 
 
0.02(6.10)*** 
 
38779 0.01 
0.15(15.69)***       0.02(10.01)*** 39996 0.01 
Panel C. PTC as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5) SaleG(1-3) SaleG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.02(2.58)*** 0.01(2.60)*** 
  
 
36718 0.00 
0.02(2.44)** 
 
0.01(2.48)** 
  
37591 0.00 
0.02(2.21)** 
 
 
0.01(2.95)*** 
 
42416 0.00 
0.01(1.74)*       0.01(4.14)*** 42781 0.00 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5) FCFG(1-3) FCFG(1,3)   
0.02(2.62)*** 0.01(0.46) 
  
 
36718 0.00 
0.02(2.56)** 
 
0.01(3.60)*** 
  
37591 0.00 
0.02(2.35)** 
 
 
0.01(1.68)* 
 
42416 0.00 
0.01(2.01)**       0.01(5.39)*** 42781 0.00 
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Table 5.3 (continue) 
Panel D. PTIN as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5) SaleG(1-3) SaleG(1,3)   
0.33(17.39)*** 0.08(7.32)*** 
  
 
38036 0.01 
0.29(15.57)*** 
 
0.07(14.47)*** 
  
38988 0.02 
0.31(17.75)*** 
 
 
0.08(12.84)*** 
 
44112 0.01 
0.28(16.22)***       0.07(16.26)*** 44505 0.02 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5) FCFG(1-3) FCFG(1,3)   
0.33(17.49)*** 0.05(1.86) 
  
 
38036 0.01 
0.33(17.53)*** 
 
0.08(14.68)*** 
  
38988 0.02 
0.31(18.19)*** 
 
 
0.11(11.81)*** 
 
44112 0.01 
0.30(17.43)***       0.09(19.31)*** 44505 0.02 
Panel E. ∆PTP as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5) SaleG(1-3) SaleG(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
-0.05(-5.21)*** 0.03(5.51)*** 
  
 
66212 0.00 
-0.05(-5.22)*** 
 
0.01(7.24)*** 
  
69727 0.00 
-0.05(-7.07)*** 
 
 
0.02(6.19)*** 
 
82652 0.00 
-0.06(-7.42)***       0.02(10.28)*** 84327 0.00 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5) FCFG(1-3) FCFG(1,3)   
-0.05(-5.15)*** 0.01(1.21) 
  
 
66212 0.00 
-0.04(-4.98)*** 
 
0.02(11.44)*** 
  
69727 0.00 
-0.05(-6.96)*** 
 
 
0.03(6.78)*** 
 
82652 0.00 
-0.05(-7.02)***       0.03(14.84)*** 84327 0.00 
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Using the same method in running regressions as in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, 
we create Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 to test whether firms’ past pattern of declining 
Sales/FCF can also have significant effects on firms’ dividend decisions as firms’ 
past decreasing EPS can have. Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 respectively report the 
relationship between propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends before or 
after controlling for risks and indicators of managerial extrapolation calculated based 
on Sales or FCF. We find that firms’ past patterns of declining Sales/FCF have a 
positive and significant effect on PTO and PTD, when risks are considered in the 
first-stage regression. Again, we find that SaleD(1,5) and FCFD(1-5) have a 
significant effect on PTO after controlling risks, while they show no significant 
effect on PTO without controlling for risks. These changes from insignificant impact 
without given risks to significant impact given risks indicate that risks are one of the 
essential determinants in dividend decisions as Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) discuss. 
In summary, firms’ decisions of omitting/decreasing dividends are affected by their 
past declining earnings, no matter whether we use a wide definition of earnings 
(Sales), or a narrow definition of earnings (FCF) which is directly related with firms’ 
available funds which can be used to finance any payout. 
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Table 5.4 Propensity to omit/decrease dividends without controlling for risks 
and indicators based on sales/FCF instead of EPS, 1963-2013. 
Table 5.4 reports the regression of firms’ dividend decisions on their determinants. This table only 
reports the regression results of propensity to omit(PTO)/decrease(PTD) on dividend premium (VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), and indicators of managerial extrapolation which from firms’ past sales decline (SaleD(1-3), 
SaleD(1,3), SaleD(1-5), and SaleD(1,5)), or free cash flow decline ((FCFD(1-3), FCFD(1,3), 
FCFD(1-5), and FCFD(1,5)),  after  the first stage regression without controlling for risks (See 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4’s results’ sections for details). This table is divided into two panels which 
respectively report PTO (Panel A) and PTD (Panel B) on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷and indicators of firms’ past 
sales/cash flow growth. Detailed definition for indicators of managerial extrapolation can be found in 
Appendix 5.2, while definition for other variable above can be found in Appendix 3.1 and Appendix 
3.3. *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical 
level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Panel A. PTO as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleD (1-5) SaleD(1,5) SaleD(1-3) SaleD(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01(1.20) -0.01(-1.60) 
  
 
37783 0.00 
0.01(1.00) 
 
0.01(0.73) 
  
39099 0.00 
0.02(2.04)** 
 
 
0.01(2.36)** 
 
43624 0.00 
0.01(1.96)*       0.01(2.81)*** 44362 0.00 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFD (1-5) FCFD(1,5) FCFD(1-3) FCFD(1,3)   
0.01(1.23) 0.01(1.07) 
  
 
37783 0.00 
0.01(0.95) 
 
0.01(0.24) 
  
39099 0.00 
0.01(2.14)** 
 
 
0.01(5.33)*** 
 
43624 0.00 
0.01(1.76)*       0.01(3.10)*** 44362 0.00 
Panel B. PTD as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleD (1-5) SaleD(1,5) SaleD(1-3) SaleD(1,3)   
-0.16(-10.09)*** 0.02(1.60) 
  
 
37783 0.00 
-0.16(9.66)*** 
 
0.03(6.16)*** 
  
39099 0.00 
-0.15(-9.80)*** 
 
 
0.03(5.50)*** 
 
43624 0.00 
-0.14(-9.30)***       0.03(7.03)*** 44362 0.00 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFD(1-5) FCFD(1,5) FCFD(1-3) FCFD(1,3)   
-0.16(-10.11)*** 0.03(3.81)*** 
  
 
37783 0.00 
-0.16(10.11)*** 
 
0.02(5.15)*** 
  
39099 0.00 
-0.15(-9.84)*** 
 
 
0.03(7.40)*** 
 
43624 0.00 
-0.15(-9.84)***       0.04(8.89)*** 44362 0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 5   Managerial Overconfidence vs Managerial Overextrapolation 
 
231 
 
Table 5.5 Propensity to omit/decrease dividends after controlling for risks and 
indicators based on sales/FCF instead of EPS, 1963-2013 
Table 5.5 reports the regression of firms’ dividend decisions on their determinants. This table only 
reports the regression results of propensity to omit(PTO)/decrease(PTD) on dividend premium (VW 
𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), and indicators of managerial extrapolation which from firms’ past sales decline (SaleD(1-3), 
SaleD(1,3), SaleD(1-5), and SaleD(1,5)), or free cash flow decline ((FCFD(1-3), FCFD(1,3), 
FCFD(1-5), and FCFD(1,5)),  after the first stage regression with controlling for risks (See Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4’s results’ sections for details). This table is divided into two panels which 
respectively report PTO (Panel A) and PTD (Panel B) on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷and indicators of firms’ past 
sales/cash flow growth. Detailed definition for indicators of managerial extrapolation can be found in 
Appendix 5.2, while definition for other variable above can be found in Appendix 3.1 and Appendix 
3.3. *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical 
level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Panel A. PTO as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleD (1-5) SaleD(1,5) SaleD(1-3) SaleD(1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
-0.02(-2.65)*** -0.01(-1.64) 
  
 
36718 0.00 
-0.02(-2.44)*** 
 
0.01(2.48)** 
  
37591 0.00 
-0.02(-2.22)*** 
 
 
0.01(2.44)** 
 
42416 0.00 
-0.01(-1.74)*       0.01(4.14)*** 42781 0.00 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFD (1-5) FCFD(1,5) FCFD(1-3) FCFD(1,3)   
-0.02(-2.62)*** 0.01(1.43) 
  
 
36718 0.00 
-0.02(-2.56)** 
 
0.01(3.60)** 
  
37591 0.00 
-0.02(-2.08)** 
 
 
0.01(5.96)*** 
 
42416 0.00 
-0.01(-2.01)**       0.01(5.39)*** 42781 0.00 
Panel B. PTD as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleD (1-5) SaleD(1,5) SaleD(1-3) SaleD(1,3)   
-0.17(-10.39)*** 0.03(2.24) 
  
 
36718 0.00 
-0.16(9.97)*** 
 
0.03(7.61)*** 
  
37591 0.00 
-0.16(-10.43)*** 
 
 
0.04(6.12)*** 
 
42416 0.00 
-0.15(-9.62)***       0.03(8.62)*** 42781 0.00 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFD(1-5) FCFD(1,5) FCFD(1-3) FCFD(1,3)   
-0.17(-10.42)*** 0.03(3.93)*** 
  
 
36718 0.00 
-0.17(10.46)*** 
 
0.04(7.39)*** 
  
37591 0.00 
-0.16(-10.51)*** 
 
 
0.04(7.61)*** 
 
42416 0.00 
-0.15(-10.24)***       0.05(11.46)*** 42781 0.00 
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We also employ different dependent variables, which represent firms’ 
decisions in terms of “strong” initiation after being non-payers over the past three or 
five years, in the first-stage regression. These dependent variables (S3newpayer and 
S5newpayer) which perform as a robustness check in previous chapters will also 
perform as a robustness test for indicators formed by using firms’ past Sales/FCF.  
Table 5.6 shows the regression results of propensity to “strongly” initiate 
dividends after being non-payers over the past three years (PTS3I) on indicators of 
firms’ growing Sales/FCF over the past three years, after the first-stage regression of 
S3newpayer on conventional factors including NYP, ∆A/A, M/B, and E/A without or 
with risks. All SaleG or FCFG indicators show significant positive effects on PTS3I, 
when dividend premium is controlled for. As a proxy for catering theory, dividend 
premium also performs a positive and significant impact on firms’ propensity to 
“strongly” initiate dividends after being non-payers for three years.
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Table 5.6 Propensity to “strongly” initiate dividends after being non-payers for three years and indicators based on sales/FCF instead of 
EPS. 
Table 5.6 reports the regression of firms’ dividend decisions on their determinants. This table only reports the regression results of propensity to “strong” initiate (PTS3I) and 
changes in propensity to “strong” initiate (PTS3I) on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), and indicators of managerial extrapolation which from firms’ past sales growth 
(SaleG(1-3), SaleG(1,3), SaleG(1-5), and SaleG(1,5)), or free cash flow growth ((FCFG(1-3), FCFG(1,3), FCFG(1-5), and FCFG(1,5)),  after  the first stage regression 
with or without controlling for risks (See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4’s results’ sections for details). This table is divided into four panels which respectively report PTS3I (Panel 
A and Panel B), ∆PTS3I (Panel C and Palen D) without or after controlling for risks, on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷and indicators of firms’ past sales/cash flow growth. Detailed definition 
for indicators of managerial extrapolation can be found in Appendix 5.2, while definition for other variable above can be found in Appendix 3.1 and Appendix 3.3. *** 
represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Dependent variable: S3newpayer  
Panel A. PTS3I without controlling risk factors   
Panel C. ∆PTS3I without controlling risk 
factors 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-3) SaleG(1,3)   VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-3) SaleG(1,3) 
0.17(17.99)*** 0.01(3.36)*** 
  
0.17(17.98)*** 0.01(4.40)*** 
 
0.16(18.11)*** 
 
0.01(3.32)*** 
 
0.16(18.02)*** 
 
0.01(3.76)*** 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-3) FCFG(1,3)   VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-3) FCFG(1,3) 
0.17(17.96)*** 0.02(4.64)*** 
  
0.16(17.95)*** 0.02(6.04)*** 
 
0.16(18.10)*** 
 
0.02(8.95)*** 
 
0.16(17.97)*** 
 
0.02(10.16)*** 
Panel B. PTS3I after controlling risk factors   Panel D. ∆PTS3I after controlling risk factors 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-3) SaleG(1,3)   VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-3) SaleG(1,3) 
0.16(17.38)*** 0.01(3.49)*** 
  
0.16(17.70)*** 0.01(4.39)*** 
 
0.16(17.32)*** 
 
0.01(2.96)*** 
 
0.16(17.72)*** 
 
0.01(3.41)*** 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-3) FCFG(1,3)   VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-3) FCFG(1,3) 
0.16(17.35)*** 0.02(4.76)*** 
  
0.16(17.66)*** 0.02(6.16)*** 
 
0.16(17.32)***   0.02(8.58)***   0.16(17.68)***   0.02(9.97)*** 
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Table 5.7 shows regression results of propensity to “strongly” initiate 
dividends after being non-payers over the past five years (PTS5I) on indicators for 
firms’ growing Sales/FCF over the past five years, after the first-stage regression of 
S5newpayer on conventional factors including NYP, ∆A/A, M/B, and E/A without or 
with risks. Apart from FCF(1-5) which shows insignificant positive results which 
can be caused by the limited observations problem discussed in Section 5.3.1, all 
other alternative proxies for firms’ dividend-related earnings growth over the past 
five years have significant effects on PTS5I. Besides, dividend premium also shows 
a significant impact on firms’ propensity to “strongly” initiate dividends after being 
non-payers for five years. 
Table 5.2 to Table 5.7 inclusive generally reveal that firms’ past earnings 
performance has an impact on managers’ dividend decisions, no matter whether we 
use a “wide” definition of dividend-related earnings performance or a “narrow” 
definition of dividend-related earnings performance proxy by sales or free cash flow, 
respectively. Indicators formed by using Sales/FCF play a similar role as indicators 
formed by using EPS to represent firms’ past earnings performance in a two-stage 
framework of regressions (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). In other words, given a 
sufficient number of observations, two-stage regression results by using 
EPSG/EPSD have a reputation in representing results by using varying definitions of 
firms’ past earnings performance. Therefore, we will only show results with 
indicators formed by using EPS in later analysis.
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Table 5.7 Propensity to “strongly” initiate dividends after being non-payers for five years and indicators based on sales/FCF instead of 
EPS 
Table 5.7 reports the regression of firms’ dividend decisions on their determinants. This table only reports the regression results of propensity to “strong” initiate (PTS5I) and 
changes in propensity to “strong” initiate (PTS5I) on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), and indicators of managerial extrapolation which from firms’ past sales growth 
(SaleG(1-5), SaleG(1,5), SaleG(1-5), and SaleG(1,5)), or free cash flow growth ((FCFG(1-5), FCFG(1,5), FCFG(1-5), and FCFG(1,5)),  after  the first stage regression 
with or without controlling for risks (See Chapter 5 and Chapter 4’s results’ sections for details). This table is divided into four panels which respectively report PTS5I (Panel 
A and Panel B), ∆PTS5I (Panel C and Palen D) without or after controlling for risks, on VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷and indicators of firms’ past sales/cash flow growth. Detailed definition 
for indicators of managerial extrapolation can be found in Appendix 5.2, while definition for other variable above can be found in Appendix 3.1 and Appendix 3.3. *** 
represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Dependent variable: S5newpayer  
Panel A. PTS5I without controlling risk factors   
Panel C. ∆PTS5I without controlling risk 
factors 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5)   VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5) 
0.18(15.24)*** 0.01(2.57)** 
  
0.17(14.95)*** 0.01(2.85)*** 
 
0.16(15.59)*** 
 
0.01(2.91)*** 
 
0.17(15.43)*** 
 
0.01(2.61)*** 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5)   VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5) 
0.18(15.25)*** 0.01(0.12) 
  
0.17(14.96)*** 0.01(0.45) 
 
0.17(15.74)*** 
 
0.02(7.94)*** 
 
0.17(15.55)*** 
 
0.02(8.08)*** 
Panel B. PTS5I after controlling risk factors   Panel D. ∆PTS5I after controlling risk factors 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5)   VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 SaleG (1-5) SaleG(1,5) 
0.17(14.76)*** 0.01(2.54)** 
  
0.17(14.91)*** 0.02(2.89)*** 
 
0.17(15.01)*** 
 
0.01(2.48)** 
 
0.17(15.39)*** 
 
0.01(2.56)** 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5)   VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 FCFG (1-5) FCFG(1,5) 
0.17(14.76)*** 0.01(0.24) 
  
0.17(14.91)*** 0.01(0.60) 
 
0.17(15.15)***   0.02(7.29)***   0.17(15.52)***   0.02(7.87)*** 
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5.3.2. Managerial overconfidence vs. Managerial extrapolation 
Based on Malmendier and Tate (2005)’s discussion on managerial overconfidence, 
we mainly follow Campbell et al. (2011)’s method in forming proxies of managers’ 
high-optimism and low-optimism. This chapter has given a discussion that 
managerial overconfidence can have varying forms and incentives (also see, 
Ben-David et al., 2007; Wu and Liu, 2011; Deshmukh et al., 2013) in Section 5.1, so 
we test respectively three alternative proxies for managerial overconfidence. 
Specifically, we test managerial overconfidence based on CEOs’ option-holding 
activities, firms’ investment ratio and CEOs’ net-buying activities on their own firms’ 
shares. 
5.3.2.1. Managerial overconfidence based on option-holding activities 
As in Campbell et al. (2011), we define managers as high-optimism when they hold 
unexercised exercisable options which are (more than) 100% in-the-money.22 In 
addition, high-optimistic CEOs should exhibit this option-holding activity at least 
twice within the whole sample period, but we defined the CEO as highly optimistic 
from the first time they show this activity. See Appendix 5.3 for details about 
descriptions of all variables in this sub-section.  
On the contrary, low-optimistic managers are those who exercise (less than) 30% 
in-the-money options early, and do not hold any unexercised exercisable options 
which are more than 30% in-the-money. As defined in Section 5.2.2.2, low-optimism 
CEOs should exhibit at least twice the low-optimistic option-holding activities as 
described above within the sample period, and we define CEOs as low-optimism 
                                                        
22 Malmendier and Tate (2005) define managers as overconfident when they hold vested but 
unexercised options that are 67% in the money. Campbell et al (2011) have a discussion that 100% 
cut-off is used to define CEOs who are very overconfident. We also test 67%, 200%, and 250% as 
cut-off points for in the money option-holding behavior, and find similar results.  
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CEOs from the first time that they exhibit such option-holding behavior. Our 
indicator for managerial overconfidence is based on managers’ option-holding 
activities from 1992 to 201323. 
We design Table 5.8 to test managerial extrapolation proxy by option-holding 
activities on firms’ dividend decisions without controlling for risks. Table 5.8 only 
lists results for the second-stage regression of residuals from the first-stage 
regression on dividend premium, managerial overconfidence based on 
option-holding activities and managerial extrapolation. We initially, in each panel, 
test PTI, ∆PTI, PTC, PTIN, ∆PTP, PTO, and PTD on dividend premium, Highopt, 
and Lowopt, and then add in indicators of managerial extrapolation for comparison.  
The first finding from Table 5.8 is that managerial overconfidence based on 
option-holding activities does not have consistent significant effects on firms’ 
dividend decisions. When indicators of managerial extrapolation are not added, 
Highopt has a significant effect on PTI, and Lowopt has a significant effect on PTC, 
PTIN, and PTO, but these significances disappear after we add in managerial 
extrapolation. The second finding is that dividend premium does not show 
significant coefficient for PTC, PTO, and PTD, when indicators of managerial 
extrapolation mostly show significant and positive effects on dividend decisions. 
Because risks can be essential explanatory factors on firms’ dividend decisions, we 
will not discuss the results further in Table 5.8, but will do so in Table 5.9 when risks 
are considered in the first-stage regression.
                                                        
23Campbell et al. (2011) show that using EXECUCOMP has the advantages in data availability as 
well as a larger data size than that of Malmendier and Tate’s (2005) sample. They also show that their 
managerial overconfidence indicators are related to those of Malmendier and Tate (2005) and are 
empirically useful. 
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Table 5.8 Propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay/omit/decrease dividends without controlling for risks, dividend premium, 
managerial extrapolation, and managerial overconfidence based on option-holding activities. 
Table 5.8 reports coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression of firms’ dividend decisions on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), managerial overconfidence based on 
option-holding activities (Highopt and Lowopt), and indicators of managerial overreaction based on firms’ past EPS growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5) and 
EPSG(1,5)), or past EPS decline (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). The dependent variables (PTI, ∆PTI, PTC, PTIN, ∆PTP, PTO and PTD) are the 
residuals from the first stage Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decisions on firm characteristics (NYP, ∆A/A, M/B, and E/A) without risks, and results are in 
Panels A, B, C, D, E, F and G respectively. *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents 
significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Panel A. 𝑷𝑻𝑰̃  as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highopt Lowopt EPSG (1-5) EPSG (1,5) EPSG (1-3) EPSG (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.06***(7.56) 0.01**(2.18) -0.01(-0.42) 
    
44460 0.00 
0.08***(5.78) 0.01(1.63) -4.84E-3(-0.26) 3.82E-3(0.58) 
   
21249 0.01 
0.08***(6.22) 0.01(1.26) -4.03E-3(-0.23) 
 
0.01***(6.14) 
  
24269 0.01 
0.08***(6.84) 4.23E-3(1.06) -0.01(-0.34) 
  
0.01*(1.89) 
 
27777 0.01 
0.08***(7.00) 2.69E-3(0.70) -0.01(-0.39) 
   
0.01***(5.91) 29597 0.01 
Panel B. ∆𝑷𝑻𝑰̃  as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
0.07***(7.14) 0.01***(4.28) -0.01(-0.71) 
    
38805 0.00 
0.08***(5.8) 0.01***(2.99) -4.21E-3(-0.22) 0.01(1.03) 
   
19591 0.00 
0.08***(6.16) 0.01**(2.35) -3.74E-3(-0.20) 
 
0.02***(9.03) 
  
21387 0.01 
0.08***(6.86) 0.01**(2.39) -3.78E-3(-0.22) 
  
0.01***(4.18) 
 
25562 0.01 
0.08***(6.91) 0.01**(1.99) -4.78E-3(-0.27) 
   
0.02***(8.38) 26373 0.01 
Panel C. 𝑷𝑻?̃? as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
-0.01(-0.31) 1.06E-3(0.20) 0.02**(1.97) 
    
19219 0.00 
-0.01(-0.74) -6.24E-4(-0.12) 0.01(1.28) 0.02**(2.56) 
   
15932 0.00 
-0.02(-0.92) -3.34E-3(-0.63) 0.02(1.62) 
 
0.03***(10.8) 
  
16553 0.01 
-0.01(-0.61) -2.17E-3(-0.42) 0.02(1.48) 
  
0.02***(5.37) 
 
17160 0.01 
-0.01(-0.46) -4.94(-0.95) 0.02(1.63) 
   
0.03***(10.83) 17486 0.01 
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Table 5.8 (continue) 
Panel D. 𝑷𝑻𝑰?̃? as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highopt Lowopt EPSG (1-5) EPSG (1,5) EPSG (1-3) EPSG (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.31***(22.32) 3.47E-3(0.61) -0.07***(-13.48) 
    
20360 0.01 
0.35***(7.76) -0.01(-0.75) 0.06**(2.10) 0.07***(3.80) 
   
16644 0.01 
0.36***(8.10) -0.02*(1.78) 0.06**(2.29) 
 
0.09***(12.33) 
  
17344 0.02 
0.37***(8.33) -0.01(-1.02) 0.06**(2.34) 
  
0.08***(8.21) 
 
18010 0.01 
0.36***(8.35) -0.02*(-1.71) 0.06**(2.39) 
   
0.10***(14.54) 18371 0.02 
Panel E. ∆𝑷𝑻?̃? as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
0.11***(8.55) -5.77E-4(-0.14) 1.85E-3(0.15)     58458 0.00 
0.12***(7.73) 4.77E-3(1.02) -9.89E-4(-0.08) 0.01(1.62)    35531 0.00 
0.12***(7.98) -3.01E-3(-0.65) 2.75E-3(0.22)  0.05***(17.48)   37858 0.01 
0.12***(8.78) -1.81E-3(-0.42) -5.02E-4(-0.04)   0.03***(7.84)  42706 0.00 
0.12***(9.08) -0.01(-1.23) 1.41E-3(0.12)    0.04***(17.87) 43748 0.01 
Panel F. 𝑷𝑻𝑶 ̃ as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highopt Lowopt EPSD (1-5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD (1-3) EPSD (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01(0.31) -1.06E-3(-0.2) -0.02**(-1.97) 
    
19219 0.00 
0.01(0.63) 5.03E-4(0.10) -0.01(-1.2) 0.08***(3.83) 
   
15932 0.00 
0.02(0.90) 2.74E-3(0.52) -0.02(-1.62) 
 
0.03***(9.38) 
  
16553 0.01 
0.01(0.47) 3.10E-3(0.61) -0.02(-1.41) 
  
0.06***(9.7) 
 
17160 0.01 
0.01(0.47) 4.61E-3(0.89) -0.02(-1.63) 
   
0.03***(9.70) 17486 0.01 
Panel G. 𝑷𝑻𝑫 ̃ as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
-0.01(-0.34) 0.09***(8.91) -0.07***(-3.12) 
    
19219 0.01 
-0.01(-0.29) 0.10***(9.26) -0.06***(-2.62) 0.13***(3.04) 
   
15932 0.01 
-0.01(-0.20) 0.10***(9.52) -0.07***(-2.96) 
 
0.02***(3.60) 
  
16553 0.01 
-0.02(-0.50) 0.10***(9.45) -0.06***(-2.64) 
  
0.10***(8.38) 
 
17160 0.01 
-0.01(-0.41) 0.10***(9.61) -0.06***(-2.82) 
   
0.04***(6.67) 17486 0.01 
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We create Table 5.9 to report coefficients of dividend premium, managerial 
overconfidence based on option-holding activities and managerial extrapolation. In 
Table 5.9, the results of managerial overreaction are similar to what was reported 
earlier in Tables 4.1 to Table 4.7 of Chapter 4. Indicators of managerial extrapolation, 
except EPSG(1-5) which has a limited number of observations, show significant 
positive impact on firms’ dividend decisions, while dividend premium only shows 
significant positive effect on PTI, ∆PTI, and PTIN. Highopt only shows significant 
positive effect on PTI, ∆PTI, and PTD, and Lowopt shows significant effect on both 
PTIN and PTD. Although the positive effect of Highopt in PTD, the positive effect of 
Lowopt in PTIN and the negative effect of Lowopt in PTD are consistent with 
Deshmukh et al. (2013)’s finding that high-optimism managers tend to reduce 
dividends because overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate future investment needs 
and cut current dividends, the positive effect of Highopt on PTI and ∆PTI supports 
Wu and Li (2011)’s argument that managers tend to increase dividends when they 
foresee high future cash-flow from current investment. We have discussed the 
possible causes of mixed results for managerial overconfidence in Section 5.2.2.2, so 
we will hot discuss them further. When risks are controlled for, we cannot find any 
evidence that the explanatory power of Highopt/Lowopt is replaced by indicators of 
managerial extrapolation. It can indicate that risks are indeed playing the role that 
managerial overconfidence seems to play in explaining dividend decisions but not 
another behaviour factor – managerial extrapolation. This finding is consistent with 
Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)’s argument that risks as fundamental factors are 
sometimes the reasons for dividend decisions but not the behaviour biases which are 
“contaminated” by fundamental factors. Compared with dividend premium and 
managerial overconfidence based on option-holding activities, indicators of 
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managerial extrapolation keep showing consistent and significant effects on dividend 
decisions, which can indicate that proxy of managerial extrapolation is not 
“contaminated” by risks.
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Table 5.9 Propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay/omit/decrease dividends after controlling for risks, dividend premium, managerial 
extrapolation, and managerial overconfidence based on option-holding activities. 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression of firms’ dividend decisions on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), managerial overconfidence based on 
option-holding activities (Highopt and Lowopt), and indicators of managerial overreaction based on firms’ past EPS growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5) and 
EPSG(1,5)), or past EPS decline (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). The dependent variables (PTI, ∆PTI, PTC, PTIN, ∆PTP, PTO and PTD) are the 
residuals from the first stage Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decisions on firm characteristics (size, ∆A/A, M/B, and E/A) and risks, and results are in Panels A, 
B, C, D and E respectively. *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical 
level of 10%. 
Panel A. 𝑷𝑻𝑰̃  as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highopt Lowopt EPSG (1-5) EPSG (1,5) EPSG (1-3) EPSG (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.06***(6.76) 0.01**(2.40) -5.43E-4(-0.04) 
    
41795 0.00 
0.08***(5.30) 0.01**(2.32) 2.53E-3(0.13) 2.72E-3(0.41) 
   
20801 0.00 
0.08***(5.59) 0.01*(1.81) 2.15E-3(0.12) 
 
0.01***(5.39) 
  
22785 0.01 
0.08***(6.24) 0.01*(1.79) 8.48E-4(0.05) 
  
4.26E-3(1.46) 
 
27243 0.00 
0.07***(6.26) 0.01(1.39) 4.38E-4(0.03)       0.01***(5.22) 28166 0.01 
Panel B. ∆𝑷𝑻𝑰̃  as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
0.04***(4.87) 0.01***(4.17) -0.01(-0.53) 
    
38082 0.00 
0.06***(3.89) 0.01***(3.05) -1.04E-3(-0.05) 0.01(1.08) 
   
19185 0.01 
0.06***(4.17) 0.01**(2.43) -7.33E-4(-0.04) 
 
0.02***(8.72) 
  
20944 0.01 
0.06***(4.74) 0.01**(2.49) -3.87E-4(-0.02) 
  
0.01***(4.27) 
 
25072 0.01 
0.06***(4.77) 0.01**(2.09) -1.17E-3(-0.07)       0.02***(8.2) 25858 0.01 
Panel C. 𝑷𝑻?̃? as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
-0.02(-1.15) -0.01(-1.15) 0.02(1.41) 
    
18340 0.00 
-0.02(-1.27) -3.21E-3(-0.62) 0.02(1.42) 0.02**(2.02) 
   
15446 0.00 
-0.03(-1.39) -0.01(-1.19) 0.02(1.44) 
 
0.02***(8.33) 
  
15847 0.01 
-0.02(-1.24) -0.01(-1.05) 0.02(1.49) 
  
0.02***(3.93) 
 
16652 0.00 
-0.02(-1.16) -0.01(-1.31) 0.02(1.48)       0.02***(7.54) 16810 0.00 
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Table 5.9 (continue) 
Panel D. 𝑷𝑻𝑰?̃? as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highopt Lowopt EPSG (1-5) EPSG (1,5) EPSG (1-3) EPSG (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.46***(10.76) 0.01(0.74) 0.08***(2.84) 
    
19384 0.01 
0.45***(9.67) 0.01(0.96) 0.08***(2.74) 0.06***(3.30) 
   
16137 0.01 
0.45***(9.94) 5.31E-4(0.04) 0.08***(2.87) 
 
0.09***(11.82) 
  
16584 0.02 
0.46***(10.15) 0.01(0.87) 0.08***(2.94) 
  
0.07***(7.05) 
 
17480 0.01 
0.45***(10.11) 3.75E-3(0.30) 0.08***(2.95)       0.09***(12.76) 17652 0.02 
Panel E. ∆𝑷𝑻?̃? as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
-0.19***(-14.56) 1.74E-3(0.42) 0.01(0.79) 
    
57110 0.00 
-0.24***(-15.44) 0.01(1.64) 0.01(0.77) 0.02***(3.44) 
   
34607 0.01 
-0.24***(-15.15) -1.63E-4(-0.03) 0.01(1.04) 
 
0.04***(15.76) 
  
36877 0.01 
-0.23***(-15.85) 3.47E-3(0.77) 0.01(0.92) 
  
0.03***(7.75) 
 
41673 0.01 
-0.22***(-15.49) 1.07E-3(0.24) 0.01(0.99) 
   
0.03***(13.22) 42682 0.01 
Panel F. 𝑷𝑻𝑶 ̃ as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highopt Lowopt EPSD (1-5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD (1-3) EPSD (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.02(1.15) 0.01(1.15) -0.02(-1.41) 
    
18340 0.00 
0.02(1.20) 2.99E-3(0.58) -0.01(-1.37) 0.03*(1.71) 
   
15446 0.00 
0.03(1.39) 0.01(1.19) -0.02(-1.44) 
 
0.02***(8.33) 
  
15847 0.01 
0.02(1.13) 0.01(1.20) -0.02(-1.44) 
  
0.04***(7.24) 
 
16652 0.00 
0.02(1.16) 0.01(1.31) -0.02(-1.48) 
   
0.02***(7.54) 16810 0.00 
Panel G. 𝑷𝑻𝑫 ̃ as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
0.02(0.67) 0.08***(8.27) -0.05**(-2.46) 
    
18340 0.01 
0.02(0.65) 0.09***(8.41) -0.06**(-2.51) 0.09**(2.08) 
   
15446 0.01 
0.02(0.71) 0.09***(8.67) -0.06***(-2.59) 
 
0.01**(2.28) 
  
15847 0.01 
0.02(0.56) 0.09***(8.46) -0.05**(-2.44) 
  
0.08***(6.16) 
 
16652 0.01 
0.02(0.64) 0.09***(8.44) -0.05**(-2.44)       0.02***(3.50) 16810 0.01 
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As in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we use S3newpayer and S5newpayer as 
dependent variables to replace newpayer to perform robustness tests and report 
results of coefficients for dividend premium, managerial overconfidence based on 
option-holding activities, and managerial extrapolation in Table 5.10. Except for 
EPSG(1-5) which has limited observations, we find a robust impact of managerial 
extrapolation on firms’ propensity to “strongly” initiate dividends.
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Table 5.10 Propensity to “strongly” initiate dividends after being non-payers for five or three years, dividend premium, managerial 
extrapolation, and managerial overconfidence based on option-holding activities. 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression of firms’ “strong” dividend initiation decisions on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), managerial 
overconfidence based on option-holding activities (Highopt and Lowopt), and indicators of managerial overreaction based on firms’ past EPS growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), 
EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The dependent variables (PTS3I, ∆PTS3I, PTS5I, ∆PTS5I) are the residuals from the first stage Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of 
S3newpayer or S5newpayer on firm characteristics (NYP, ∆A/A, M/B, and E/A) with or without risks, and results are in Panels A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H respectively. *** 
represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. PTS3I as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
 
Panel E. PTS5I as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highopt Lowopt EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) 
 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highopt Lowopt EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) 
0.06***(7.63) 0.01***(3.76) -2.68E-3 (-0.20) 
   
0.06***(7.61) 0.01***(5.32) -4.58E-4 (-0.03) 
  
0.08***(6.85) 0.01**(2.27) -2.56E-3(-0.15) 0.01**(2.43) 
  
0.08***(5.75) 0.02***(3.71) 2.72E-4(0.01) 0.01(1.07) 
 
0.08***(7.01) 0.01**(1.96) -3.34E-3(-0.20) 
 
0.01***(6.43) 
 
0.08***(6.18) 0.01***(3.18) 3.61E-4(0.02) 
 
0.02***(6.85) 
Panel B. PTS3I as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
 
Panel F. PTS5I as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
0.06***(6.70) 0.01***(3.68) -5.05E-4(-0.04) 
   
0.06***(6.84) 0.01***(4.23) 1.45E-3(0.10) 
  
0.07***(6.14) 0.01***(2.69) 8.49E-4(0.05) 0.01**(2.22) 
  
0.08***(5.23) 0.02***(3.42) 3.40E-3(0.18) 0.01(1.07) 
 
0.07***(6.17) 0.01**(2.31) 3.04E-4(0.02) 
 
0.01***(5.86) 
 
0.08***(5.55) 0.01***(2.91) 2.88E-3(0.16) 
 
0.02***(6.55) 
Panel C. ∆ PTS3I as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
 
Panel G. ∆ PTS5I as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
0.06***(6.97) 0.01***(4.53) -0.01(-0.70) 
   
0.06***(6.84) 0.02***(5.77) -0.01(-0.64) 
  
0.08***(6.71) 0.01***(2.58) -4.13E-3(-0.24) 0.01***(3.91) 
  
0.08***(5.55) 0.02***(3.76) -3.88E-3(-0.20) 0.01(0.92) 
 
0.08***(6.76) 0.01**(2.22) -4.96E-3(-0.29) 
 
0.02***(7.70) 
 
0.08***(5.88) 0.01***(3.09) -3.67E-3(-0.20) 
 
0.02***(8.15) 
Panel D. ∆ PTS3I as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
 
Panel H. ∆ PTS5I as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
0.05**(5.65) 0.01***(4.41) -0.01(-0.59) 
   
0.06***(5.96) 0.01***(4.47) -0.01(-0.60) 
  
0.07***(5.43) 0.01***(2.69) -0.09(-0.10) 0.01***(4.10) 
  
0.07***(4.76) 0.02***(3.27) -2.42E-3(-0.13) 0.01(0.93) 
 
0.06***(5.46) 0.01**(2.33) -2.52E-3(-0.14) 
 
0.02***(7.70) 
 
0.07***(5.06) 0.01***(2.69) -2.35E-3(-0.13) 
 
0.02***(8.13) 
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5.3.2.2. Managerial overconfidence based on investment ratio 
We follow Campbell et al. (2011) in forming our second proxy for managerial 
overconfidence based on investment ratio. Campbell et al. (2011) use investment 
ratio as a proxy for managerial overconfidence because Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
find that investment level has significant correlation with managers’ overconfidence. 
We define high (low) optimistic CEOs as those whose firms have industry-adjusted 
investment ratio at the top (bottom) quintile for two continuing years. Table 5.11 
reports second-stage regression results of different dividend decisions on dividend 
premium, managerial overconfidence based on investment ratio and managerial 
extrapolation, when risks are not controlled in the first-stage regression in the sample 
from 1963 to 2013.   
We find evidence that the significant effect of Lowinvest disappears when 
managerial extrapolation is considered in Table 5.11. Besides, dividend premium 
does not have a significant impact on some situations of PTC and PTO, and 
directions of dividend premium on PTC or PTO do not support the argument of 
catering theory that managers try to satisfy investors who begin to invest more in 
dividend-paying firms. Except for EPSG(1-5) on PTI and PTC, and EPSD(1-5) on 
PTO, other EPS-related indicators show significant positive effects on firms’ 
dividend decisions.
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Table 5.11 Propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay/omit/decrease dividends without controlling for risks, dividend premium, 
managerial extrapolation, and managerial overconfidence based on investment ratio. 
Table 5.11 reports coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression of firms’ dividend decisions on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), managerial overconfidence based 
on option-holding activities (Highinvest and Lowinvest), and indicators of managerial overreaction based on firms’ past EPS growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5) and 
EPSG(1,5)), or past EPS decline (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). The dependent variables (PTI, ∆PTI, PTC, PTIN, ∆PTP, PTO and PTD) are the 
residuals from the first stage Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decisions on firm characteristics (NYP, ∆A/A, M/B, and E/A) without risks, and results are in 
Panels A, B, C, D and E respectively. *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in 
the critical level of 10%. 
Panel A. 𝑷𝑻𝑰̃  as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highinvest Lowinvest EPSG (1-5) EPSG (1,5) EPSG (1-3) EPSG (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.16***(25.83) -4.87E-3(-1.57) -3.94E-3(-1.20) 
   
 
70901 0.01 
0.17***(14.92) -0.01(-1.39) -0.01(-1.01) 0.01(1.06) 
  
 
30198 0.01 
0.16***(15.58) -0.01*(-1.91) -2.81E-3(-0.59) 
 
0.02***(7.90) 
 
 
34429 0.01 
0.16***(17.51) -0.01(-1.26) -2.01E-3(-0.46) 
  
0.01***(3.52) 
 
41198 0.01 
0.16***(17.82) -0.01(-1.58) -7.88E-4(-0.19) 
 
  
0.02***(9.27) 43962 0.01 
Panel B. ∆𝑷𝑻𝑰̃  as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
0.18***(25.21) -0.01**(-2.14) -0.01(-1.46) 
   
 
63914 0.01 
0.17***(14.77) -0.01*(-1.80) -0.01(-1.48) 0.03***(4.00) 
  
 
28960 0.01 
0.17***(15.76) -0.01***(-2.73) -1.68E-3(-0.34) 
 
0.03***(15.24) 
 
 
31530 0.02 
0.16***(17.54) -0.01*(-1.94) -3.67E-3(-0.82) 
  
0.03***(9.32) 
 
39702 0.02 
0.16***(17.77) -0.01**(-2.54) -2.66E-4(-0.06) 
 
  
0.03***(17.4) 40979 0.02 
Panel C. 𝑷𝑻?̃? as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
1.84E-3 (0.28) 2.87E-3(0.53) -0.02***(-3.56) 
    
53999 0.00 
-0.01(-1.24) 3.28E-3(0.50) -0.01**(-2.24) 2.03E-3(0.46) 
   
37783 0.00 
-0.01(-1.23) 1.33E-3(0.20) -0.01**(-2.42) 
 
0.01***(6.62) 
  
39099 0.00 
-0.02**(-2.01) 3.37E-3(0.56) -0.01**(-2.16) 
  
0.01**(1.99) 
 
43624 0.00 
-0.02**(-2.28) 1.29E-3(0.22) -0.01*(-1.80) 
   
0.02***(8.03) 44362 0.00 
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Table 5.11 (continue) 
Panel D. 𝑷𝑻𝑰?̃? as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highinvest Lowinvest EPSG (1-5) EPSG (1,5) EPSG (1-3) EPSG (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.31***(22.24) 0.03**(2.16) -0.06***(-5.26) 
    
56626 0.01 
0.31***(16.36) 0.03**(1.98) -0.07***(-5.43) 0.08***(7.76) 
   
39139 0.01 
0.30***(16.09) 0.01(0.90) -0.06***(-4.49) 
 
0.10***(20.94) 
  
40589 0.02 
0.28***(16.47) 0.03**(2.24) -0.06***(-4.77) 
  
0.10***(16.54) 
 
45366 0.02 
0.26***(15.52) 0.02(1.49) -0.05***(-4.35) 
   
0.12***(26.67) 46171 0.02 
Panel E. ∆𝑷𝑻?̃? as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
0.10***(14.48) 2.40E-3(0.58) -0.02***(-4.52)     121269 0.00 
0.05***(6.47) 0.01*(1.76) -0.03***(-5.57) 0.02***(4.95)    67980 0.00 
0.05***(6.06) -2.17E-3(-0.42) -0.02***(-3.55)  0.07***(35.69)   71606 0.02 
0.04***(5.06) 0.01**(2.02) -0.02***(-5.44)   0.03***(15.25)  84822 0.00 
0.03***(3.96) 1.91E-3(0.43) -0.02***(-3.77)    0.07***(41.11) 86579 0.02 
Panel F. 𝑷𝑻𝑶 ̃ as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highinvest Lowinvest EPSD (1-5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD (1-3) EPSD (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
-1.84E-3(-0.28) -2.87E-3(-0.53) 0.02***(3.56) 
    
53999 0.00 
0.01(1.24) -3.25E-3(-0.5) 0.01**(2.23) 0.02(1.13) 
   
37783 0.00 
0.01(1.19) -1.65E-3(-0.25) 0.01**(2.48) 
 
0.01***(5.53) 
  
39099 0.00 
0.02**(2.31) -2.39E-3(-0.40) 0.01*(1.91) 
  
0.04***(9.24) 
 
43624 0.00 
0.02**(2.20) -1.51E-3(-0.25) 0.01*(1.83) 
   
0.01***(7.10) 44362 0.00 
Panel G. 𝑷𝑻𝑫 ̃ as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
-0.16***(-12.54) -0.01(-1.20) 0.03***(2.70) 
    
53999 0.00 
-0.16***(-10.10) -0.02*(-1.7) 0.01(1.14) 0.18***(6.48) 
   
37783 0.01 
-0.16***(-10.01) -0.01(-1.16) 0.01(1.33) 
 
0.02***(5.25) 
  
39099 0.00 
-0.14***(-9.56) -0.02(-1.62) 0.01(1.20) 
  
0.12***(14.38) 
 
43624 0.01 
-0.14***(-9.50) -0.01(-1.23) 0.01(1.25) 
   
0.03***(8.91) 44362 0.01 
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When we test managerial extrapolation proxy by investment ratio on firms’ 
dividend decisions after considering risks, the results of managerial overreaction are 
also similar to what was reported earlier in Table 4.2 to Table 4.7; EPSG(1,5), 
EPSG(1-3), and EPSG(1,3) all show significant positive impact on firms’ dividend 
decisions. In Table 5.12, the negative effect of Highinvest on ∆PTI generally 
supports Deshmukh et al. (2013)’s finding, but we find that Highinvest/Lowinvest 
has positive/negative effects on both PTIN and PTD. Besides, the results for 
dividend premium in Table 12 all support Baker and Wurgler (2004a) in that it has a 
positive effect on PTI, ∆PTI, PTC and PTIN but a negative effect on PTD. It is 
interesting to find that only risks takeover the explanatory of Lowinvest on PTO, but 
not managerial extrapolation. It emphasizes the importance of considering all 
fundamental factors including risks in explaining dividend policy. 
We create Table 5.13 by using S3newpayer and S5newpayer as dependent 
variables to replace newpayer to perform robustness tests, and we report results of 
coefficients for dividend premium, managerial overconfidence based on 
option-holding activities, and managerial extrapolation. This shows the same results 
as in Table 5.10 except EPSG(1-5) with limited observations, which we find robust 
impact of managerial extrapolation on firms’ propensity to “strongly” initiate 
dividends.
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Table 5.12 Propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay/omit/decrease dividends after controlling for risks, dividend premium, 
managerial extrapolation, and managerial overconfidence based on investment ratio. 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression of firms’ dividend decisions on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), managerial overconfidence based on 
option-holding activities (Highopt and Lowopt), and indicators of managerial overreaction based on firms’ past EPS growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5) and 
EPSG(1,5)), or past EPS decline (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). The dependent variables (PTI, ∆PTI, PTC, PTIN,∆PTP, PTO and PTD) are the 
residuals from the first stage Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decisions on firm characteristics (size, ∆A/A, M/B, and E/A) and risks, and results are in Panels A, 
B, C, D and E respectively. *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical 
level of 10%. 
Panel A. 𝑷𝑻𝑰̃  as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highinvest Lowinvest EPSG (1-5) EPSG (1,5) EPSG (1-3) EPSG (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.17***(26.04) -1.55E-3(-0.48) -2.55E-3(-0.74) 
   
 
41795 0.00 
0.18***(15.75) -3.52E-3(-0.59) -0.01(-0.96) 0.01(0.87) 
  
 
20801 0.00 
0.18***(16.31) -0.01(-1.23) -1.57E-3(-0.31) 
 
0.02***(7.17) 
 
 
22785 0.01 
0.17***(18.36) -1.90E-3(-0.40) -1.53E-3(-0.34) 
  
0.01***(3.23) 
 
27243 0.00 
0.17***(18.45) -3.92E-3(-0.85) 7.01E-4(0.16) 
 
  
0.02***(8.50) 28166 0.01 
Panel B. ∆𝑷𝑻𝑰̃  as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
0.16***(23.16) -0.01**(-2.04) -4.55E-3(-1.24) 
   
 
38082 0.00 
0.15***(13.19) -0.01*(-1.74) -0.01(-1.36) 0.03***(4.14) 
  
 
19185 0.01 
0.16***(14.15) -0.01***(-2.69) -1.13E-3(-0.22) 
 
0.03***(15.12) 
 
 
20944 0.01 
0.15***(15.65) -0.01*(-1.91) -3.02E-3(-0.67) 
  
0.03***(9.63) 
 
25072 0.01 
0.15***(15.87) -0.01**(-2.55) 2.89E-4(0.06) 
 
  
0.03***(17.32) 25858 0.01 
Panel C. 𝑷𝑻?̃? as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
0.02***(3.83) 0.01(1.00) -0.01**(-2.17) 
    
18340 0.00 
0.02***(2.61) 0.01(1.15) -0.01(-1.56) 4.59E-3(1.07) 
   
15446 0.00 
0.02**(2.32) 4.62E-3(0.74) -0.01(-1.25) 
 
0.02***(7.80) 
  
15847 0.01 
0.02**(2.18) 0.01(1.06) -0.01(-1.11) 
  
0.01***(2.77) 
 
16652 0.00 
0.01(1.51) 4.83E-3(0.83) -4.09E-3(-0.82) 
   
0.02***(9.12) 16810 0.00 
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Table 5.12 (continue) 
Panel D. 𝑷𝑻𝑰?̃? as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highinvest Lowinvest EPSG (1-5) EPSG (1,5) EPSG (1-3) EPSG (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.31***(21.92) 0.03***(2.81) -0.05***(-4.28) 
    
19384 0.01 
0.33***(17.4) 0.04***(2.69) -0.06***(-4.63) 0.07***(7.08) 
   
16137 0.01 
0.32***(17.15) 0.02(1.54) -0.05***(-3.67) 
 
0.10***(19.94) 
  
16584 0.02 
0.30***(17.33) 0.04***(2.82) -0.05***(-3.94) 
  
0.09***(15.87) 
 
17480 0.01 
0.28***(16.29) 0.03**(2.13) -0.04***(-3.58) 
   
0.12***(25.60) 17652 0.02 
Panel B. ∆𝑷𝑻?̃? as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
0.02**(2.54) 0.01(1.39) -0.02**(-3.50) 
    
117889 0.00 
-0.05***(-5.20) 0.01(1.17) -0.02***(-3.82) 0.02***(5.13) 
   
66212 0.00 
-0.05***(-5.21) -2.90E-3(-0.52) -0.01**(-2.48) 
 
0.05***(25.53) 
  
69727 0.01 
-0.60***(-7.49) 0.01(1.60) -0.02***(-3.60) 
  
0.03***(12.85) 
 
82652 0.00 
-0.06***(-8.02) 1.61E-3(0.33) -0.01**(-2.35) 
   
0.06***(30.43) 84327 0.01 
Panel E. 𝑷𝑻𝑶 ̃ as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highinvest Lowinvest EPSD (1-5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD (1-3) EPSD (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
-0.02***(-3.83) -0.01(-1.00) 0.01**(2.17) 
    
51875 0.00 
-0.02***(-2.61) -0.01(-1.13) 0.01(1.55) 0.05***(3.50) 
   
36718 0.00 
-0.02**(-2.32) -4.62(-0.74) 0.01(1.25) 
 
0.02***(7.80) 
  
37591 0.00 
-0.01*(-1.86) -0.01(-0.88) 4.30E-3(0.85) 
  
0.04***(11.21) 
 
42416 0.00 
-0.01(-1.51) -4.83(-0.83) 4.09E-3(0.82) 
   
0.02***(9.12) 42781 0.00 
Panel E. 𝑷𝑻𝑫 ̃ as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
-0.16***(-12.88) 0.11***(7.34) -0.03(-1.29) 
    
18340 0.01 
-0.17***(-10.34) 0.12***(7.54) -0.04(-1.55) 0.22***(7.81) 
   
15446 0.01 
-0.17***(-10.21) 0.12***(7.74) -0.04(-1.42) 
 
0.04***(9.50) 
  
15847 0.01 
-0.15***(-10.02) 0.12***(7.78) -0.03(-1.21) 
  
0.14***(16.93) 
 
16652 0.01 
-0.14***(-9.54) 0.12***(7.71) -0.03(-1.03) 
   
0.05***(13.41) 16810 0.01 
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Table 5.13 Propensity to “strongly” initiate dividends after being non-payers for five or three years, dividend premium, managerial 
extrapolation, and managerial overconfidence based on investment ratio. 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression of firms’ “strong” dividend initiation decisions on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), managerial 
overconfidence based on investment ratio (Highinvest and Lowinvest), and indicators of managerial overreaction based on firms’ past EPS growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), 
EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The dependent variables (PTS3I, ∆PTS3I, PTS5I, ∆PTS5I) are the residuals from the first stage Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of 
S3newpayer or S5newpayer on firm characteristics (NYP, ∆A/A, M/B, and E/A) with or without risks, and results are in Panels A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H respectively. *** 
represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Panel A. PTS3I as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
 
Panel E. PTS5I as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highinvest Lowinvest EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) 
 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highinvest Lowinvest EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) 
0.17***(27.71) -0.01**(-2.16) -0.01(-1.66) 
   
0.18***(28.08) -0.01**(-2.39) -0.01(-1.64) 
  
0.17***(17.96) -0.01(-1.63) -4.40E-3(-0.99) 0.02***(5.82) 
  
0.18***(15.26) -0.01*(-1.69) -0.01(-1.47) 0.02***(2.60) 
 
0.16***(18.24) -0.01**(-2.07) -2.06E-3(-0.49) 
 
0.02***(12.05) 
 
0.17***(15.98) -0.01**(-2.57) -3.23E-3(-0.68) 
 
0.02***(10.94) 
Panel B. PTS3I as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
 
Panel F. PTS5I as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
0.18***(26.60) -0.01*(-1.94) -0.01(-1.64) 
   
0.18***(27.26) -0.01**(-2.40) -0.01(-1.54) 
  
0.16***(17.36) -0.01(-1.56) -0.01(-1.13) 0.02***(6.00) 
  
0.17***(14.77) -0.01(-1.63) -0.01(-1.45) 0.02**(2.55) 
 
0.16***(17.47) -0.01**(-2.05) -2.46E-3(-0.56) 
 
0.02***(11.73) 
 
0.17***(15.38) -0.01**(-2.56) -3.03E-3(-0.60) 
 
0.02***(10.60) 
Panel C. ∆ PTS3I as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
 
Panel G. ∆ PTS5I as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
0.18***(26.08) -0.01**(-2.48) -3.64E-3(-1.02) 
   
0.18***(26.13) -0.01**(-2.49) -3.49E-3(-0.98) 
  
0.16***(17.94) -0.01**(-2.10) -2.54E-3(-0.58) 0.02***(7.99) 
  
0.17***(14.97) -0.01*(-1.81) -0.01(-1.10) 0.02***(3.45) 
 
0.16***(18.15) -0.01***(-2.68) 1.93E-4(0.04) 
 
0.03***(14.33) 
 
0.17***(15.84) -0.01***(-2.78) -8.14E-4(-0.16) 
 
0.03***(12.35) 
Panel D. ∆ PTS3I as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
 
Panel H. ∆ PTS5I as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
0.18***(25.64) -0.01**(-2.38) -3.71E-3(-1.03) 
   
0.18***(25.86) -0.01**(-2.43) -3.09E-3(-0.86) 
  
0.16***(17.65) -0.01**(-2.04) -3.15E-3(-0.71) 0.02***(8.16) 
  
0.17***(14.92) -0.01(-1.64) -0.01(-1.10) 0.02***(3.57) 
 
0.16***(17.85) -0.01***(-2.62) -4.83E-4(-0.11) 
 
0.03***(14.31) 
 
0.17***(15.8) -0.01***(-2.63) -6.24E-4(-0.12) 
 
0.03***(12.49) 
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5.3.2.3. Managerial overconfidence based on net-buying activities 
As Section 5.2.2.2 has discussed, we use a “dirty” estimation to proxy for CEOs’ 
changes in their own firms’ shareholdings excluding options. We follow Campbell et 
al. (2011) to define High-optimistic/Low-optimistic CEOs under two conditions: (1) 
a CEO should increase/decrease his (her) own firms’ shareholding by at least 10%, 
and (2) the CEO’s net-buying percentage of shares must be ranked at the top/bottom 
quintile among all CEOs. We report second-stage regression results of dividend 
decisions on dividend premium, managerial overconfidence based on CEOs’ 
net-buying activities of their own firms’ shares and managerial extrapolation from 
1992 to 2013 in Table 5.14, after the first-stage regression without controlling for 
risks.   
We find evidence that the significant effect of Highinvest on PTI and ∆PTI 
disappears when managerial extrapolation is considered in Table 5.14. Dividend 
premium does not show any significant impact on PTC, PTO or PTD, and we find 
that directions of dividend premium on PTC or PTO do not support the argument of 
catering theory. Except for EPSG(1-5) on PTI and ∆PTI, other EPS-related 
indicators show significant positive effects on firms’ dividend decisions.
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Table 5.14 Propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay/omit/decrease dividends without controlling for risks, dividend premium, 
managerial extrapolation, and managerial overconfidence based on net-buying activities. 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression of firms’ dividend decisions on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), managerial overconfidence based on 
net-buying activities (Highnet and Lownet), and indicators of managerial overreaction based on firms’ past EPS growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)), 
or past EPS decline (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). The dependent variables (PTI, ∆PTI, PTC, PTIN, ∆PTP, PTO, and PTD) are the residuals from the 
first stage Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decisions on firm characteristics (NYP, ∆A/A, M/B, and E/A) excluding risks, and results are in Panels A, B, C, D, E, 
F and G respectively. *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level 
of 10%. 
 
Panel A. 𝑷𝑻𝑰̃  as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highnet Lownet EPSG (1-5) EPSG (1,5) EPSG (1-3) EPSG (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.06***(7.45) 0.01**(2.27) 0.01(1.59) 
    
44460 0.00 
0.08***(5.70) 0.01(0.84) 0.01(0.74) 0.00(0.64) 
   
21249 0.01 
0.08***(6.15) 0.01(0.69) 0.01(1.47) 
 
0.01***(6.26) 
  
24269 0.01 
0.08***(6.78) 0.01(1.23) 0.01(0.54) 
  
0.01*(1.95) 
 
27777 0.01 
0.08***(6.95) 0.01(1.07) 0.01(0.84) 
   
0.01***(5.96) 29597 0.01 
Panel B. ∆𝑷𝑻𝑰̃  as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
0.06***(6.95) 0.02***(3.21) 0.02***(2.75) 
    
38805 0.00 
0.08***(5.67) 0.01(1.20) 0.02(1.51) 0.01(1.14) 
   
19591 0.01 
0.08***(6.04) 0.01(1.08) 0.02**(2.19) 
 
0.02***(9.24) 
  
21387 0.01 
0.08***(6.75) 0.01*(1.70) 0.01(1.33) 
  
0.01***(4.30) 
 
25562 0.01 
0.08***(6.81) 0.01(1.56) 0.02*(1.66) 
   
0.02***(8.52) 26373 0.01 
Panel C. 𝑷𝑻?̃? as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
-0.01(-0.29) 5.59E-4(0.07) -0.01(-0.79) 
    
19219 0.00 
-0.01(-0.72) -1.74E-3(-0.24) -0.01(-0.51) 0.02**(2.53) 
   
15932 0.01 
-0.02(-0.87) -0.01(-0.69) -0.01(-0.78) 
 
0.03***(10.79) 
  
16553 0.01 
-0.01(-0.58) -2.55E-3(-0.35) -0.01(-0.92) 
  
0.02***(5.33) 
 
17160 0.01 
-0.01(-0.42) -2.57E-3(-0.34) -0.01(-1.10) 
   
0.03***(10.79) 17486 0.01 
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Table 5.14 (continue) 
Panel D. 𝑷𝑻𝑰?̃? as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highnet Lownet EPSG (1-5) EPSG (1,5) EPSG (1-3) EPSG (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.37***(8.97) -0.14***(-7.73) -1.74E-3(-0.06) 
    
20360 0.01 
0.36***(7.94) -0.15***(-8.11) 0.02(0.76) 0.07***(3.79) 
   
16644 0.01 
0.37***(8.33) -0.15***(-8.46) 0.01(0.21) 
 
0.09***(12.38) 
  
17344 0.02 
0.38***(8.52) -0.15***(-8.07) 0.01(0.39) 
  
0.08***(8.15) 
 
18010 0.01 
0.37***(8.56) -0.15***(-8.23) -1.16E-3(-0.04) 
   
0.10***(14.57) 18371 0.02 
Panel E. ∆𝑷𝑻?̃? as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
0.11***(8.53) 0.01(1.06) 2.69E-3(0.27)     58458 0.00 
0.11***(7.70) -1.19E-3(-0.16) 2.65E-3(0.25) 0.01*(1.66)    35531 0.00 
0.12***(8.00) -2.44E-3(-0.33) 4.59E-3(0.43)  0.05***(17.48)   37858 0.01 
0.12***(8.80) -2.03E-3(-0.29) -0.01(-0.56)   0.03***(7.84)  42706 0.00 
0.12***(9.13) -2.47E-3(-0.35) -4.14E-3(-0.42)    0.04***(17.84) 43748 0.01 
Panel F. 𝑷𝑻𝑶 ̃ as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highnet Lownet EPSD (1-5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD (1-3) EPSD (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.01(0.29) -5.59E-4(-0.07) 0.01(0.79) 
    
19219 0.00 
0.01(0.61) 1.99E-3(0.27) 0.01(0.58) 0.08***(3.85) 
   
15932 0.01 
0.02(0.85) 0.01(0.66) 0.01(0.77) 
 
0.03***(9.37) 
  
16553 0.01 
0.01(0.43) 3.88E-3(0.53) 0.01(0.90) 
  
0.06***(9.69) 
 
17160 0.01 
0.01(0.42) 2.52E-3(0.34) 0.01(1.08) 
   
0.03***(9.67) 17486 0.01 
Panel G. 𝑷𝑻𝑫 ̃ as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
-0.02(-0.70) 0.14***(9.23) -0.01(-0.53) 
    
19219 0.00 
-0.03(-0.73) 0.15***(9.63) -0.03(-1.03) 0.13***(3.05) 
   
15932 0.01 
-0.02(-0.66) 0.15***(9.76) -0.01(-0.54) 
 
0.02***(3.04) 
  
16553 0.01 
-0.03(-0.89) 0.15***(9.81) -0.01(-0.59) 
  
0.10***(8.14) 
 
17160 0.01 
-0.03(-0.81) 0.14***(9.65) -3.68E-3(-0.16) 
   
0.04***(6.14) 17486 0.01 
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When we test managerial extrapolation proxy by net-buying activities on firms’ 
dividend decisions, we find similar results to what was reported earlier in Table 4.2 
to Table 4.7 in Table 5.15 where risks are controlled for in first-stage regressions. 
CEOs who observe past earnings growth tend to initiate/continue/increase/pay 
dividends, while CEOs who observe past EPS decline tend to omit/decrease 
dividends. The negative effect of Highnet on PTIN and the positive effect of Lownet 
on PTD are consistent with Deshmukh et al. (2013)’s paper, but we find that Lownet 
has no significant effect on firms’ dividend decisions in most circumstances. Besides, 
dividend premium has a significant positive effect on PTI, ∆PTI, and PTIN, but 
insignificant effect on PTC and PTD. In Table 51.4, we find no evidence that risks 
are replacing the explanatory power of Highnet on PTI or ∆PTI, which may indicate 
that risks cannot explain all possible explanatory power of managerial extrapolating 
in replacing managerial overconfidence to explain firms’ dividend decisions. In 
summary, indicators of managerial overreaction show a robust impact on firms’ 
dividend decisions, while other proxy for behaviour bias including dividend 
premium and managerial overconfidence does not have such a consistent effect on 
these dividend decisions. 
We create Table 5.16 by using S3newpayer and S5newpayer as dependent 
variables to replace newpayer in running robustness tests and report results. This 
shows the same results as in Table 5.10 and Table 5.13, except for EPSG(1-5), and 
we find that managerial extrapolation has robust explanatory power in explaining 
firms’ propensity to “strongly” initiate dividends.
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Table 5.15 Propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay/omit/decrease dividends after controlling for risks, dividend premium, 
managerial extrapolation, and managerial overconfidence based on net-buying activities. 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression of firms’ dividend decisions on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), managerial overconfidence based on 
net-buying activities (Highnet and Lownet), and indicators of managerial overreaction based on firms’ past EPS growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)), 
or past EPS decline (EPSD(1-3), EPSD(1,3), EPSD(1-5), and EPSD(1,5)). The dependent variables (PTI, ∆PTI, PTC, PTIN, ∆PTP, PTO, and PTD) are the residuals from the 
first stage Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of dividend decisions on firm characteristics (NYP, ∆A/A, M/B, and E/A) and risks, and results are in Panels A, B, C, D, E, F and 
G respectively. *** represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 
10%. 
 
 
Panel A. 𝑷𝑻𝑰̃  as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highnet Lownet EPSG (1-5) EPSG (1,5) EPSG (1-3) EPSG (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.06***(6.64) 0.01**(2.23) 0.01*(1.76) 
    
41795 0.00 
0.08***(5.21) 0.01(0.86) 0.01(0.97) 0.00(0.49) 
   
20801 0.00 
0.08***(5.51) 0.01(0.69) 0.02(1.62) 
 
0.01***(5.54) 
  
22785 0.01 
0.07***(6.16) 0.01(1.28) 0.01(0.82) 
  
0.00(1.54) 
 
27243 0.00 
0.07***(6.19) 0.01(1.13) 0.01(1.08) 
   
0.01***(5.31) 28166 0.01 
Panel B. ∆𝑷𝑻𝑰̃  as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
0.04***(4.68) 0.02***(2.95) 0.02***(2.86) 
    
38082 0.00 
0.05***(3.75) 0.01(0.99) 0.02*(1.71) 0.01(1.18) 
   
19185 0.01 
0.06***(4.05) 0.01(0.85) 0.02**(2.32) 
 
0.02***(8.93) 
  
20944 0.01 
0.06***(4.62) 0.01(1.49) 0.01(1.49) 
  
0.01***(4.38) 
 
25072 0.01 
0.06***(4.67) 0.01(1.36) 0.02*(1.80) 
   
0.02***(8.35) 25858 0.01 
Panel C. 𝑷𝑻?̃? as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
-0.02(-1.09) -1.84E-3(-0.25) -0.01(-1.04) 
    
18340 0.00 
-0.02 (-1.24) 1.48E-3(0.20) -2.84E-3(-0.24) 0.01**(1.98) 
   
15446 0.00 
-0.02(-1.33) -3.02E-3 (-0.28) -0.01(-0.57) 
 
0.02***(8.26) 
  
15847 0.01 
-0.02(-1.20) -6.25E-4 (-0.08) -0.01(-0.67) 
  
0.02***(3.86) 
 
16652 0.00 
-0.02(-1.11) -1.34E-3 (-0.18) -0.01(-0.75) 
   
0.02***(7.47) 16810 0.00 
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Table 5.15 (continue) 
Panel D. 𝑷𝑻𝑰?̃? as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highnet Lownet EPSG (1-5) EPSG (1,5) EPSG (1-3) EPSG (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.46***(10.86) -0.11***(-6.39) 0.03 (1.17) 
    
19384 0.01 
0.45***(9.78) -0.13***(-6.73) 0.05*(1.79) 0.06***(3.33) 
   
16137 0.01 
0.46***(10.09) -0.13***(-7.00) 0.04(1.43) 
 
0.09***(11.96) 
  
16584 0.02 
0.46***(10.25) -0.12***(-6.74) 0.04(1.49) 
  
0.07***(7.04) 
 
17480 0.01 
0.46***(10.24) -0.13***(-6.93) 0.04(1.24) 
   
0.09***(12.88) 17652 0.02 
Panel E. ∆𝑷𝑻?̃? as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
-0.19***(-14.58) 0.01(0.89) 3.64E-3(0.36) 
    
57110 0.00 
-0.25***(-15.5) 0.01(0.80) 0.01(0.87) 0.03***(3.49) 
   
34607 0.01 
-0.24***(-15.16) 3.33E-3(0.43) 0.01(0.88) 
 
0.04***(15.79) 
  
36877 0.01 
-0.23***(-15.88) 0.01(0.73) 4.08E-3(0.40) 
  
0.03***(7.78) 
 
41673 0.01 
-0.22***(-15.51) 3.88E-3(0.53) 4.89E-3(0.48) 
   
0.03***(13.25) 42682 0.01 
Panel F. 𝑷𝑻𝑶 ̃ as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highnet Lownet EPSD (1-5) EPSD(1,5) EPSD (1-3) EPSD (1,3) N 𝑹𝟐 
0.02(1.09) 1.84E-3(0.25) 0.01(1.04) 
    
18340 0.00 
0.02(1.17) -1.38E-3(-0.19) 3.33E-3(0.28) 0.04*(1.72) 
   
15446 0.00 
0.02(1.33) 2.06E-3(0.28) 0.01(0.57) 
 
0.02***(8.26) 
  
15847 0.01 
0.02(1.09) 1.64E-3(0.22) 0.01(0.66) 
  
0.04***(7.19) 
 
16652 0.00 
0.02(1.11) 1.34E-3(0.18) 0.01(0.75) 
   
0.02***(7.47) 16810 0.00 
Panel G. 𝑷𝑻𝑫 ̃ as dependent variable after controlling for risk   
0.012(0.35) 0.13***(8.75) -0.02(-1.05) 
    
18340 0.01 
0.01(0.27) 0.13***(8.61) -0.04(-1.54) 0.09**(2.08) 
   
15446 0.01 
0.01(0.30) 0.13***(8.82) -0.03(-1.29) 
 
0.01*(1.76) 
  
15847 0.01 
0.01(0.23) 0.13***(8.86) -0.03(-1.13) 
  
0.07***(5.93) 
 
16652 0.01 
0.01(0.29) 0.13***(8.84) -0.02(-0.98) 
   
0.02***(3.04) 16810 0.01 
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Table 5.16 Propensity to “strongly” initiate dividends, dividend premium, managerial extrapolation, and managerial overconfidence 
based on net-buying activities. 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression of firms’ “strong” dividend initiation decisions on dividend premium (VW 𝑃𝐷−𝑁𝐷), managerial 
overconfidence based on net-buying activities (Highnet and Lownet), and indicators of managerial overreaction based on firms’ past EPS growth (EPSG(1-3), EPSG(1,3), 
EPSG(1-5), and EPSG(1,5)). The dependent variables (PTS3I, ∆PTS3I, PTS5I, ∆PTS5I) are the residuals from the first stage Fama-Macbeth logistic regression of 
S3newpayer or S5newpayer on firm characteristics (NYP, ∆A/A, M/B, and E/A) with or without risks, and results are in Panels A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H respectively. *** 
represents significance in the critical level of 1%; ** represents significance in the critical level of 5%; * represents significance in the critical level of 10%. 
 
Panel A. PTS3I as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
 
Panel E. PTS5I as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highnet Lownet EPSG(1-3) EPSG(1,3) 
 
VW 𝑷𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Highnet Lownet EPSG(1-5) EPSG(1,5) 
0.06***(7.47) 0.02***(2.86) 0.02**(2.19) 
   
0.06***(7.42) 0.02***(3.10) 0.02**(2.41) 
  
0.08***(6.75) 0.01*(1.69) 0.01(0.99) 0.01**(2.54) 
  
0.08***(5.59) 0.01(1.39) 0.01(1.29) 0.01(1.18) 
 
0.08***(6.91) 0.01(1.55) 0.01(1.31) 
 
0.01***(6.56) 
 
0.08***(6.04) 0.01(1.28) 0.02**(2.04) 
 
0.02***(7.14) 
Panel B. PTS3I as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
 
Panel F. PTS5I as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
0.06***(6.54) 0.02***(2.60) 0.02**(2.29) 
   
0.06***(6.65) 0.02***(2.94) 0.02***(2.64) 
  
0.07***(6.02) 0.01(1.49) 0.01(1.19) 0.01**(2.34) 
  
0.07***(5.09) 0.01(1.22) 0.02(1.57) 0.01(1.18) 
 
0.07***(6.06) 0.01(1.38) 0.01(1.47) 
 
0.01***(6.02) 
 
0.07***(5.42) 0.01(1.13) 0.02**(2.24) 
 
0.02***(6.79) 
Panel C. ∆PTS3I as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
 
Panel G. ∆PTS5I as dependent variable without controlling for risk 
0.06***(6.76) 0.02***(3.29) 0.02***(2.84) 
   
0.06***(6.61) 0.02***(3.33) 0.02***(2.88) 
  
0.08***(6.59) 0.01*(1.75) 0.01(1.38) 0.01***(4.04) 
  
0.08***(5.39) 0.01(1.28) 0.02(1.56) 0.01(1.04) 
 
0.08***(6.65) 0.01*(1.65) 0.02*(1.72) 
 
0.02***(7.86) 
 
0.08***(5.74) 0.01(1.20) 0.02**(2.27) 
 
0.02***(8.43) 
Panel D. ∆PTS3I as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
 
Panel H. ∆PTS5I as dependent variable after controlling for risk 
0.05***(5.45) 0.02***(3.07) 0.02***(2.98) 
   
0.05***(5.76) 0.02***(3.16) 0.02***(3.05) 
  
0.06***(5.31) 0.01(1.57) 0.01(1.55) 0.01***(4.23) 
  
0.07***(4.62) 0.01(1.12) 0.02*(1.75) 0.01(1.04) 
 
0.06***(5.35) 0.01(1.47) 0.02*(1.87) 
 
0.02***(7.86) 
 
0.07***(4.93) 0.01(1.04) 0.02**(2.43) 
 
0.02***(8.36) 
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5.4. Conclusion 
As one of the managerial behaviour biases which can have an impact on managers’ 
dividend decisions, managerial overreaction from firms’ past earnings performance 
is still not discussed in relevant previous literature, while other managerial behaviour 
biases such as catering incentives or overconfidence have been discussed and tested 
under the issue of firms’ dividend policies. We find empirical evidence that managers 
tend to overextrapolate firms’ past EPS growth/decline into the future in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4, and this managerial overextrapolation can affect managers’ dividend 
decisions because overextrapolating managers wrongly believe that firms’ past 
earnings’ increases/decreases will last for a longer time when firms will have 
more/less cash to pay out as dividends. However, we do not test whether managerial 
extrapolation can still have a significant impact on firms’ dividend policies given 
managerial overconfidence which may also have an impact on dividend decisions. In 
this Chapter, we further discuss the robustness of managerial extrapolation’s effect 
on firms’ dividend policy by using two methods: (1) we try to release or narrow the 
definition of firms’ past earnings performance by using alternative measurements of 
firms’ dividend-related earnings, and we test whether these different definitions of 
dividend-related earnings can have a similar effect on firms’ dividend decisions as 
EPS does; (2) we add in managerial overconfidence indicators proxy by different 
managers’ activities or observable accounting data (managerial overconfidence based 
on CEOs’ option-holding activities, managerial overconfidence based on investment 
ratio and managerial overconfidence based on managers’ net-buying activities on 
their own firms’ shares) in the second-stage regression, after getting residuals from 
the first-stage regression which regress firms’ dividend decisions on conventional 
factors (size, profitability, investment opportunities, and risks), and we then compare 
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the degrees of influence among catering incentive, managerial overconfidence and 
managerial extrapolation. 
We have four main findings in this chapter. (1) We find that alternative 
measurements of firms’ past dividend-related earnings performance – sales or free 
cash flow can perform similarly as EPS can do in explaining managers’ extrapolation 
of past earnings performance into the future and then make dividend decisions. (2) 
We find mixed results for the impact of managerial overconfidence by using 
different measurements. Spectacularly, we find results which are consistent with 
Ben-David et al. (2007), Wu and Liu (2011) and Deshmukh et al. (2013), but these 
results are not robust in different regressions with varying dependent variables. (3) 
Dividend premium (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a) shows significant impact on firms’ 
dividend decisions in most circumstances, but its significant effect is not robust 
when managerial overconfidence and managerial extrapolation are considered in 
different regression functions. (4) We find that indicators of managerial extrapolation 
which proxy by firms’ earnings growth/decline over the past three or five years have 
consistent and significant effects on firms’ dividend decisions, given other 
conventional factors and other factors representing managerial behaviour activities.  
As a concluding chapter for previous empirical chapters (Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4), Chapter 5 extends the “horse race” among different determinants of 
firms’ dividend policy to a larger scale, in terms of possible explanatory factors 
proxy for managerial behaviour activities. During the sample period from 1963 to 
2013, indicators for managerial extrapolation consistently show significant effects on 
different dividend decisions including dividend initiation, continuation, increase, 
paying, omission and decrease, while other behaviour factors cannot keep their 
significant impact on these dividend decisions. In other words, indicators of 
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managerial extrapolation win the “horse race” in terms of consistency. Although it 
(managerial extrapolation) may only be one piece of the whole cake in determinants 
of dividend policy, it always shows up when other pieces of the cake cannot. 
Therefore, this empirical chapter jointly with the previous two empirical chapters 
shed the light on the issue of using psychology theory to explain firms’ dividend 
decisions and guide investors in understanding what managerial behaviour factors 
are behind the phenomena of paying dividends. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
 
Previous literature has presented a thorough and wide ranging discussion of the 
determinants of firms’ dividend policies. We find an important research gap among 
these determinants: among behaviour factors that are used to explain firms’ dividend 
decisions, managerial extrapolation is still not discussed. Based on the experimental 
psychology theory that individuals can break Bayes’ rule by overreacting to the 
representativeness of limited information (overestimation on a small sample of 
observations in Kahneman and Tversky (1974)), we posit a hypothesis that managers 
may extrapolate firms’ past earnings performance into the future. Specifically, 
managers can make wrong dividend decisions based on their overextrapolation of 
past earnings growth/decline into the future. We discuss this hypothesis in this thesis 
and find robust empirical evidence of it. 
We develop three empirical chapters to examine managerial extrapolation in 
this thesis. Firstly, Chapter 3 jointly tests managerial extrapolation on past earnings 
growth/decline on firms’ dividend decisions by following the methodology of Baker 
and Wurgler (2004a) and Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). We design indicators which 
record firms’ growing/decreasing EPS over the past five or three years to represent 
managers’ extrapolation of past earnings performance in Chapter 3, and we create 
variables which are residuals from Fama-Macbeth logistic regressions which regress 
indicator of dividend decisions on conventional determinants including firms’ sizes, 
investment opportunities, profitability (see Fama and French, 2001) and risks (see 
Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009). We then use these residuals as dependent variables 
which represent firms’ propensity to initiate/continue/increase/pay/omit/decrease 
dividends in the second stage regression on managers’ catering incentive based on 
investors’ behaviour biases (the dividend premium of Baker and Wurgler (2004a)) 
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and indicators of managerial extrapolation. Based on in-sample data from 1963 to 
2000, we find that firms’ excellent/pessimistic past EPS performance can 
positively/negatively affect managers’ dividend decisions. Chapter 3 also provides 
evidence that managers who choose to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends after 
observing past growing EPS overreacted to the representativeness of past growth in 
earnings, because they cannot correctly predict future earnings growth after making 
decisions to initiate/continue/increase/pay dividends. In addition, neither can 
managers who choose to omit/decrease dividends after observing past decline in EPS 
correctly predict future earnings performance after making dividend decisions. These 
findings support our hypothesis that managers’ activities in extrapolating past 
earnings performance into the future represent managers’ overreaction to firms’ past 
performance (managers are overexterapolated). Therefore, indicators for managerial 
extrapolation represent a type of managerial behaviour bias, and this bias affects 
managers’ dividend decisions. 
We find the reappearance of dividends around 2000 (Julio and Ikenberry, 2004) 
is shown up with the same movement of percentage for firms with growing EPS over 
the past five or three years. Therefore, we make Chapter 4 a straight extension of 
Chapter 3 by using the same methodology but a different sample period. In Chapter 
4, we test indicators of managerial extrapolation on firms’ propensity to 
initiate/continue/increase/pay/omit /decrease dividends, jointly with managers’ 
catering incentive (dividend premium) in the out-of-sample period from 2001 to 
2013 as well as the whole sample period from 1963 to 2013. During the 
out-of-sample period from 2001 to 2013 and the whole sample from 1963 to 2013, 
we find robust evidence that indicators of managerial extrapolation have significant 
effects on firms’ dividends and on managers who make dividend decisions based on 
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past streams of increasing/decreasing EPS overreact. In contrast to Chapter 3, 
Chapter 4 provides evidence that other determinants, including investment 
opportunities, risks or dividend premium cannot always have robust effects on 
managers’ dividend decisions, while managerial extrapolation can keep having 
explanatory power on these decisions. As an unique contribution of Chapter 4, we 
discusses the possible impact of financial crisis or recession on firms’ dividend 
decisions and discusses whether results for our indicators of managerial 
overextrapolation will be affected by controlling for financial crisis or recession. 
In previous literature, managerial overconfidence is also a key determinant of 
firms’ dividend policy (see Deshmukh et al., 2013). The psychology literature 
provides different definitions for varying types of ‘overconfidence’ (see Moore and 
Healy, 2008), and it also distinguishes ‘overextrapolation’ from ‘overconfidence’ 
(see Alti and Tellock, 2014). Both performing in representing managers’ biases, 
managerial overconfidence and managerial overextrapolation should be tested in the 
same model for a comparison. Thus, we use Chapter 5 to run a ‘horse race’ among 
three managerial behaviour factors: managers’ catering incentive (dividend 
premium), managerial overconfidence (respectively based on managers’ 
option-holding activities, investment ratio and managers’ net-buying activities in 
their own firms’ shares) and managerial extrapolation (firms’ past stream of earnings 
growth/decline). During the whole sample period from 1963 to 2013, we compare 
these managerial behaviour factors and find that proxy of managerial extrapolation 
perform at least as well as the other two behaviour factors in explaining firms’ 
dividend decisions. In addition, Chapter 5 shows that findings based on indicators of 
managerial extrapolation formed by using EPS are robust, after we use alternative 
Chapter 6    Conclusion 
266 
 
measurements of managerial extrapolation formed by using firms’ sales or free cash 
flow to replace indicators based on EPS.  
In summary, this thesis provides evidence that managerial extrapolation of past 
earnings performance into the future can affect managers’ dividend decisions. This 
influence may be trial (see DeAngelo et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion on 
behaviour factors in explaining dividend policy) but significant and robust during 
in-sample period from 1963 to 2000 and out-of-sample period from 2001 to 2013, 
when it is compared with two other types of variables which represent managers’ 
catering incentive to investors and managerial overconfidence, respectively. 
Managerial extrapolation can be used to explain several payout policy’s 
phenomenon including sharp dividend’s decline around 1978, dividend’s 
reappearance around 2002 and fluctuation in the percentage of firms who 
initiate/continue/increase/pay/omit/decrease dividends.  
This thesis develops the hypothesis about the influence of managerial 
extrapolation on managers’ dividend decisions. Based on the methodology of Fama 
and French (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2004a), we provide large amount of 
empirical evidence in this thesis to support the hypothesis. However, there is still 
plenty of relevant and worthwhile further research being conducted. For example, 
this thesis does not extend the analysis to include some other possible dividend 
policy’s determinants including firms’ lifecycle, firms’ leverage and firms’ liquidity 
(see DeAngelo et al., 2006; Baker et al., 2001; Banerjee et al., 2007)24. This thesis 
does not investigate the causes and components of different managerial 
overconfidence, or it does not discusses further on mixed results of managerial 
overconfidence on firms’ payout policy. There may be other better methods to 
                                                        
24 We roughly test the robustness of our indicators of managerial extrapolation when these 
factors are controlled, and our main conclusions hold. However, we do not show and discuss it in 
this thesis. 
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evaluate managerial extrapolation into the future, but these will be left for further 
research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 3.1 Firm-specific variables 
Firm-specific variables 
Variable name Definition Literature 
BE Book equity is Stockholder’s Equity (DATA216) minus Preferred Stock (DATA10) plus Deferred 
Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (TXDITC) minus Postretirement Benefit Asset (PRBA). If 
Stockholder’s Equity (DATA216) is not available, it is replaced by either Common Equity 
(DATA60) plus Preferred Stock (DATA130), or Total Assets (AT) minus Liabilities (DATA181). If 
Preferred Stock (DATA10) is not available, it is replaced by either Preferred Stock Redemption 
Value (DATA56), or Preferred Stock Carrying Value (DATA130). 
Same as Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a) 
ME Market equity at fiscal year-end (DATA199) times common shares outstanding (DATA25). We 
follow Baker and Wurgler (2004a) to compute the dividend premium using ME at calendar year-end, 
and use ME at fiscal year-end to compute firm characteristic. 
Same as Fama and 
French (2001), and 
Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a) 
NYP Stock exchange percentile is stock market capitalization percentile. It is equal to the percentage of 
firms having smaller capitalization than firms in all NYSE in fiscal year t. We apply NYSE’s 
breakpoints to classify firm size in AMEX and NASDAQ market. 
Same to Fama and 
French (2001) 
M/B Market-to-book ratio is book assets (AT) minus book equity plus market equity all divided by book 
assets (AT). 
Same as Fama and 
French (2001), and 
Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a) 
∆A/A Asset growth is increase rate of assets (AT) from fiscal year t-1 to year t. Same as Fama and 
French (2001), and 
Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a) 
E/A Profitability is income before extraordinary items (DATA18) plus interest expense (DATA15) plus 
deferred taxes (TXDI) divided by total assets (AT). 
Same as Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a) 
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Appendix 3.1 (continue) 
Sys risk Systematic risk is the standard deviation of the predicted value from a conventional CAPM for a 
firm. 
Same as Hoberg 
and Prabhala 
(2009) 
Idi risk Idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the residuals from a conventional CAPM for a firm. Same as Hoberg 
and Prabhala 
(2009) 
𝑽𝑾 𝑷𝒕
𝑫−𝑵𝑫 Book-value-weighted dividend premium is the difference in log of book-value-weighted total 
market-to-book ratio (M/B) for dividend payers and the log of this ratio for nonpayers in the calendar 
year t. The market value in calculating M/B here is the fiscal year end market value. 
Same as Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a) 
 , , , ,
1 1
 P log ( ) log ( )
m n
D ND payer non payer
i t i t i tt i t
i i
M M
VW
B B
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
where 
,i t  is the book-value-weight for Payer i in year t, and ωi,t is the book-value-weight for Payer 
i in year t.  
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Appendix 3.2 EPS-related variables 
Variable name Definition 
EPSG(1-5) Dummy of strong 5-year increase in EPS: If a firm’s EPS (EPSPX) has kept 
non-decreasing from year lag_6 to year lag_1 (non-decreasing year by year) 
for total 5 years, it is defined as the one with 5-year stable EPS increase. Its 
value is 1, if conditions above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6
,
1   
1 5
0                                                                                    
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t
if EPS EPS EPS EPS EPS EPS
EPSG
if otherwis
         
  

 
 
 EPSG(1-3) Dummy of strong 3-year increase in EPS: If a firm’s EPS has kept at least 
non-decreasing from year lag_4 to year lag_1 (non-decreasing year by year) 
for total for 3 years, it is defined as the one with 3-year stable EPS increase. 
Its value is 1, if conditions above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
,
1   
1 3
0                                                  
i t i t i t i t
i t
if EPS EPS EPS EPS
EPSG
if otherwise
     
  

 
 
 EPSG(1,5) Dummy of general 5-year increase in EPS: If a firm’s EPS in year lag_6 is 
less than its value in year lag_1, it is defined as the one with an general EPS 
increase from year lag_6 to year lag_1. The increase could be fluctuating, but 
it should be an increase in total. Its value is 1, if conditions above could be 
satisfied, otherwise 0. 
 , 1 , 6
,
1   
1,5
0                 
i t i t
i t
if EPS EPS
EPSG
if otherwise
 
 

 
 
 EPSG(1,3) Dummy of general 3-year increase in EPS: If a firm’s EPS (EPSPX) in year 
lag_4 is less than its value in year lag_1, it is defined as the one with an 
general EPS increase from year lag_4 to year lag_1. The increase could be 
fluctuating, but it should be an increase in total. Its value is 1, if conditions 
above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
 , 1 , 4
,
1   
1,3
0                 
i t i t
i t
if EPS EPS
EPSG
if otherwise
 
 

 
 
 EPSG (1-5) Dummy of strong 5-year decrease in EPS: If a firm’s EPS (EPSPX) has kept 
decreasing from year lag_6 to year lag_1 (decreasing year by year) for total 5 
years, it is defined as the one with 5-year stable EPS decrease. Its value is 1, if 
conditions above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6
,
1   
1 5
0                                                                                    
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t
if EPS EPS EPS EPS EPS EPS
EPSG
if otherwis
         
  

 
 
 EPSG (1-3) Dummy of strong 3-year decrease in EPS: If a firm’s EPS has kept at least 
decreasing from year lag_4 to year lag_1 (decreasing year by year) for total 
for 3 years, it is defined as the one with 3-year stable EPS decrease. Its value 
is 1, if conditions above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
,
1   
1 3
0                                                  
i t i t i t i t
i t
if EPS EPS EPS EPS
EPSG
if otherwise
     
  

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Appendix 3.2 (continue) 
EPSD(1,5) Dummy of general 5-year decrease in EPS: If a firm’s EPS in year lag_6 is 
less than its value in year lag_1, it is defined as the one with a general EPS 
decrease from year lag_6 to year lag_1. The decrease could be fluctuating, 
but it should be a decrease in total. Its value is 1, if conditions above could be 
satisfied, otherwise 0. 
 , 1 , 6
,
1   
1,5
0                 
i t i t
i t
if EPS EPS
EPSG
if otherwise
 
 

 
 
 EPSD(1,3) Dummy of general 3-year decrease in EPS: If a firm’s EPS (EPSPX) in year 
lag_4 is less than its value in year lag_1, it is defined as the one with a general 
EPS decrease from year lag_4 to year lag_1. The decrease could be 
fluctuating, but it should be a decrease in total. Its value is 1, if conditions 
above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
 
, 1 , 4
,
1   
1,3
0                 
i t i t
i t
if EPS EPS
EPSG
if otherwise
 
 

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Appendix 3.3 Payout status variables 
Variable name Definition Literature 
Payer A firm is a dividend payer in fiscal year t if it has positive dividends per share by the ex-date 
(DATA26) in fiscal year t. If a firm is a payer in fiscal year t as defined above, its value is 1 for 
this variable, otherwise it is 0. 
Same as Fama and 
French (2001), and 
Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a) 
Nonpayer A firm is a nonpayer if it does not have positive dividends per share by the ex-date (DATA26) 
in the fiscal year t.25 
Same as Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a) 
Newpayer A firm is a new payer if it was a non-payer in fiscal year t-1 (survived non-payer in year t-1), but 
it becomes a payer in fiscal year t. If a firm is a new payer in fiscal year t as defined above, it 
equals to 1, otherwise it equals to 0. 
Same as Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a) 
 
, , , 1   (1 - )i t i t i tnewpayer payer payer    
 
Divcontinue Divcontinue represents a firm who was a dividend payer in fiscal year t-1, and it continues to be 
a payer in fiscal year t. If a firm is a divcontinue as defined above, it equals to 1, otherwise it 
equals to 0. 
Same as Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a) 
 
, , , 1   i t i t i tdivcontinue payer payer    
 
Divincrease Divincrease represents a firm who was a dividend payer in fiscal year t-1, and it increases its 
dividend payment (DATA26) in fiscal year t. If a firm is a divincrease as defined above, it 
equals to 1, otherwise it equals to 0. 
 
 
, , 1
,
1   26 26
0                             
i t i t
i t
if DATA DATA
Divincrease
if otherwise





 
 
   
                                                        
25 The same as the definition given by Baker and Wurgler (2004a), a firm is a nonpayer, if it is not a payer at year t. 
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Appendix 3.3 (continue) 
Divomission Divomission represents a firm who was a dividend payer in fiscal year t-1, but it becomes a 
nonpayer in fiscal year t. If a firm is a divomission as defined above, it equals to 1, otherwise it 
equals to 0. 
 
 
, , , 1 (1- )  i t i t i tdivomission payer payer    
 
Divdecrease Divdecrease represents a firm who was a dividend payer in fiscal year t-1, and it decreases its 
dividend payment in fiscal year t. If a firm is a divdecrease as defined above, it equals to 1, 
otherwise it equals to 0. 
 
 
, , 1
,
1   26 26
0                            
i t i t
i t
if DATA DATA
Divdecrease
if otherwise

 

 
 
   
S5newpayer Strong new payer S5newpayer is a firm that did not pay dividends over past 5 years, but 
becomes a dividend payer in fiscal year t. Specifically, a strong new payers S5newpayer is 
defined as: 
 
 
5
, , ,
1
5    (1 )i t i t i t k
k
S newpayer newpayer payer 

    
 
 
 
S3newpayer Strong new payer S3newpayer is a firm that did not pay dividends over past 3 years, but 
becomes a dividend payers in fiscal year t. Specifically, a strong new payers S3newpayer is 
defined as: 
 
 
3
, , ,
1
3    (1 )i t i t i t k
k
S newpayer newpayer payer 

    
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Appendix 5.1 Firm-specific variables 
 
Variable name Definition Literature 
Sales Sales equals to total sales (SALE) divided by property, plants, and equipment (PPENT) at 
the end of last fiscal year/ 
Same as Lakonishok, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1994) 
FCF FCF is a firm’s free cash flow which equals to operating income before depreciation 
(OIBDP) minus depreciation (DP), income tax (TXT), interest and related expense (XINT), 
and preferred dividends (DVP) all divided by total asset (AT). 
Similar to Kulchania, but we 
add common dividends 
(DVC) back 
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Appendix 5.2 Alternative indicators of firms’ past performance 
 Variable name Definition 
SaleG(1-5) Dummy of strong 5-year increase in sales: If a firm’s sales 
(SALE/𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1) has kept non-decreasing from fiscal year t-6 to fiscal year 
t-1 (non-decreasing year by year) for total 5 years, it is defined as the one with 
5-year stable sales increase in fiscal year t. Its value is 1, if conditions above 
could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6
,
1   
(1 5)
0                                                                                    
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t
if sales sales sales sales sales sales
SALEG
if otherwis
         
  

 
 
   SaleG(1-3) Dummy of strong 3-year increase in sales: If a firm’s sales has kept at least 
non-decreasing from fiscal year t-4 to fiscal year t-1 (non-decreasing year by 
year) for total for 3 years, it is defined as the one with 3-year stable sales 
increase in fiscal year t. Its value is 1, if conditions above could be satisfied, 
otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
,
1   
(1 3)
0                                                  
i t i t i t i t
i t
if sales sales sales sales
SALEG
if otherwise
     
  

 
 
   SaleG(1,5) Dummy of general 5-year increase in sales: If a firm’s sales in fiscal year t-6 
is less than its value in fiscal year t-1, it is defined as the one with an general 
sales increase from fiscal year t-6 to fiscal year t-1. The increase could be 
fluctuating, but it should be an increase in total. Its value is 1, if conditions 
above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 6
,
1   
(1,5)
0                 
i t i t
i t
if sales sales
SALEG
if otherwise
 
 

 
 
   SaleG(1,3) Dummy of general 3-year increase in sales: If a firm’s sales in fiscal year t-4 
is less than its value in fiscal year t-1, it is defined as the one with an general 
sales increase from fiscal year t-4 to fiscal year t-1. The increase could be 
fluctuating, but it should be an increase in total. Its value is 1, if conditions 
above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 4
,
1   
(1,3)
0                 
i t i t
i t
if sales sales
EPSG
if otherwise
 
 

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Appendix 5.2 (continue) 
SaleD (1-5) Dummy of strong 5-year decrease in sales: If a firm’s sales has kept 
decreasing from fiscal year t-6 to fiscal year t-1 (decreasing year by year) for 
total 5 years, it is defined as the one with 5-year stable sales decrease in fiscal 
year t. Its value is 1, if conditions above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6
,
1   
(1 5)
0                                                                                    
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t
if sales sales sales sales sales sales
SALED
if otherwis
         
  

 
 
   SaleD (1-3) Dummy of strong 3-year decrease in sales: If a firm’s sales has kept at least 
decreasing from fiscal year t-4 to fiscal year t-1 (decreasing year by year) for 
total for 3 years, it is defined as the one with 3-year stable sales decrease in 
fiscal year t. Its value is 1, if conditions above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
,
1   
(1 3)
0                                                  
i t i t i t i t
i t
if sales sales sales sales
SALED
if otherwise
     
  

 
 
 
   SaleD(1,5) Dummy of general 5-year decrease in sales: If a firm’s sales in fiscal year t-6 
is less than its value in fiscal year t-1, it is defined as the one with a general 
sales decrease from fiscal year t-6 to fiscal year t-1. The decrease could be 
fluctuating, but it should be a decrease in total. Its value is 1, if conditions 
above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 6
,
1   
(1,5)
0                 
i t i t
i t
if sales sales
SALED
if otherwise
 
 

 
 
   SaleD(1,3) Dummy of general 3-year decrease in sales: If a firm’s sales in fiscal year t-4 
is less than its value in fiscal year t-1, it is defined as the one with a general 
sales decrease from fiscal year t-4 to fiscal year t-1. The decrease could be 
fluctuating, but it should be a decrease in total. Its value is 1, if conditions 
above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 4
,
1   
(1,3)
0                 
i t i t
i t
if sales sales
SALED
if otherwise
 
 

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Appendix 5.2 (continue) 
  
FCFG(1-5) Dummy of strong 5-year increase in sales: If a firm’s FCF 
((OIBDP-DP-TXT-XINT-DVP)/AT) has kept non-decreasing from fiscal year 
t-6 to fiscal year t-1 (non-decreasing year by year) for total 5 years, it is 
defined as the one with 5-year stable sales increase in fiscal year t. Its value is 
1, if conditions above could be satisfied, otherwise 0.  
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6
,
1   
(1 5)
0                                                                                    
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t
if FCF FCF FCF FCF FCF FCF
FCFG
if otherwis
         
  

 
 
   FCFG(1-3) Dummy of strong 3-year increase in FCF: If a firm’s FCF has kept at least 
non-decreasing from fiscal year t-4 to fiscal year t-1 (non-decreasing year by 
year) for total for 3 years, it is defined as the one with 3-year stable FCF 
increase in fiscal year t. Its value is 1, if conditions above could be satisfied, 
otherwise 0. 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
,
1   
(1 3)
0                                                  
i t i t i t i t
i t
if FCF FCF FCF FCF
FCFG
if otherwise
     
  

 
 
   FCFG(1,5) Dummy of general 5-year increase in FCF: If a firm’s FCF in fiscal year t-6 
is less than its value in fiscal year t-1, it is defined as the one with an general 
FCF increase from fiscal year t-6 to fiscal year t-1. The increase could be 
fluctuating, but it should be an increase in total. Its value is 1, if conditions 
above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 6
,
1   
(1,5)
0                 
i t i t
i t
if FCF FCF
FCFG
if otherwise
 
 

 
 
   FCFG(1,3) Dummy of general 3-year increase in FCF: If a firm’s FCF in fiscal year t-4 
is less than its value in fiscal year t-1, it is defined as the one with an general 
FCF increase from fiscal year t-4 to fiscal year t-1. The increase could be 
fluctuating, but it should be an increase in total. Its value is 1, if conditions 
above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 4
,
1   
(1,3)
0                 
i t i t
i t
if FCF FCF
FCFG
if otherwise
 
 

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Appendix 5.2 (continue) 
FCFD (1-5) Dummy of strong 5-year decrease in FCF: If a firm’s FCF has kept 
decreasing from fiscal year t-6 to fiscal year t-1 (decreasing year by year) for 
total 5 years, it is defined as the one with 5-year stable FCF decrease in fiscal 
year t. Its value is 1, if conditions above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6
,
1   
(1 5)
0                                                                                    
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t
if FCF FCF FCF FCF FCF FCF
FCFD
if otherwis
         
  

 
 
   FCFD (1-3) Dummy of strong 3-year decrease in FCF: If a firm’s FCF has kept at least 
decreasing from fiscal year t-4 to fiscal year t-1 (decreasing year by year) for 
total for 3 years, it is defined as the one with 3-year stable FCF decrease in 
fiscal year t. Its value is 1, if conditions above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
,
1   
(1 3)
0                                                  
i t i t i t i t
i t
if FCF FCF FCF FCF
FCFD
if otherwise
     
  

 
 
 
   FCFD(1,5) Dummy of general 5-year decrease in FCF: If a firm’s FCF in fiscal year t-6 
is less than its value in fiscal year t-1, it is defined as the one with a general 
FCF decrease from fiscal year t-6 to fiscal year t-1. The decrease could be 
fluctuating, but it should be a decrease in total. Its value is 1, if conditions 
above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 6
,
1   
(1,5)
0                 
i t i t
i t
if FCF FCF
FCFD
if otherwise
 
 

 
 
   FCFD(1,3) Dummy of general 3-year decrease in FCF: If a firm’s FCF in fiscal year t-4 
is less than its value in fiscal year t-1, it is defined as the one with a general 
FCF decrease from fiscal year t-4 to fiscal year t-1. The decrease could be 
fluctuating, but it should be a decrease in total. Its value is 1, if conditions 
above could be satisfied, otherwise 0. 
, 1 , 4
,
1   
(1,3)
0                 
i t i t
i t
if FCF FCF
FCFD
if otherwise
 
 

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Appendix 5.3 Alternative measurements for managerial overconfidence 
Firm-specific variables 
Variable name Definition Literature 
Highopt A firm’s Highopt CEO should hold higher than 100% in-the-money options. The moneyness of an 
option for a Highopt CEO is calculated as the unit value of unexercised exercisable options 
(OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL/OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM) divided by the average exercise price 
(PRCC_F-(OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL/OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM)). A CEO can only be 
defined as Highopt one when he (she) shows at least twice such option-holding activities during 
the sample period (recorded as Highopt CEO from the first time). 
Same as Campbell et 
al. (2011) 
Lowopt A firm’s Lowopt CEO should exercise lower than 30% in-the-money options. The moneyness of 
an option for a Lowopt CEO is calculated as the unit value of exercised options 
(OPT_EXER_VAL/OPT_EXER_NUM) divided by the average exercise price 
(PRCC_F-(OPT_EXER_VAL/OPT_EXER_NUM)). A CEO can only be defined as Highopt one 
when he(she) shows at least twice such option-holding activities during the sample period 
(recorded as Highopt CEO from the first time), and does not hold any unexercised exercisable 
option which is more than 30% in-the-money. The function of calculating moneyness of 
unexercised exercisable option is above in Highopt. 
Same as Campbell et 
al. (2011) 
Highinvest A firm with Highinvest CEO should have investment rate which is at the top quintile of firms in the 
same industry for at least two consecutive years. The investment rate is calculated as capital 
expenditure (CAPX) divided by property, plants, and equipment (PPENT) at last fiscal year end. 
Same as Campbell et 
al. (2011) 
Lowinvest A firm with Lowinvest CEO should have investment rate which is at the bottom quintile of firms in 
the same industry for at least two consecutive years. The investment rate is calculated as capital 
expenditure (CAPX) divided by property, plants, and equipment (PPENT) at last fiscal year end. 
Same as Campbell et 
al. (2011) 
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Appendix 5.3 (continue) 
Highnet A firm’s Highnet CEO should increase his (her) shares owned excluding options 
(SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS) on this firm by more than 10% from last fiscal year to current fiscal 
year, and also is ranked at the top quintile among all CEO in this increase rate of shares owned. We 
exclude the first time when this classification appears, and repeat the analysis. 
 
Similar to Campbell 
et al. (2011), but we 
use shares owned 
excluding options to 
proxy for CEO’s 
net-buying activities. 
 
Lownet A firm’s Lownet CEO should decrease his (her) shares owned excluding options 
(SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS) on this firm by more than 10% from last fiscal year to current fiscal 
year, and also is ranked at the bottom quintile among all CEO in this increase rate of shares owned. 
We exclude the first time when this classification appears, and repeat the analysis. 
Similar to Campbell 
et al. (2011), but we 
use shares owned 
excluding options to 
proxy for CEO’s 
net-buying activities. 
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